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Abstract 
 
This study has four (4) broad objectives. The first objective is to investigate whether 
politically connected (PCON) firms pay higher audit fees than non-PCON firms. The 
second objective is to examine the moderating effect of political connections (PCON versus 
non-PCON) on the association between the internal governance mechanisms, specifically, 
audit committee (AC) and internal audit functions (IAF), and audit fees. The third objective 
is to investigate whether high regulated firms (HRFs) pay higher audit fees than less 
regulated firms (LRFs). The fourth objective is to examine the moderating effect of 
regulatory oversight (HRF versus LRF) on the association between the above mentioned 
internal governance mechanisms and audit fees.  
 
This study is conducted in the Malaysian corporate setting that is unique due to the high 
involvement of the government in business (resulting in significantly high political 
connectedness with businesses) and the stringent regulatory oversight by the Central Bank 
of Malaysia (Bank Negara Malaysia) on financial institutions. In addition, the Bursa 
Malaysia revised its Listing Requirements to enhance the internal governance mechanisms 
in 2008, thus providing an opportunity to examine the audit fees issue from the demand 
side perspective both for the PCON firms and the HRFs.    
 
This research draws from three theories, namely, the agency theory, political embeddedness 
perspective and institutional theory, to form the framework and develop the hypotheses to 
be examined.  
 
Six (6) hypotheses are developed and tested, using data from 209 sample firms from years 
2005 to 2009, that are before and after the revision of the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements in 2008 (BMLR 2008). The data were collected from the firms‟ annual 
reports and DataStream. In addition, interviews were conducted with selected external 
auditors, heads of the internal auditors and regulators that ascertain the existence of the 
demand side explanation for the audit fees.  
  
      
This study is important as it provides additional knowledge about the impact of the revised 
BMLR 2008 on AC characteristics and IAF attributes for PCON firms since most prior 
research was conducted before 2008. Specifically, it is evidenced that PCON firms have 
higher audit fees due to improved internal governance mechanisms which demand for 
increase in audit effort. Further, this study also provides support that HRFs firms have 
higher audit fees than LRFs due to the existence of an  industry-specific regulator, over and 
above the capital market regulator, which requires more audit effort thus, increase in audit 
fees. As such, this study provides evidence and implications for regulators and others 
concerned with establishing guidelines and listing rules pertaining to internal governance 
mechanisms in an institutional context such as Malaysia.  
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Abstrak 
 
Kajian ini mempunyai empat (4) objektif umum. Objektif yang pertama adalah untuk 
menyiasat sama ada firma terkait politik (TKP) membayar yuran audit yang lebih tinggi 
berbanding dengan firma tak terkait politik (TTKP). Objektif kedua adalah untuk meneliti 
kesan moderat yang ditunjukkan oleh pertalian politik (TKP lawan TTKP) terhadap 
perkaitan antara mekanisme-mekanisme tadbir urus dalaman, khususnya jawatankuasa 
audit (JA) dan jawatankuasa audit dalaman (JAD), dengan yuran audit. Objektif ketiga 
adalah untuk menyiasat sama ada firma yang amat dikawal (FAD) membayar yuran audit 
yang lebih tinggi berbanding dengan firma yang kurang dikawal (FKD). Objektif keempat 
adalah untuk meneliti kesan moderat yang ditunjukkan oleh pemerhatian kawal selia (FAD 
lawan FKD) terhadap perkaitan antara mekanisme-mekanisme tadbir urus dalaman yang 
disebutkan tadi dengan yuran audit.  
 
Kajian ini dijalankan dalam persekitaran korporat di Malaysia yang tersendiri hasil 
daripada penglibatan aktif oleh pihak kerajaan dalam perniagaan (yang menyebabkan 
keberkaitan politik yang tinggi dalam pelbagai perniagaan) dan pemerhatian kawal selia 
yang ketat oleh Bank Negara Malaysia ke atas instituti-institusi kewangan. Tambahan lagi, 
pada tahun 2008, Bursa Malaysia menyemak semula Keperluan Penyenaraian untuk 
mempertingkatkan mekanisme tadbir urus dalaman, lalu membuka ruang untuk meneliti isu 
yuran audit dari perspektif sudut permintaan bagi firma TKP and FAD. 
 
Kajian ini bertitik tolak daripada tiga teori, iaitu teori agensi, teori perspektif ketersiratan 
politik, dan teori institusi untuk membentuk rangka kerja dan membangunkan hipotesis 
untuk diteliti.  
             
Enam (6) hipotesis dibina dan diuji dengan menggunakan data daripada 209 firma sampel 
daripada tahun 2005 hingga 2009, iaitu sebelum dan selepas semakan semula terhadap 
Keperluan Penyenaraian Bursa Malaysia pada tahun 2008 (KPBM 2008). Data dikumpul 
daripada laporan tahunan firma dan DataStream. Lebih lanjut lagi, temuduga dijalankan 
dengan auditor luar, ketua auditor dalaman, dan pengawal selia terpilih yang mengesahkan 
wujudnya penjelasan tentang sudut permintaan bagi yuran audit tersebut. 
 
Kajian ini penting kerana ia memberi pengetahuan tambahan berkenaan kesan semakan 
semula KPBM 2008 terhadap ciri-ciri JA dan sifat-sifat JAD terhadap firma TKP 
memandangkan kebanyakan kajian yang lebih awal dijalankan sebelum tahun 2008 lagi. 
Lebih khusus lagi, ia membuktikan bahawa firma TKP dikenakan yuran audit yang lebih 
tinggi yang disebabkan oleh penambah-baikan mekanisme tadbir urus dalam yang 
memerlukan usaha mengaudit yang lebih mendalam. Selanjutnya, kajian ini juga 
menyokong bahawa firma TKP dikenakan yuran audit yang lebih tinggi berbanding TTKP 
kerana wujudnya pengawal selia yang khusus bagi sesuatu industri, di samping pengawal 
selia pasaran modal, yang memerlukan usaha pengauditan yang lebih mendalam yang 
menyebabkan meningkatnya yuran audit. Oleh yang demikian, kajian ini memberi bukti 
dan implikasi kepada pengawal selia dan mereka yang berkaitan dengan mengeluarkan 
garis panduan dan peraturan penyenaraian yang berkaitan dengan mekanisme tadbir urus 
dalaman dalam konteks institusi seperti di Malaysia. 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the research study. It discusses the background of this 
study, followed by the motivation, research objectives and research questions of this study. 
It briefly explains the research methodology, theoretical framework, hypotheses 
development and research model. Further, a summary of the research findings is provided, 
followed by a discussion on the significance of the study. Finally, the chapter narrates the 
organisation of this thesis. 
 
1.2 Background of Study 
Malaysia has made significant progress in developing an efficient and well-regulated 
capital and financial market, as well as strengthening the institutional framework for the 
regulation of the accounting and auditing profession (World Bank, 2012). Good progress 
has been achieved in improving the quality and consistency of corporate financial reporting 
and corporate governance (CG) for listed firms. The importance of good governance and 
the need to raise CG standards were recognised since the 1997 Asian financial crisis which 
highlighted the need for strong CG practices. The Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange‟s (now 
Bursa Malaysia) joint survey
1
 with Price Waterhouse Coopers in 1998 found that 94 
percent of the surveyed firms agreed that the Malaysia‟s CG regime required reformation 
particularly in addressing issues of investors‟ confidence, minority shareholders protection 
and transparency in directors‟ dealings.  
 
                                                 
1 KLSE/Price Waterhouse Coopers‟ survey was to improve corporate governance framework and to ensure firms apply the 
highest possible standard of „best practices‟. 
2 
 
The World Bank had conducted three (3) assessments on the observance of CG codes in 
Malaysia since 2001 (World Bank, 2001; 2005 and 2012). In the 2005 Report, it was 
observed that Malaysia faced several challenges to further improve its corporate 
governance practices. Amongst these challenges, the government's level of equity 
ownership had remained large, whilst free float remained low and directors' accountability 
and protection for minority shareholders were noted to require further improvement. In 
addition, the role of institutional investors and shareholder activism in the corporate 
governance framework need to be strengthened (World Bank, 2005). 
 
Following the 2001 and 2005 World Bank Reports, the corporate governance landscape in 
Malaysia transformed significantly as firms accentuated their corporate governance efforts.  
For instance, the Bursa Malaysia introduced Corporate Governance Initiatives to raise the 
standards of corporate governance practices among listed firms, and the minority 
shareholders watchdog group (MSWG) introduced a Malaysian Corporate Governance 
Index to promote best practices in CG among listed firms in 2009. This is supported further 
when Malaysian firms with concentrated ownership produced better accounting results 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Malaysia was also ranked 6th (among 11 Asian countries) in 
terms of Corporate Governance quality in Corporate Governance Watch 2007
2
 (ACGA, 
2007) and has improved to rank 4th in 2012 (ACGA, 2012). 
 
In 2007 the Securities Commission (SC) released the revised code of corporate governance 
to further strengthen Malaysia‟s corporate governance framework, aligning it with the then 
current globally accepted best practices. The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
                                                 
2 This report was produced in collaboration between the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and an independent non-
profit organisation in Hong Kong. 
3 
 
(MCCG, Revised 2007), which superseded the earlier Code issued in March 2000, contains 
recommendations aimed to strengthen the roles and responsibilities of boards of directors 
and audit committees so as to ensure that they discharge their duties effectively. 
Subsequently, the newly amended regulations under Section 9 of the Capital Markets and 
Services Act 2007 (CMSA) and the revamped Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 
(BMLR) in 2008 called for increased interaction between the internal governance 
mechanisms of audit committee and internal audit function.  
 
The oversight duties of an audit committee as prescribed by the BMLR 2008 include 
reviewing the audit plan with the external auditor; reviewing the audit report; ensuring the 
adequacy of the scope, functions and resources of the internal audit function and reviewing 
the internal audit program. In fulfilling the internal audit oversight function, internal 
auditors perform analyses and appraisals of activities to make recommendations for 
improving internal controls and promoting efficiency. Clearly, the interactions amongst 
these key players are important to achieve effective governance in a firm.  
 
1.2.1 Level of Audit Fees 
The World Bank Report on Observance of Standards and Codes (2012) highlights that there 
is anecdotal evidence that suggests that generally the audit fees charged in Malaysia are low 
when compared with other ASEAN member countries (World Bank, 2012, p.4). The Report 
further elaborates that the reasons for this reflect the price-competitive environment in 
which the audit profession has been operating in and the relatively low salaries paid to 
accounting professionals in Malaysia (particularly when compared with Singapore). The 
Report suggests that it is not uncommon for decisions on hiring auditors to be based 
4 
 
primarily on the audit fee level. The concern raised by the World Bank is that over time this 
practice could have a significant impact on audit quality and potentially damage the 
reputation of the Malaysian audit profession as a whole. 
 
The World Bank team acknowledges that the regulators are aware of this issue, and that the 
Audit Oversight Board (AOB) has also raised concerns about price-based competition at a 
time when audit firms are incurring additional costs to meet higher-quality standards. 
Measures are taken to address the matter. The World Bank report also notes that the 
regulators are putting significant efforts into providing education to directors and ensuring 
the governing bodies (particularly audit committees) to properly balance considerations of 
audit quality with the level of audit fees in appointment decisions. In addition, banks and 
insurance firms are required to obtain prior approval from Bank Negara Malaysia on an 
annual basis on the appointment of auditors. Further, the Audit Oversight Board (AOB) is 
working with other stakeholders in enhancing audit quality, including addressing the issue 
of audit fees. Its importance is linked to the ability of accounting firms to be able to attract 
and retain talent and pay competitive remuneration. The World Bank Report issued in 
February 2012 suggests that a review of the legislation and regulations governing auditors 
should be conducted with the overarching goal of supporting high-quality audits within a 
framework of free and open market competition. It is believed that this process is currently 
ongoing. This study (which focuses on the audit fee phenomenon in Malaysia) is timely in 
response to the concerns raised by the World Bank Report 2012 regarding the low audit 
fees in Malaysia.  
 
 
5 
 
1.2.2      Supply and Demand Perspectives in Audit Fees 
Audit fees may be examined from the supply or demand perspectives. The supply 
perspective posits that external auditors are able to reduce the external audit testing and 
consequently audit fees if the internal governance mechanism serves as a substitute to the 
external auditors in monitoring the management. However, if the external auditors perceive 
the audited client as having higher audit risks, they are expected to expend more audit effort 
hence leading to higher audit fees. 
 
On the other hand, the demand perspective holds that if the internal governance mechanism 
complements the work performed by the external auditors, higher audit fees will be charged 
to the audit client because the internal governance mechanism will demand more audit 
procedures from the external auditor in order to avoid material misstatements in financial 
reporting.  
 
According to Griffin, Lont and Sun (2008), the relations between corporate governance and 
audit fees can be explained through the demand and supply perspectives. Whereby, (1) 
there is an increase in audit fees because auditing services provide a mean to attain better 
governance, and (2) there is a decrease in audit fees due to auditors incorporating the 
benefits of better governance when pricing their services. Their results suggest that better 
governance reduces the cost of auditing. This is because better governance enhances the 
quality of financial statements and internal controls, which reduces the audit risk and 
consequently audit fees.  
 
 
6 
 
1.2.2.1  Political Connections 
As observed in the World Bank Report in 2005, the high level of government equity 
ownership was then seen as a challenge in enhancing good corporate governance in 
Malaysia. Several corporate governance studies prior to 2007 had investigated the 
government-linked firms
3
, and found firms with political connections to be more risky. 
Politically connected firms are firms identified as having political connections with key 
government officials (see Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Mohamad, 
Hassan and Chen, 2006; Abdul Wahab, Mat Zain, James and Haron, 2009) [in this study 
government-linked firms with political connections are collectively referred to as politically 
connected firms or PCON firms]. Firms other than PCON firms can be categorised into 
institutional and managerial (INST&MGRL) ownership structured firms and family-owned 
(FAMILY) firms. In this current study, they are collectively referred to as non-PCON 
firms. While, there is consensus in the extant literature that PCON firms differ from other 
types of ownership structured firms (Faccio, 2010), there is limited empirical evidence on 
the impact of corporate governance reforms between these two groups.   
 
Malaysian PCON firms are said to be favoured firms (Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Gul, 2006; 
Johnson and Mitton, 2003), which makes Malaysia an interesting case study. According to 
Gomez and Jomo (1999), the purpose of having favoured firms is to reduce equity 
ownership imbalance between the various ethnic groups by increasing Bumiputra
4
 equity 
ownership in the capital market.  
 
                                                 
3 Government-linked firms are defined as firms that have a primary commercial objective and in which the Malaysian Government has a 
direct controlling stake through Khazanah, Ministry of Finance (MOF), Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (KWAP), and Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM) [Putrajaya Committee GLC (PCG) high performance, (2007)] 
4 Bumiputra means in Malay “sons of the soil”. It refers to Malays and other indigenous people as distinct from Chinese, Indians, and 
other non-indigenous residents. 
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Studies conducted prior to MCCG 2007 [Johnson and Mitton, 2003 (study period 1990-
1999); Fraser, Zhang and Derasid, 2006 (study period 1990-1999); Faccio, Masulis and 
McConell, 2006 (study period 1997-2002); Gul, 2006 (study period 1996-1998); Yatim, 
Kent and Clarkson, 2006 (study period-2003); Abdul Wahab, Mat Zain and James, 2011 
(study period 2001-2003); Bliss and Gul, 2012 (study period 2001-2004)] show that  PCON 
firms were perceived by the market and the external auditors to be riskier than non-PCON 
firms and as such were imposed with higher audit fees. A recent study by Bliss and Gul 
(2012) shows that PCON firms are perceived as being of higher risk due to higher extend of 
leverage. Such perceptions in turn are expected to increase monitoring costs leading to 
higher audit fees.  
 
Further, political connection draws on the concept of political embeddedness
5
 which is 
divided into two strands of benefits and costs. First, it explains a firm‟s direct ties to the 
government which provide opportunities to obtain valuable advice and facilitate access to 
government resources (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Secondly, the government tends to pursue its 
own political or socio-economic goals and abuses its power to divert the firm‟s resources to 
achieve the government‟s goals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). The government may also 
promote strategies to maximise its own interests which may diverge from those of the firm 
and its shareholders. In Malaysia, the issue of PCON firms is more crucial as they are also 
perceived to be firms favoured by the government. 
 
As PCON firms are generally perceived to exhibit poor corporate governance, greater 
agency problems (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009), and more risk (Gul, 2006), prior studies had 
drawn on the supply based perspective in explaining the audit fee phenomenon. However, 
                                                 
5 Political embeddedness refers to bureaucratic, instrumental, or affective ties to the state and its actors (Michelson, 2007). 
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given the enhanced CG reforms since 2007, it is timely for a research to explore the 
explanation from the demand side by investigating the internal governance mechanisms‟ 
impact post-BMLR 2008 implementation on audit fees. Furthermore, as the enhanced CG 
practices were mandated since 2001 [as observed in the World Bank Report (2012)], there 
is a marked improvement in corporate governance and it is believed that such 
improvements would have led to the demand side explanation for audit fees to be of greater 
significance.  
 
Hence, this study examines the moderating effect of political connections on the association 
between the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes, and audit fees for PCON firms.  
 
1.2.2.2    Regulatory Oversight 
It is also noted that most prior studies on corporate governance have examined only the 
non-financial firms because financial firms were perceived to be highly regulated. 
Therefore, this study also investigates the impact of enhanced corporate governance in the 
highly regulated sector. 
 
Regulatory oversight influences corporate governance practices in organizations in the 
following ways. Regulatory oversight partially substitutes for corporate governance and 
reduces the need for extensive external audit testing in highly regulated firms (HRFs) 
which results in lower audit fees (Dunn and Mayhew, 2004; Bryan and Klein, 2005; Boo 
and Sharma, 2008). Further, close monitoring by an industry-specific regulator reduces 
information asymmetries and the level of oversight required from the corporate governance 
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mechanisms such as the boards of directors, audit committees and external auditors 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Smith and Watts, 1992; Bryan and Klein, 2005). Hence, lower 
audit fee was evidenced for highly regulated firms as compared to less regulated firms 
(LRFs) (Boo and Sharma, 2008). 
 
Bedard, Johnstone and Ettredge (2004) posit that from a governance risk perspective, the 
external auditors perceive lower client risks if the firm is subjected to a strong regulatory 
oversight function coupled with having an effective audit committee and internal audit 
functions. The external auditors will have greater assurance that the internal governance 
mechanisms are operating effectively, thus the audit effort and fees are reduced. 
 
However, according to Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan (2003), given the 
complementary effect of regulatory oversight for internal governance, independent 
directors serving on the boards of HRFs have greater incentives to protect their reputational 
capital and avoid litigation cost than those in LRFs. Further, stringent regulatory oversights 
enhance the critical role of internal governance mechanisms (Stoll, 1998; Adams and 
Mehran, 2003) and consequently increase in audit fees. In other words, as stricter 
requirements are imposed on highly regulated firms due to its industry-specific regulator, 
the boards of directors and audit committees of HRFs may demand for additional assurance 
from the firms‟ external auditors. This is because regulatory oversight demands the 
directors to discharge their governance duties. The risk of lawsuits increases if the directors 
fail to perform (Boo and Sharma, 2008). As a result, a wider scope of audit engagement by 
auditors is required causing an increase in the audit fees. 
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Questions arise as to whether corporate governance reforms can also be effective at 
enhancing the governance of highly regulated industries, particularly the banking and 
insurance firms in Malaysia which is strictly regulated by the Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM). This and other differences between highly regulated and less regulated firms have 
led to the conflicting views on the role of regulatory oversight as a substitute or 
complement for internal governance of highly regulated firms (Stoll, 1998; Adams and 
Mehran, 2003). Hence, the existence of the regulatory oversight and audit fees gaps 
arguably needs to be addressed and investigated so as to offer a better and clearer 
understanding on corporate governance issues. In addition, as will be discussed below, it is 
still unclear whether regulatory oversight moderates the relationship between the internal 
governance mechanisms and audit fees. Therefore, this study examines the moderating 
effect of regulatory oversight on the association between the said internal governance 
mechanisms and audit fees for HRFs. 
 
1.3 Research Motivations, Objectives and Research Questions 
The motivation for the present study is based on three considerations. First, there have been 
several studies concerning the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee 
characteristics and internal audit function attributes associated with higher or lower levels 
of audit fees. Similarly, there are also studies on the relationship between the said internal 
governance mechanisms and audit fees stemming from both the demand for audit services 
by the client (Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Abbott et al., 2003; Yatim et al., 2006; Carcello, 
Hermanson, Neal and Riley, 2002; Hay, Knechel and Ling, 2008) and the supply of audit 
services by the external auditor (Collier and Gregory, 1996; Felix, Gramling and Maletta, 
2001).   
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Prior studies on PCON firms have generally drawn on the supply based perspective.  
Additionally, these studies have also examined the relationships between corporate 
governance and audit fees for PCON firms before Bursa Malaysia revised its listing 
requirements in 2008 (for example, Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Gul, 2006; Yatim et al., 
2006; Eichenseher, 1995). Further, such studies on auditors also focused on auditor tenure, 
audit quality, audit risk and audit fees (Redmayne, Bradbury and Cahan, 2011; Ghosh and 
Moon, 2005; Abdul Wahab et al., 2009; Abdul Wahab, Mat Zain and James, 2011). 
However, this far no study has examined the audit fee phenomenon subsequent to the 
enhanced reforms in 2008. It is important to investigate whether the enhanced corporate 
governance rules impact the PCON and non-PCON firms differently. Therefore, this 
present research undertake this study to extend the audit fee literature by examining the 
moderating effect of political embeddedness on the association between the enhanced 
listing requirements pertaining to internal governance mechanisms and audit fees on PCON 
firms in Malaysia.  
 
Secondly, there is still mixed findings on the relationship between the internal governance 
mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and internal audit functions, and audit fees 
(Goodwin and Kent, 2006). Furthermore, in Malaysia prior studies were conducted when 
the CG environment was still in its infancy with limited enforcement. Two contrary views 
are expressed in the literature regarding the relationship between internal governance and 
audit fees. The first view holds that better internal governance will lead to lower audit fees, 
whilst the second view claims better internal governance will lead to more auditing effort 
and thus higher audit fees (Hay et al. 2008). Due to the inconclusive results, this study 
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explores these associations further and suggests that enhanced internal governance 
mechanisms in politically connected firms will lead to higher audit fees. 
 
Thirdly, there is also a call for research on the association between internal governance 
mechanisms and audit fees of firms in highly regulated industry (Cohen, Krishnamoorty 
and Wright, 2004; DeFond and Francis, 2005). Previous studies before the revision in the 
code of corporate governance and the BMLR in 2007 and 2008 respectively, were 
conducted on firms subjected to a less-regulated environment (for example Balachandran, 
2007; Yatim et al., 2006). No study to date has specifically examined the impact of the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2007 and new BMLR 2008 on highly 
regulated firms and less regulated firms.  
 
The summary of the three key motivations, research objectives and research questions for 
this study are shown in Table 1.1 on page 14. The detailed research questions are found in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.10. 
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Table 1.1:  Motivations, Research Objectives and Questions 
Motivations Research Objectives Research Questions 
 
1. No study to date on the 
impact of the revised BMLR 
2008 regarding the internal 
governance mechanisms on 
audit fees for PCON and non-
PCON firms.  
 
2. Mixed findings on the 
association between the internal 
governance mechanisms and 
audit fees. 
 
 
 
3. Limited research on the effect 
of regulatory oversight on the 
association between the internal 
governance mechanisms and 
audit fees for HRFs.  
 
 
To investigate whether PCON firms pay 
higher audit fees than non-PCON firms. 
 
Do PCON firms pay higher audit 
fees than non-PCON firms? 
 
 
 
 
 
To examine the association between the 
audit committee (AC) characteristics and 
internal audit function (IAF) attributes, 
and audit fees for PCON and non-PCON 
firms. 
 
 
To investigate whether HRFs pay higher 
audit fees than LRFs. 
 
To examine the association between the 
AC characteristics and IAF attributes, 
and audit fees for HRFs and LRFs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Is the association between AC 
characteristics and IAF attributes, 
and audit fees stronger post-
BMLR 2008 implementation for 
PCON than non-PCON firms? 
 
 
Do HRFs pay higher audit fees 
than LRFs? 
 
Is the association between AC 
characteristics and IAF attributes, 
and audit fees stronger post- 
BMLR 2008 implementation for 
HRFs than LRFs? 
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1.4 Research Methodology, Theoretical Framework, Hypotheses Development 
and Research Model 
 
This study applies a positivist research methodology that requires a quantitative research 
approach for data collection and analysis (Chua, 1986). A total of 209 firms observations 
from 2005 until 2009 are obtained prior to and post-BMLR 2008. The data is collected 
from the annual reports of sampled firms and DataStream. Interviews were conducted with 
selected external auditors, heads of the internal auditors and regulators to elicit their 
perceptions and to obtain a better understanding on the enhanced corporate governance, 
auditing process and their implications on audit fees and this is discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
The four research questions as tabulated in Table 1.1 are guided by three theories, namely 
the agency theory, political embeddedness perspective and institutional theory, to form the 
framework and to develop the hypotheses to be examined.  The agency theory advocates 
that the presence of an effective board of directors can increase the credibility of the 
financial reporting process and facilitate communication between managers, external 
auditors and internal auditors (DeZoort, 1997). Thus, effective audit committee 
characteristics will improve the corporate governance practices and higher audit fees due to 
the demand for additional assurance from the external auditors in order to safeguard their 
reputational capital (Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan, 2003). As discussed above, 
the BMLR 2008 in Malaysia has strengthened the role of the audit committee and mandated 
the internal audit function of listed firms, lending support to the importance of the agency 
theory in corporate governance. 
 
Further, there is increasing research that draws on the concept of political embeddedness 
capturing “bureaucratic, instrumental, or affective ties to the state and its actors” 
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(Michelson, 2007, p.352, as cited in Okhmatovskiy, 2010). Two strands of research 
emerge.  
 
The first strand focuses on the benefits associated with political connections, emphasising 
that such connections provide opportunities on regulatory policies to enhance firms‟ 
legitimacy, gain access to valuable state controlled resources, benefit from preferential 
treatment and also receive exclusive information regarding state policies (Okhmatovskiy, 
2010). In this context, such connections may enhance the firms‟ performance (Luo and 
Chen, 1997; Peng and Luo, 2000; Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Siegel, 2007).  
 
The second strand, however, posits that such political ties do not necessarily have positive 
effects on performance as such ties also entail significant costs (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 
1993). Arguably, such connections are a source of inefficiencies as the state may pursue its 
own political or socio-economic goals and may use its control to divert such firms‟ 
resources to achieve these goals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). In addition, Aharoni (2000) 
argues that such firms lack monitoring and lack incentives for managers to perform better. 
Whilst there is consensus in the extant literature that PCON firms differ from non-PCON 
firms in terms of market and auditor perceptions of risk and performance (Faccio, 2010), 
there is limited empirical evidence on the impact of corporate governance reforms between 
these two groups and its association with audit fees.    
 
Besides that, the personal and professional relationships (Richard, 2006) between the 
external auditors and their former colleagues who are now holding positions in the boards 
of directors and top management of the audited clients create a situation of high political 
16 
 
embeddedness. As former external auditors, the said directors and managers have a better 
understanding on the tasks carried out by the external auditors and empathise with the low 
level of audit fees in Malaysia. Further, in order to protect their reputational capital, they 
will demand for substantive audit procedures and are willing to pay higher audit fees to the 
external auditors.  
 
In this study, it is found that a higher percentage of PCON firms engaged Big4 auditors to 
carry out the external audit functions (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2). In addition, the 
majority of the audit committee members of PCON firms are former auditors working in 
the Big4 audit firms. This leads to another situation of political embeddedness complicating 
the PCON firms.  
 
In addition, the underlying assumption on the role of regulators in promoting good 
corporate governance practices is supported by the institutional theory. It is the 
responsibility of the regulatory agencies having oversight authority over accounting matters 
(Baker, Nelson and Staley, 2006) to restore public confidence by enforcing corporate 
governance practices. Thus, the institutional theory theorised an important role for 
regulatory agencies to ensure that formal mechanisms are in place to ensure compliance of 
rules and regulations. Using the argument that the role of governance mechanisms is to 
communicate with the various actors of the corporate governance mosaic (Cohen et al., 
2004), this study hypothesised that regulatory oversight strengthens the association between 
internal governance mechanisms and audit fees in Malaysia. The role of regulatory 
oversight is more pertinent in highly regulated firms which are financial institutions tightly 
regulated by the Bank Negara Malaysia. 
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The hypotheses for this study are divided into two parts as shown in Table 1.2. First, it is to 
examine the moderating effect of political connections on the association between audit 
committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and audit fees. The 
variables for audit committee characteristics are independence, diligence and expertise. 
While the internal audit function attributes are proxied by objectivity and work 
performance. This research adopts SAS No. 65, the Auditor’s Consideration of the Internal 
Audit Function of Financial Statements
6
 (AICPA, 1997), to measure objectivity and work 
performance. The voluntary disclosures on internal audit function activities as per Para 43 
of the Statement of Internal Control (SIC) are used as a measurement for work 
performance. 
 
Secondly, it is to examine the moderating effect of regulatory oversight on the association 
between the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes and audit fees.  
 
The audit fees models for this study are drawn from prior literature (i.e. Craswell and 
Francis, 1999; Tsui, Janggi and Gul, 2001; Carcello et al., 2002). Model 1 focuses on the 
moderating effect of political connections on the association between audit committee 
characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and audit fees (PCON versus non-
PCON firms). Model 2 examines the moderating effects of regulatory oversight on the 
association between the said internal governance mechanisms and audit fees (HRFs versus 
LRFs). Statistical analyses for Model 1 and 2 are based on the t-tests and Chi-square 
analysis. A multivariate regression analysis is used to examine both models. 
                                                 
6 SAS 65 is similar to ISA 610 adopted in Malaysia. Refer to Chapter 5 Sections 5.6.2 on the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 
610 (Malaysian Institute of Accountants, Internal Auditing Guidelines). 
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   Table 1.2:  Summary of Hypotheses 
Independent Variables  Hypotheses 
 
 
1) Audit Committee 
Characteristics: 
a. Independence 
b. Diligence  
c. Expertise  
 
 
H1 
 
H2 
 
Political Embeddedness 
PCON firms pay higher audit fees than non-PCON firms. 
 
The association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees is 
stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation for PCON than non-PCON firms. 
 
2) Internal Audit 
Function Attributes: 
a. Objectivity 
b. Work 
Performance 
 
H3 The association between internal audit function attributes and audit fees is 
stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation for PCON than non-PCON firms. 
 
 
1) Audit Committee 
Characteristics: 
a. Independence 
b. Diligence  
c. Expertise  
 
 
H4 
 
H5 
 
Regulatory Oversight 
Highly regulated firms pay higher audit fees than less regulated firms. 
 
The association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees is 
stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation for HRFs than LRFs. 
 
2) Internal Audit 
Function Attributes: 
a. Objectivity 
b. Work 
Performance 
H6 The association between internal audit function attributes and audit fees is 
stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation for HRFs than LRFs. 
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1.5  Findings 
The t-tests and Chi-Square analysis indicates that audit fees for PCON firms are higher 
in comparison with the non-PCON firms. In the linear multivariate analysis, four 
hypotheses are strongly supported namely audit committee diligence (DIL) and 
expertise (EXP), and internal audit function objectivity (OBJ) and work performance 
(WP). The results support that audit committee members who meet frequently are well 
informed and have the knowledge about financial and auditing issues, demand for 
substantive audit task and consequently results in higher audit fees for the firm. Further, 
audit committee members with financial expertise provide additional support for 
external auditors because it allows the audit committee members to better understand 
the auditing issues, risks and audit procedures (Abbott et al., 2003). Additionally, the 
results also confirm that PCON firms‟ heads of internal auditors report directly to audit 
committee and disclose more information on internal audit activities under voluntary 
disclosure as per Para 43 of Statement of Internal Control (SIC)
7
. The findings in this 
study supports Goodwin and Kent (2006) and Hay et al. (2008) that internal audit and 
external audit complements each other within the governance framework. 
 
Further, HRFs experience higher audit fees than LRFs. In the linear multivariate 
analysis, the results indicate that regulatory oversight strengthens the association 
between audit committee diligence, expertise and audit fees. Finally, this study finds 
that regulatory oversight strengthens the association between internal audit objectivity 
and audit fees. These findings suggest that diligent and expert audit committees demand 
for additional assurance from their external auditors to ensure effective oversight over 
financial statement audit as well as to protect their reputational capital (Carcello et al., 
2002, Abbott et al., 2003). Further, the findings also indicate that regulatory oversight 
                                                 
7 Refer Chapter 5 Section 5.6.2 on the voluntary disclosure under Para 43 of  Statement of Internal Control (SIC) 
20 
 
strengthens the direct reporting line of the head of internal auditors to audit committee, 
thus leading to greater audit effort and increased audit fees for HRFs. 
 
1.6 Significance of Study 
This study is significant as it has five contributions to extant CG research. First, the 
study provides empirical evidence for regulators and related stakeholders regarding the 
impact of the enhanced BMLR in 2008 on the internal governance mechanisms of audit 
committee and internal audit function, since most prior research was conducted before 
the revision. It supports the claim in the World Bank Report 2012 that enhanced reforms 
since 2008 have been effectively implemented. Such information may assist regulators 
and policy makers in implementing further enhancements recommended in the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012 and also BMLR 2012. Following this, 
policy makers should ensure mechanisms are in place as this would be an indicator for 
determining the level of conformance by the audit committee with the newly amended 
requirements.  
 
Secondly, this study also evidences that enhanced CG reforms does matter for PCON 
firms in Malaysia despite the negative perceptions raised during the 1997 crisis and 
thereafter. Since most of the auditing and accounting studies on corporate governance 
were very much grounded by agency theory (Cohen, Krishnamoorty and Wright, 2008), 
the inclusion of political embeddedness perspective in this research is a key contribution 
to extant literature. It explains the political relationships between PCON firms and the 
government as well as the political networking between former Big4 auditors appointed 
by the firms and their external auditors. Whilst negative perceptions existed in the 
market regarding PCON firms, enhanced CG reforms have made a change to the PCON 
firms. This was also alluded to in the World Bank Report (2012). 
21 
 
Third, given the absence of corporate governance research in highly regulated 
environment [see Cohen et al., (2004); Defond and Francis (2005)], the investigation as 
to how highly regulated firms are impacted by corporate governance practices is timely. 
The environment resulting from the stringent regulatory role of Bank Negara Malaysia 
(BNM) on the banking institutions and insurance firms provides a good setting to 
conduct such study. Most of the studies have shown a positive association between 
internal governance mechanisms and audit fees for less regulated firms. It is not clear 
whether this relationship still holds in a highly regulated industry, since regulatory 
oversight could either diminish or heighten the imperative for monitoring by internal 
governance mechanisms (Boo and Sharma, 2008). Hence, the study confirms the 
importance of regulatory oversight in enhancing CG effectiveness.  
 
Fourthly, the findings of past research on the relationships between internal governance 
mechanisms and external auditing as substitutes or complements have been mixed. This 
study is undertaken to find the role of internal governance mechanisms vis-a-vis 
external auditing in Malaysia i.e. whether they are substitutes of or complements with 
each other.  
 
Lastly, given the limited attention on the formulation of an appropriate measure of 
internal audit work performance, this study extends current literature by introducing 
new measurement for the work performance of internal audit functions. Since previous 
measures used for obtaining contribution of IAF relate more to the size of the function 
rather than the quality (Prawitt, Sharp and Wood, 2008), this research uses SAS No. 65, 
the Auditor’s Consideration of the Internal Audit Function of Financial Statements 
(AICPA, 1997) which describes IAF quality characteristics as comprised of 
competence, objectivity and quality of work performance. It is important to note that in 
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this study, the voluntary disclosures on internal audit function activities as per Para 43 
of the Statement of Internal Control is introduced as the measurement for work 
performance. 
 
1.7 Organisation of Thesis 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters including this introduction chapter. The 
discussion is organised as follows:  
 
Chapter 1 provides the introduction, background, research objectives and research 
questions that act as foundation to the whole thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the extant corporate governance landscape with a focus on the audit 
fees research. The aim is to articulate the gap in audit fees research and justify the 
research questions for the study.  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis explains the agency theory, political embeddedness perspective 
and institutional theory and how these theories provide the underlying reasons for the 
relationship between internal governance mechanisms, regulators and audit fees.  
 
Chapter 4 presents the research models and develops the hypotheses for further 
examination. In specific, six hypotheses are developed for the study. The hypotheses are 
divided into two sub-sections, under PCON firms and non-PCON firms, and highly 
regulated and less regulated firms. It draws upon the past literature and the theories 
examined in Chapters 2 and 3.  
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Chapter 5 outlines the method of data collection, the definition and reasons for variable 
selection and the instruments used in measuring the variables. Basically, it explains the 
research design and the methodology applied in the study. 
 
Chapter 6 analyse of the interviews with selected regulators, heads of internal auditors 
and external auditors on their perception regarding the audit fees issue. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the results of the quantitative analysis on the association between 
internal governance mechanisms and audit fees for the different types of ownership 
structured firms by focusing on PCON firms. Further, the association between internal 
governance mechanism and audit fees for HRFs and LRFs are also discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
Chapter 8 presents an overview of this study and the discussion of the results. Further, 
contributions and detailed discussions on the limitations of the current study as well as 
suggestions for future research are also undertaken in this chapter. 
 
1.8       Conclusion 
This study extends the inductive research which investigates (1) the moderating effect 
of political connections on the association between the internal governance mechanisms 
of audit committee and internal audit function for (PCON versus non-PCON firms) 
post-BMLR 2008; and (2) the moderating effect of regulatory oversight on the 
association between the said internal governance mechanisms and audit fees for (HRFs 
versus LRFs) post-BMLR 2008.  
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Given the importance of audit quality and regulatory oversight, the issue of audit fees is 
an important area for investigation in the context of Malaysia as discussed above. 
Further detailed discussions are in the ensuing chapters. The next Chapter discusses the 
audit fees literature in more detail and provides the justification for the derivation of the 
research questions addressed in this study. 
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Chapter 2 AUDIT FEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A 
REVIEWAND SYNTESIS OF LITERATURE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter discusses the extant literature on corporate governance and its 
development with particular focus on studies conducted on audit fees in developed and 
emerging economies. It then draws an overview of the theoretical linkages among three 
(3) key organizational monitoring mechanisms namely, audit committee, internal audit 
function and external audit. It also identifies the research gaps in this area.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance  
„Corporate governance‟ (CG) is a broad and somewhat vague term used for a range of 
corporate controls and accountability mechanisms designed to meet the aims of 
corporate stakeholders. The Cadbury Report (1992) in the United Kingdom (UK) 
defines corporate governance as the systems by which firms are directed and controlled. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) principles of 
corporate governance (1999, revised 2004) took a broader perspective describing 
corporate governance as a set of relationships between a firm‟s board, its shareholders 
and stakeholders. 
 
A definition by the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance in 
Malaysia in its Report on Corporate Governance (1999, p.52) stated that: 
Corporate governance is the process and structure used to 
direct and manage the business and affairs of the company 
towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate 
accountability with the ultimate objective of realizing long 
term shareholder value, whilst taking account of the 
interests of other stakeholders…. 
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The definitions illustrate that corporate governance is concerned with the firm‟s internal 
controls and board structure, as well as external aspects such as its relationship with 
shareholders and stakeholders. This is in line with the agency theory on the incentives 
that will align the interests of agents with those of the principals, so the managers of the 
organization will manage the company in accordance with the objectives of 
shareholders and at the same time reduce agency costs. As such, corporate governance 
is a mechanism to facilitate the control of managers and groups of power in the firm and 
also to facilitate the maximization of firm value (Cuervo, 2002). The exercise of power 
must be within an accepted governance framework. The board and managers are 
responsible with directing and managing the business of their firm and as decision 
makers, they are accountable to the owners of the firm. 
 
2.3  Corporate Governance Landscape  
Figure 2.1 shows the evolution of the corporate governance landscape in Malaysia. It 
can be said that the initiative started with the establishment of the High Level Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance in 1999 that consists of members from both 
government and industry. The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
which was released by the Committee in March 2000 formed the basis for Corporate 
Governance Best Practices in 2000. It was initially drawn up to allow for a more 
flexible approach to raise standards in corporate governance as opposed to the rigid and 
prescriptive ways imposed by regulations (Arens, Elder, Beasley, Devi, Takiah and 
Shaari, 2003). The principles underlying the Code focus on four areas namely, board of 
directors, director‟s remuneration, shareholders, and accountability and audit. 
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Figure 2.1: The Corporate Governance Landscape 
The Corporate Governance Landscape from 1999 until 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Compiled from the following sources:- 
Corporate Governance Blue Print (2011), retrieved on 10 March, 2012 from http://www.sc.com.my/. 
MCCG (Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance) (2012, 2007 and 2000), retrieved on 7 May 2011 from   http://www.sc.com.my/ 
SC (Securities Commission Malaysia), retrieved on 5 November, 2011 from http://www.sc.com.my/. 
MSWG, retrieved on 10 December, 2011 from http://www.mswg.org.my/. 
BMSB (Bursa Malaysia Sdn Bhd, formerly known as KLSE) (2001), retrieved on November 4, 2011 from http://www.bursamalaysia.com/. 
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The corporate governance framework in Malaysia adopts a hybrid approach (Khadaroo 
and Shaikh, 2007) i.e. a mixture of prescriptive and non-prescriptive approaches. The 
prescriptive approach is based on regulations, for example, the corporate governance 
practices in the United States (US) that are heavily regulated by the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
2002; and the non-prescriptive approach is based on voluntary codes like those in the 
United Kingdom (UK) that draw from the Cadbury, Greenbury, Turnbull and Higgs 
reports.  
 
The combination of these two approaches has contributed to the uniqueness of the 
corporate environment in Malaysia. Firms should apply the broad principles of good 
corporate governance set out by the MCCG flexibly and with common sense to the 
varying circumstances of individual firms. In addition, Bursa Malaysia revamped its 
Listing Requirements in the year 2001, among others was that all listed firms were 
required to include a „Corporate Governance Statement‟ in their annual reports and 
disclose their level of compliance with the Code.   
 
In the year 2007, the Securities Commission (SC) released a revised Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2007) to further improve the Malaysia‟s corporate 
governance framework. The Revised Code of best practices 2007 intended to intensify 
the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors and audit committee and to ensure 
that they perform their responsibilities effectively (MCCG, 2007). In 2012, the MCCG 
2007 was again revised.8 Besides that, the newly amended regulations under Section 9 
of the Capital Markets and Services Act 2007 (CMSA) and the revamped Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR) in 2008 called for increased interaction 
between the audit committee and internal audit function.  
                                                 
8The new MCCG is taking effect on Dec 31, 2012. The Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 contains 35 new recommendations 
for strategic initiatives aimed at strengthening self and market discipline. 
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In addition, shareholder activism is also on the rise in Malaysia due to the establishment 
of minority shareholders watchdog group (MSWG) in 2007. This will in the long term 
positively influence firms (The Star, July 8, 2009). Active shareholders can influence 
the firm‟s behaviour such as by alleviating boardroom complacency and bringing about 
more positive changes in a timelier manner.  Further, the Corporate Governance Blue 
Print was launched in 2011 to provide action plans to raise the standards of corporate 
governance in Malaysia by strengthening self and market discipline and promoting 
greater culture of corporate governance.  Thus, it can be concluded that this is part of 
the government‟s efforts to make Malaysia a more conducive investment arena for 
investors. 
 
The next section will discuss the corporate governance mechanisms which are divided 
into three categories, as shown in Figure 2.2. The categories are (1) the internal 
governance mechanisms; (2) the external governance mechanisms; and (3) the 
regulatory oversight mechanisms. The interactions among these corporate governance 
key players are important in order to achieve effective governance in a firm. The 
interrelationships between various actors and mechanisms within corporate governance 
are shown in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2:  Corporate Governance Mosaic and Financial Reporting Quality  
Source: Cohen, Krishnamoorty and Wright, (2004) 
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2.3.1 Internal Governance Mechanisms 
The internal governance mechanisms include the board, audit committee, internal 
auditors and management. With regards to the board and audit committee, prior 
researches suggest that a stronger board and audit committee are associated with a 
demand for higher quality audits. Further, stronger internal governance structure should 
be connected with higher audit fees. According to Carcello et al. (2002), high quality 
board would demand for more external monitoring from external auditors. Abbott et al. 
(2003) posit that from the point of view of the audit committee, they demand a higher 
level of audit assurance, resulting in an increased level of audit coverage and higher 
audit fees. 
 
Additionally, a close relationship between the internal auditors and the audit committee 
has the potential to enhance the corporate governance capabilities of both parties. The 
independence of the internal auditor firm, from the firm‟s management is strengthens 
when it reports directly to the audit committee as required by new Bursa Malaysia 
Listing Requirements (BMLR 2008). Further, the function of the internal auditor is 
likely to be enhanced when he is designated as an important agent of the audit 
committee. Correspondingly, the effectiveness of the audit committee is improved when 
it is able to obtain significant information on issues of internal controls and quality of 
accounting policies. Thus, since good governance is human centric and involves 
corporate governance key players, it stands to reason that audit quality can only be as 
good as the person providing the service.   
 
Further, the managers must carry out their responsibility and work towards maximizing 
shareholders‟ value. Unfortunately, their duties may be impacted by their motivation to 
maximise their own personal gains. Thus, this type of behaviour needs to be controlled 
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by independent parties who formed the external governance and regulatory oversight 
mechanisms.  
 
2.3.2 External Governance Mechanisms 
The external governance mechanism consists of the external auditors and regulators. As 
depicted in Figure 2.2, the external auditor plays a significant role in carrying out 
financial statement audit and hence, can be viewed as an important participant in the 
governance process. He is a watchdog of the firm, and any shortfall in the performance 
of his duty will impact investors‟ protection and confidence. For instance, the failure of 
an auditor to flag issues of going concern in his opinions will severely compromise the 
interests of shareholders. Therefore, a public accountant who performs external auditing 
function is expected to provide reasonable assurance that the management did not 
distort the true financial performance of the firm (Nazatul, 2009), thus safeguarding the 
interests of the investing public.   
 
2.3.3 Regulatory Oversight Mechanisms 
As shown in Figure 2.2, the regulatory oversight mechanisms comprised of the courts 
and legal system, regulators, financial analysts, stock exchanges, legislators and 
stockholders, which are external to the firm. They influence governance in ways that are 
integral to safeguarding the interests of the firm‟s stakeholders. These external players 
often influence the interactions among the actors who are more directly involved in the 
governance of the firm. Greater regulatory oversight would enhance the critical role of 
corporate governance. For instance, the impact of PCAOB Auditing Standard 5 on audit 
fees results from new audit requirements on financial reporting have led to tighten audit 
regulation. Due to this reason, additional audit work needs to be carried out by external 
auditors, thus they demand higher audit fees (Jiang and Wu, 2009).  
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2.4 Corporate Governance and the Audit Profession 
 
The role of an external auditor, who is appointed by the shareholders, is crucial to the 
effective governance of modern corporations. The Cadbury Report (1992, p.36) stated 
that: 
The annual audit is one of the cornerstones of corporate 
governance. Given the separation of ownership from 
management, the directors are required to report on their 
stewardship by means of the annual report and financial 
statements sent to the shareholders. The audit provides an 
external and objective check on the way in which the 
financial statements have been prepared and presented, 
and it is an essential part of the checks and balances 
required. The question is not whether there should be an 
audit, but how to ensure its objectivity and effectiveness. 
 
Using agency theory, Adams, Sherris and Hossain (1997) posit that the cost of external 
audit will be determined by the monitoring costs of the auditor, which in turn reflects 
the internal governance mechanisms and board structure of the firm.  
 
Issues of governance in corporations have become central to the public policy agenda. 
This has been reinforced by the shocking corporate scandals exhibited by renowned 
conglomerates such as Enron in 2001 and WorldCom in 2002 in the United States (US). 
Malaysia also had its fair share of corporate scandals, such as Malaysian Airlines 
System (MAS), Tabung Haji, Transmile Group Berhad and Megan Media. All these 
scandals are arguably manifestations of bad governance and thus, there is a need for 
better monitoring by regulatory institutions, institutional investors and shareholders‟ 
watchdog group in order to inculcate good governance practices in the corporate sector.  
 
The activities of the auditing profession in recent years are considered to be 
tremendously eventful. There have been many occasions where external auditors have 
failed in performing their duties to exercise independence and objectivity when 
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reporting the results of their audit findings. For example, the collapse of Enron and 
WorldCom together with their auditor, Arthur Anderson, in the early 2000s put the audit 
profession under scrutiny globally. As a consequence of the high level of litigation and 
criticism against auditors, stricter rules and measures were put in place to enhance 
independence and audit quality. In addition, corrective actions and radical reforms were 
undertaken in various countries by accounting bodies, governments and capital market 
regulators to strengthen audit practice (Leung, Cooper and Robertson, 2004). Key 
reform activities, among others, were the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
in the US in 2002, the Bouton Report in France in 2002 and the Winter Report in the 
UK in 2002 (IFAC, 2003). 
 
The provision of „non-audit services‟ for audit clients which caused conflicts of interest 
for external auditors was curbed. Leung et al. (2004) observe that accounting firms had 
diversified by providing a wide range of services and products including, among others, 
tax planning advice and strategic consulting to their audit clients. As a result, auditors 
played multiple roles simultaneously as advisors to the managers and also as 
independent attestators to the shareholders. This raised concerns about auditor 
independence, and measures were introduced to reduce the conflict of interest. 
 
Further, increasing fraudulent practices and corruption have raised concerns regarding 
the credibility of the audit profession (Business Times, August 23, 2011). This issue has 
been raised not only in Malaysia but also in the US and countries in the European 
continent. Consequently, laws were reformed and new professional standards were 
pronounced. All these changes and measures posed significant challenges for the 
auditors in carrying out their audit work (Lee and Azham, 2008).  They could have an 
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impact on the pricing of audit services, cause necessary price adjustments and 
consequently, affect the profitability of audits carried out by external auditors.  
 
2.4.1 Corporate Governance and Audit Fees 
Good corporate governance is essential to economic stability and growth in developed 
and developing economies. Malaysia is dedicated to promote the development of sound 
corporate governance systems and practices (Abdul Rahman, 2006). Indeed, it can be 
said that considerable progress has already been achieved. Even in the most advanced 
economies, there have been signs that some developments in capital market have 
outpaced the development of corporate governance systems and practice (Abdul 
Rahman, 2006). In an ever-changing world, this is nothing new as financial policy-
makers, supervisors and regulators are always trying to catch up with the evolution of 
capital markets.  
 
Increasing competition and the recent spate of corporate collapses have renewed 
attention to the efficacy of audit pricing. The auditing profession has received much 
criticism for the increase in audit fees (Ciesielski and Weirich, 2006). Since the demise 
of Arthur Andersen, the costs associated with the much reviled section 404 of Sarbanes 
Oxley (SOX) Act have made the criticism sharper (Lee and Azham, 2008). The purpose 
of the SOX Act is to reduce the possibilities of corporate fraud by increasing the 
stringency of procedures and requirements for financial reporting. Section 404 of the 
Act mandates all listed firms in the United States to establish internal controls and 
procedures for financial reporting and document test and maintain those controls and 
procedures to ensure their effectiveness. Compliance is mandated for financial years 
ending after 15 November 2004.   
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Enhanced corporate governance is likely to have an effect on audit fees because 
improved corporate governance implies that the control environment is more effective 
(Hay et al., 2008). Further, improving governance through improving the board or the 
audit committee will lead to more external auditing (Hay, 2012). They may demand for 
more testing as statutory audit is one of the important corporate governance tools for 
shareholders to monitor the managers.  
 
Past research also shows that audit fees have implications on audit quality (Hoitash, 
Markelevich and Barragato, 2007). However, in this study audit fees is used to reflect 
the audit risk of the audit client. This is because audit risk is a significant factor in 
determining the extent of audit work and consequently determining the amount of audit 
fees (Chan et al., 1993). Basically, the issues can be viewed from two different 
perspectives; governance risk and demand based perspectives, as discussed below. 
 
 From the governance risk perspective, which is also known or referred to as the supply 
side perspective, researchers argue that corporate governance is associated with lower 
audit fees (Bedard et al., 2004). The reason is that external auditors respond to client 
risks through appropriate audit procedures. Auditors who perceive higher risks will 
increase their audit effort, resulting in higher audit fees. Conversely, if auditors perceive 
lower client risks, then audit effort and fees may be reduced. Prior studies (for example, 
Beasley, 1996; Dechow, Sloan and Wong, 1996; Klein, 2002; Abbott et al., 2004; 
Krishnan and Ye, 2005) observe that the strength of board of directors and audit 
committee is significantly associated with the quality of internal controls and financial 
reports. Auditors will have greater assurance about internal controls, compliances and 
reduced likelihood of material misstatement in financial reports if they perceive a strong 
37 
 
and independent board and audit committee. In such cases, the auditors may reduce 
their audit effort, resulting in lower audit fees. 
 
In contrast, from a demand based perspective, researchers propose that higher quality 
corporate governance structures demand more external monitoring and thus, firms are 
willing to pay for higher quality audits. Similarly, directors with greater reputational 
capital at risk will demand substantive audit testing from external auditor in order to 
protect their reputational capital and reduce the risk of litigation (O‟Sullivan, 1999 and 
2000; Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; Goodwin and Kent, 2006). Supported 
by Bedard et al, (2004), auditors will strategically respond to client risks through 
appropriate adjustments to the audit procedures. In addition, Fields, Fraser and Wilkins 
(2004) suggest that strong audit committee‟s internal monitoring reduces risk inherent 
in banking institutions that could manifest in audit efficiencies. Thus, auditors who 
observe higher client risks will increase their audit effort, resulting in higher audit fees. 
The converse will hold if auditors notice lower client risks.  
 
The legislation under the SOX Act was designed to increase the oversight and 
regulation of the accounting profession with the goals of strengthening corporate 
governance and increasing the transparency of financial audits (Cosgrove and 
Niederjohn, 2008). Ciesielski and Weirich (2006) report that between 2001 and 2004, 
total audit and audit related fees increased by an average of 103 percent for 496 of the 
S&P 500 firms. The fees increased by an average of 41 percent in 2004 alone upon the 
implementation of the Act. Further, Taub (2005) in his survey of 40 Fortune 500 firms 
in the US highlight that PricewaterhouseCoopers observed an increase in audit fees 
averaging 134 percent. KPMG‟s fees raised by an average of 109 percent; Ernst & 
Young‟s fees increased on average by 96 percent and Deloitte‟s fees by 78 percent.   
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With regards to the banking industry, Janson and Scheiner (2007) find that audit and 
audit-related fees increased between 2003 and 2004 by an average of 61.3 percent for 
midsized banks, and by 89.0 percent for similarly sized financial services firms in the 
non-bank sector in the first year of SOX Act compliance. When large-market-
capitalization banks were considered, they found that audit fees increased by an average 
of 50.7 percent, while large-market capitalization financial services firms witnessed an 
average increase of 50.1 percent. 
 
In contrast, O‟Sullivan (1999) in a study during the post-Cadbury period in the UK 
finds that there is no evidence that the internal governance mechanism influences audit 
fees even after the firms altered their internal governance characteristics. The Cadbury 
report sets out recommendations on the arrangement of firm boards and accounting 
systems to mitigate corporate governance risks and failures. This is because a potential 
avenue through which external auditors and audit clients may reduce audit costs is by 
placing greater reliance on the work undertaken by the internal audit function (Felix et 
al., 2001; Gramling, 1999). This follows the governance risk perspectives for the 
internal audit function is one of the key governance mechanisms with responsibilities 
for evaluating and improving internal controls, risk management and other governance 
processes within the firm. As such, the internal auditor‟s work has the potential to cover 
areas which the external auditor needs to examine during the audit engagement period. 
This may have fee implications too.  
 
A large body of research has examined the determinants of audit fees over the past 25 
years (Hay et al., 2006; Hay, 2012). Unfortunately, research to date examining the 
relationship between corporate governance and audit fees is limited. Additionally, the 
preliminary support from these past studies (Tsui, et al., 2001; Carcello et al., 2002) 
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signifies contradictory results as to whether the relationship between corporate 
governance and audit fees is positive or negative. Measures of governance in published 
studies include the existence of an audit committee and internal audit function. The 
literature on each of these measures vis-a-vis audit fees will be examined below. 
 
2.4.2 Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees 
 
Audit committee is an important self-regulatory governance mechanism with significant 
oversight responsibilities over financial reporting, internal control and audit activities 
(BRC, 1999; SEC, 1999; United States Congress, 2002). Extant literature has examined 
audit pricing for listed firms in terms of size, organizational complexity, riskiness and 
specific characteristics of the audit client including various aspects of internal 
governance structures (Simunic and Stein, 1996; Carcello et al., 2002; Cohen, 
Krishnamoorty and Wright, 2002; Goodwin and Kent, 2006). Other audit research has 
sought to identify the impact of various corporate governance factors on financial 
reporting and audit quality, and the level of audit fees (Gul and Tsui, 1998; Carcello et 
al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2003; Tsui et al., 2001). These studies find that stronger 
corporate governance practice is associated with higher audit fees (Chan, Ezzamel and 
William, 1993; Collier and Gregory, 1996; O‟Sullivan, 1999, 2000; Carcello et al., 
2002). This is in conjunction with the demand based perspective whereby independent 
directors demand additional assurance from external auditors in order to protect their 
reputational capital.  
 
A review of empirical studies on the relationship between audit committee 
characteristics and external audit fees shows mixed results. Abbott et al. (2003) 
documented that audit committee independence and financial expertise have significant 
positive impact on the cost of audit. However, Carcello et al. (2002) find that the 
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characteristics of the board of director‟s independence, diligence and expertise but not 
the audit committee are positively associated with audit fees. The results from 
Lifschutz, Jacobi and Feldstein‟s (2010) study on 60 large public firms on the Tel Aviv 
100 Stock Exchange Index show that board independence and audit committee 
diligence are positively and significantly associated with audit fees. However, Boo and 
Sharma (2008) observe the association between board/audit committee sizes, 
independence and audit fees is weaker for highly regulated firms than less regulated 
firms. They also evidence that regulatory oversight strengthens the association between 
multiple directorships and audit fees. The reason is that regulatory oversight reduces 
information asymmetry and at the same time reduces the demand for costly monitoring 
by external auditor. 
 
Similarly, studies have been done in Malaysia on the effect of audit committee as a 
governance mechanism on audit fees. Results by Yatim et al. (2006) show that external 
audit fees are positively and significantly associated with board independence, audit 
committee expertise and the frequency of audit committee meetings. Again, the results 
are consistent with the demand-side approach for audit services, wherein firms with 
good corporate governance attributes demand higher audit quality, resulting in higher 
external audit fees. Balanchandran (2007) evidences the relationship between a firm‟s 
internal corporate governance characteristics and audit fees and shows the external 
auditor perceives higher inherent risk when CEO duality is present. His study also 
shows that CEO duality is associated with higher audit fees in less regulated firms.  
 
In contrast, studies that focus on corporate governance risk (supply side explanation) 
find that strong corporate governance is associated with lower audit fees (Bedard et al., 
2004). They propose that external auditor considers the quality of monitoring provided 
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by internal governance in assessing risk and audit planning. As a result, greater reliance 
on the internal controls lowers the risk of financial misreporting and thus, the external 
auditors are likely to reduce the audit engagement work and the extent of audit tests.  
Past researches (Beasley, 1996; Klein, 2002; Abbott et al., 2004; Krishnan and Ye, 
2005) show that the strength of the board and/or audit committee is significantly 
associated with the quality of internal controls and financial reports which leads to 
lower audit engagement and audit fees. Tsui et al. (2001) also find evidence that board 
independence is more effective in monitoring a firm‟s financial reporting process, which 
decreases control risk and audit fees. Similarly, Boo and Sharma‟s (2008) research on 
bank holding firms, find that with the exception of the audit committee, none of the 
other corporate governance variables are significantly associated with audit fees. They 
also observe a negative association between audit committee independence and audit 
fees.  
 
To ensure that audit committee serves as an effective check on the management of a 
firm, the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR) was amended in 2008 to 
provide for the composition of audit committees, the frequency of meetings and the 
need for audit committee members to attend continuous training to keep abreast with 
developments in relevant financial and other related developments. In addition, 
executive directors are no longer allowed to become members of the audit committee in 
order to preserve the independence of the committee. Following the recent corporate 
misdeeds which have underscored the importance of having an effective and 
independent internal audit function, the BMLR 2008 also requires all listed firms to 
carry out their own internal audit functions. The reporting line for internal auditors has 
also been clarified, with the audit committee to be held accountable for ensuring 
adherence to the scope of internal audit functions. 
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2.4.3 Internal Audit Function and Audit Fees 
Prior studies generally suggest that internal control (for example internal audit function) 
and external auditing can substitute for each other, so that better internal control will be 
associated with lower audit fees (Hay et al., 2008). In addition, several other studies 
argue that better internal control will allow external audit work to be reduced, for 
instance, control mechanisms in an organization can be substituted one for another 
(Simunic, 1980), and this could lead to lower audit fees. Prawitt et al. (2008) highlight 
that high quality internal audit function (IAF) results in lower external audit fees as 
well. 
 
Hogan and Wilkins (2008) observe that audit fees are significantly higher for internal 
control deficient firms and the fee increment is highest for firms that have most 
substantial internal control problems. Felix et al. (2001) suggest that internal audit 
contribution to external audit work will reduce audit fees, and they find a significant 
negative relation. Referring to Simunic (1980, 1984), firms can substitute internal 
control for external auditing if there is monopoly pricing, or substitute external auditing 
for internal control when knowledge spill over reduce the cost of external auditing.  
 
In contrast, past research has examined the interaction between internal audit functions 
and external audit services, and finds them to be complementary. From this demand 
perspective, improved corporate governance is associated with higher audit fees. Walker 
and Casterella (2000) find that there is a positive relationship between external audit 
fees and the presence of an internal audit department. Other studies also find that the 
expected reduction in audit work does not occur even when auditors are able to rely on 
internal control (O‟Keefe, Simunic and Stein, 1994; Hackenbrack and Knechel, 1997). 
Hay et al. (2008) find that controls, governance and auditing are complements, not 
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substitutes, and an increase in one will lead to an increase in the others. According to 
Goodwin and Kent (2006), audit fees is positively related to the use of an internal audit 
function because firms with strong corporate governance practices are likely to engage 
in greater levels of internal auditing and are also willing to pay for a higher quality of 
external audit work.  
 
2.4.4  Regulatory Oversight and Audit Fees 
In Malaysia, banking institutions and insurance firms are subjected to licensing and 
regulation by the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) apart from being regulated by the 
Securities Commission (SC) and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR). 
Comparatively, other listed firms, for example firms in the manufacturing industries, 
plantations and trading services, are regulated by the Securities Commission and BMLR 
only. Thus, banking institutions and insurance firms are said to be highly regulated 
firms (HRFs) as they are supervised by an industry-specific regulator, i.e. the BNM, 
whereas the other firms may be referred to as less regulated firms (LRFs).  
 
According to Boo and Sharma (2008), direct monitoring and stringent regulatory 
oversight by an industry-specific regulator reduces the heightened risk and information 
asymmetries in highly regulated firms. They evidence the regulatory oversight impact 
on internal corporate governance and audit fees for a sample of 469 US listed highly 
regulated and less regulated firms. They find that regulatory oversight influences audit 
fees and the associations between internal governance and audit fees. They also attribute 
lower audit fees to highly regulated firms as compared to less regulated firms. Dunn and 
Mayhew (2004) and Bryan and Klein (2005) in their studies posit that regulatory 
oversight reduces the need for an extensive external audit in highly regulated firms. This 
is because firms subject to regulatory oversight have stronger corporate governance 
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practices and will vigilantly monitor their internal controls and financial reporting 
process as they. Besides that, close monitoring by the industry-specific regulator will 
reduce the role of external auditing as a control mechanism. Consequently, by relying 
on the effective external and internal monitoring processes, auditors could reduce the 
extent of costly testing procedures in highly regulated firms. These observations are 
consistent with the substitute‟s perspective, whereby regulatory oversight partially 
substitutes the external audit as a monitoring mechanism.  
 
On the contrary, Abbott et al. (2003) argue that greater regulatory oversight enhances 
the critical role of corporate governance. The rationale is that an independent and 
effective board and audit committee of a highly regulated firm have greater incentives 
to protect their reputational capital than those in a less regulated firm. They demand for 
additional assurance from the external auditor in order to reduce their personal risks. 
This in turn will lead to additional audit engagement by the external auditors and at the 
same time increases audit fees. This is consistent with the notion that regulatory 
oversight complements the internal governance mechanisms. Thus, it is important to 
study whether regulatory oversight substitute or complements for external audit 
monitoring in Malaysia. 
 
2.5 The Research Gap: Corporate Governance, Regulation and Audit Fees 
As discussed above, studies show that corporate governance has an effect on audit fees 
because improved corporate governance implies that the control environment is efficient 
and effective. Further, high quality audit by external auditor is reflected in higher audit 
fees. According to Menon and Williams (2001), audit production efficiencies should be 
reflected in lower fees, while increased audit procedures should trigger higher fees. 
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However, prior research on corporate governance and audit fees reveal conflicting 
results as to whether the effect is significantly positive or negative (i.e. Tsui et al., 2001; 
Carcello et al., 2002). Further, Hunter and Schmidt (1990) suggest that narrative 
literature reviews can be misleading and often inconclusive. The varying results could 
possibly be due to variations in sample size, time period and setting of studies. As a 
result, different researchers may have reached different conclusions about a set of 
individual studies.  
 
It is still unclear whether the internal audit function plays a substitution or 
complementary role to external auditing and thus, its implications on audit fees are 
inconclusive. Additionally, it is not obvious whether regulatory oversight is able to 
substitute or complement part of external audit work. Due to these conflicting results, it 
is vital to extend the existing literature by examining the moderating effect of regulatory 
oversight on the relationship between audit committee characteristics, internal audit 
function attributes and audit fees in the lens of the demand based perspective.  
 
Furthermore, given that the prior studies were conducted in more developed market 
settings (like the US and UK), it is unclear whether different institutional settings in 
emerging markets will provide similar results. Thus, more research needs to be carried 
out on this issue in an emerging economy such as Malaysia. Next the political economy 
of an emerging economy, Malaysia, is discussed. 
 
2.6 Political Economy in Malaysia 
Economies with efficient economic policies and stable political systems are a big draw 
to investors. Countries that have opened themselves to the global markets and that have 
good legal systems in place attract more capital in the process of globalization (Abdul 
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Rahman, 2006). However, before investors decide to invest their funds in a particular 
business, they want to be assured that the business is financially sound and will continue 
to be so in the foreseeable future (Abdul Rahman, 2006). Investors need to have 
confidence that the business is well managed and will continue to be profitable. 
 
In the era of globalization and open market, Malaysia is exposed to intense competition 
from other nations. Malaysia has a unique corporate environment which offers clear 
identifiable segments of ethnic, and politically connected (PCON) firms (Gul, 2006; 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Yatim et al., 2006) and government linked firms (Najid and 
Abdul Rahman, 2011). It is also generally accepted that Malaysia has favoured firms as 
a result of the government‟s intention to increase Bumiputra equity in the country 
(Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Gul, 2006). It is done through the implementation of the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) that was introduced in 1971 with the objective to redistribute 
wealth equally among the Malaysian Bumiputra and non-Bumiputra (Hensley and 
White, 1993). In order to achieve the NEP‟s objective, the government has advanced the 
Bumiputra businesses, both public and private, by establishing public enterprises and 
joint public-private firms (Bowie, 1988).  
 
There is a close link between selected large firms or conglomerates and the government 
of the day. These politically connected firms have exclusive business relationships with 
the state-owned enterprises and have the ability to access the government‟s major 
contracts (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). The analysis in Johnson and Mitton (2003) provides 
insights that stock returns of politically connected firms were lower in comparison with 
other Malaysian firms. They observe that politically connected firms suffered the most 
during the early stages of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 assuming that the 
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government was unable to implement capital controls. However, once capital controls9 
were imposed, the returns of these favoured firms were higher on average (Johnson and 
Mitton, 2003).  
 
According to Gul (2006), the Malaysian corporate sector is differentiated by the 
existence of the politically connected firms. His study, based on a sample of 740 firm 
year observations, finds a greater increase in audit fees for firms with political 
connections than for non-politically connected firms during the financial crisis. 
However, there was a decline in audit fees for politically connected firms after the 
capital controls were implemented by the government. Abdul Wahab et al. (2009) 
examine 390 Malaysian firms for the period of 1999 to 2003 and find a positive 
relationship between institutional ownership and audit fees. They find that the audit fees 
are higher for politically connected firms.  
 
The corporate landscape in Malaysia is further redefined through the implementation of 
the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA) 1974. The Act was enacted to further advance the 
objective of the NEP, i.e. to increase Bumiputra equity ownership in Malaysian listed 
firms. It requires all firms listed on the stock exchange with equity over a specific limit, 
to sell at least 30 percent of their shares to Bumiputra. The 30 percent stakes are usually 
bought by the government institutional investors or other Bumiputra trust funds on 
behalf of the Bumiputra. Some of these agencies are the Employees Provident Fund 
(EPF), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera 
(LTAT), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH) and Social Security Organization (SOCSO), which 
are also the top five institutional shareholders in Malaysia (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009). 
The shares would then be held by these agencies until the Bumiputra businesses are 
                                                 
9 Government‟s implementation of capital controls in 1998 was primarily to benefit political-connected firms that were 
adversely affected by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
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ready to acquire them (Hamid, 2011). The intention is to reduce equity ownership 
imbalance between the various ethnic groups through increasing Bumiputra equity 
ownership in the capital market (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). 
 
According to La Porta, Lopez, Shleifer and Vishny (1999), the strong governmental 
intervention through NEP have impaired the enforcement of law and order because 
ownership is distributed to certain groups of investors rather than competitively 
achieved. Whilst the Bumiputra are safeguarded under the umbrella of NEP, non-
Bumiputra are left to struggle for their own survival in any feasible way, which includes 
concentrated shareholdings, cross-shareholdings and pyramiding in their firms (Hamid, 
2011).  
 
Interestingly, in the aspects of corporate governance and audit pricing, Yatim et al. 
(2006) find evidence that Bumiputra-controlled firms practice favourable corporate 
governance than non-Bumiputra firms. This shows that Bumiputra controlled firms 
practice improved internal corporate governance as compared to their non-Bumiputra 
counterparts.  The findings by Gul (2006) and Abdul Wahab et al. (2009 and 2011) on 
audit fees for politically connected firms and Yatim et al. (2006) on the audit fees for 
Bumiputra-controlled firms were based on the data prior to the implementation of 
BMLR 2008. Thus, it is important to find whether the findings hold even after the 
corporate governance reform was carried out in 2008. 
 
2.7 Ownership Structure in Malaysia 
The political economy shaped the ownership structure of corporation in Malaysia. The 
rapid growth of the economy has not diluted the concentrated ownership structure in the 
Malaysian firms. Malaysia offers clearly identifiable capital segments which are divided 
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into different types of ownership structures. This division can be observed and 
categorised into politically connected (PCON) firms and non-PCON firms. In this study, 
non-PCON firms are further divided into institutional ownership firms and managerial 
ownership firms (INST&MGRL), and family ownership firms (FAMILY). This is to 
provide a more comprehensive analysis. The classifications of this study‟s sample firms 
are further discussed in Section 4.5.1 of Chapter 4. 
 
2.7.1 Politically Connected (PCON) Firms 
Faccio et al. (2006) in their study on political connections defined a firm as politically 
connected if at least one of its large block holders (anyone directly or indirectly 
controlling at least 10% of voting rights) or one of its top directors (e.g., CEO, 
president, etc) is a government minister or a head of state, or is closely related to a top 
politician or political party, or is a member of parliament.  
 
Malaysia also has its own unique feature of politically connected firms or favoured 
firms, given the close link between selected large firms or conglomerates and the 
government. These politically connected firms have exclusive business relationships 
with the state-owned enterprises and have the ability to access government‟s major 
contracts (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). This is because from a political angle, equitable 
distribution of corporate wealth is one of the key elements under the national 
development policy. The government has also given much attention and initiatives to 
ensure that these favoured firms perform in an effective way and assist the government 
to improve the economic growth.  
 
Market economists have argued that firms in the hands of the government are inferior in 
performance compared to firms in private hands (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1996; 
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Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). This argument arises due to 
their institutional relationship with the government, the market structure in which they 
operate, or the management systems applied within them (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
Besides that, these favoured firms have also been criticized for being too risk-averse and 
lacking sufficient entrepreneurial drive. There have been claims that some of their 
investments may be politically rather than commercially motivated.  
 
2.7.2  Non-PCON Institutional and Managerial Ownership Firms  
Another feature of the Malaysian corporate sector that is also shared amongst the East 
Asian economies such as Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Korea relates to 
institutional ownership (Sulong and Mat Nor, 2008). Institutional ownership in 
Malaysia is relatively high and represents approximately 13 percent of the total market 
capitalization of Bursa Malaysia (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009). The top five institutional 
investors are Employees Provident Fund (EPF), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), 
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH) and Social 
Security Organization (SOCSO) (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009). The institutional investors 
act as an important force in corporate monitoring to protect minority shareholders‟ 
interest. The significant increase in the institutional investors‟ shareholdings has led to 
the formation of a large and powerful constituency which plays a significant role in 
corporate governance (The Star, July 8, 2009). The institutional investors act as an 
important force in corporate monitoring to protect minority shareholder‟s interest. Thus, 
they play a significant role in corporate governance (CG Blueprint, 2011).  
 
Firms with managerial ownership are also common amongst Malaysian listed firms. 
Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000) estimate that approximately 85 percent of 
Malaysian listed firms are owner managed, at the 20% cut-off of control right. Jensen 
51 
 
and Meckling (1976) observe that as management ownership increases, their interests 
are more aligned with that of the owners and thus, the need for intense monitoring by 
the board decreases. They contend that managerial ownership can assist to reduce 
agency costs because managers who own large fraction of the firm‟s shares are 
responsible for any managerial actions that destroy or create value for the firm. When 
managers own a smaller portion of shares, they have greater incentives to pursue 
personal benefits and less incentive to maximize firm value. Consequently, one way to 
reduce the associated increase in agency costs is to increase the shareholdings of the 
managers.  
 
2.7.3  Non-PCON Family Ownership Firms  
Family controlled firm or family ownership is another common form of business 
organization. A stream of literature explains that family ownership is central in most 
countries (Ibrahim and Samad, 2010). Thus, study on the role of family ownership is 
critical to the understanding of corporate governance practices of the firms in Asia 
(Claessens and Fan, 2002). Unlike the developed countries such as the UK and the US 
where dispersed ownership is prevalent, Asian firms have more concentrated ownership 
where family control is common in both small and established firms (Mak and Kusnadi, 
2004). The presence of family (Halim, 2001), government or institutional ownership 
(Abdullah, 2006, World Bank, 2012) may complicate the implementation of corporate 
governance systems in Malaysia.  Claessens et al. (2000) study the separation of 
ownership and control in nine East Asian corporations (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, 
South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand), and find that 
Malaysia has the third highest concentration of control after Thailand and Indonesia, 
with 67.2 percent are family controlled at the cut off level of voting rights of 20 percent.  
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Family ownership is predominant as large shareholders in Malaysia (Zhuang, Edwards 
and Capulong, 2001). Due to this reason, family businesses have become a significant 
component of the Malaysian economy.  
 
2.8 Institutional Setting: The Profession and Regulation 
 
Recent corporate scandals and irregularities have led to public pressure to reform 
business practices and increase regulatory oversight. Dishonesty, greed and cover-ups 
are not new societal concerns. Efforts have been made by the government for the 
development of corporate governance in Malaysia through legislative measures (Abdul 
Rahman, 2006). The concern to improve the prevailing state of corporate governance 
has contributed to the rapid developments of the regulatory framework. Several 
regulatory and administrative agencies have impacted corporate governance in 
Malaysia. These agencies include the Securities Commission (SC), Companies 
Commission of Malaysia (CCM), Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA), Bursa Malaysia (BM) and Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB), as shown in Figure 2.3. These agencies play pivotal roles in providing 
stringent oversight of firms and the structure of corporate financial reporting framework 
in Malaysia. The next discussion elaborates further on each agency and its respective 
role. 
 
2.8.1 Securities Commission (SC) 
The Securities Commission (SC) of Malaysia is the key corporate governance regulator 
and watchdog. The SC was established under the Securities Commission Act 1993 as a 
regulatory body for the capital market. Its main function is to regulate all matters 
pertaining to securities and futures markets and at the same time to ensure enforcement 
of securities and futures laws (http://www.sc.com.my). As an enforcement agency, it 
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has powers to investigate and take administrative, civil or criminal actions against firms. 
To complement its enforcement role, the SC identifies and builds up front line 
regulators, for instance, the Bursa Malaysia, Malaysian Institute of Accountants and 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board which give emphasis to the auditor‟s 
responsibilities in financial statement reporting. The SC monitors and promotes good 
corporate governance practices. The role of the SC is evidenced by the revision of the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) in 2007 and 2012.  
 
Another initiative by the SC is the establishment of the Minority Shareholders 
Watchdog Group (MSWG). It was formed with the aim of promoting the interests of the 
minority shareholders. One of MSWG‟s roles is to create awareness among the minority 
shareholders of their rights to information from firms. MSWG plays a leading role in 
creating shareholders‟ activism which aims at making minority shareholders active 
participants in the market. 
 
In addition, increasing calls to enhance the credibility of financial reporting in Malaysia 
have also led to several other key developments in enhancing corporate governance 
practices by the SC. For instance, in 2010, the Securities Commission Act 1993 was 
amended. The new Section 31B widens the functions of the SC to include promoting 
and developing an effective and robust audit oversight framework in Malaysia, 
promoting confidence in the quality and reliability of audited financial statements and 
also regulating auditors of listed firms. For the purpose of discharging those functions, 
the Act was also amended by adding new Section 31C to provide for the establishment 
of the Audit Oversight Board (AOB), and the appointment of the members of the Board 
by the SC.  Since auditors are a crucial link in the financial reporting value chain, the 
AOB is intended to enhance confidence in the quality and reliability of audited financial 
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statements of listed firms and public interest entities. It is empowered to carry out 
regular and rigorous inspections to ensure that auditors of these entities comply with the 
appropriate standards of auditing.  
 
2.8.2 Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) 
The Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) is a government agency in charge of 
administering and enforcing the Companies Act 1965 which regulates the formation and 
operations of all firms incorporated in Malaysia. With regard to corporate financial 
reporting, the CCM plays a major role since the Act specifically spells out most of the 
financial reporting requirements for firms in Malaysia. The Ninth Schedule of the Act 
prescribes all the financial information required to be presented in the annual report. 
Section 174 outlines the reporting responsibilities of the external auditors in connection 
with audited financial reports. The auditors are required to conduct audits in accordance 
with the approved standards on auditing in Malaysia to obtain reasonable assurance 
about whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement. 
 
2.8.3  Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
On 23 October 1958, the Central Bank of Malaya Ordinance 1958 (CBO) was enacted 
and the Central Bank of Malaysia (Central Bank of Malaya until the formation of 
Malaysia in 1963) commonly known as the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) was 
established pursuant to the CBO on 24 January 1959. BNM‟s functions include 
maintaining the economic interest of the nation and serves as management to provide 
appropriate structures for a new financial system in Malaysia.  
 
The BNM is renowned for its pursuit of a high level of regulatory and supervisory 
standards. Over the past forty years, the BNM has played a pivotal role in the systematic 
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development of the financial infrastructure. As the financial regulatory structure 
evolved, an umbrella of financial safety nets and prudential regulators was put in place 
to ensure that the inherent safety and the soundness of the Malaysian financial 
institutions would promote stability within the financial system 
(http://www.bnm.gov.my/).  
 
According to Lum and Koh (2004), the BNM is one of the best financial regulators in 
the ASEAN financial market economies due to its strict interpretation and transparency 
of its regulatory guidelines. It provides a stringent regulatory oversight on all financial 
institutions and insurance firms in Malaysia. Part X of the Banking and Financial 
Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA) also gives power to the BNM to control and supervise 
the said firms10. In section 69, it provides that BNM has the power to examine, without 
notice, any books and accounts of a financial institution.  
 
Not only does the BNM has the power to examine the financial institution, sections 40, 
55 and 57 of the BAFIA provide that the appointment of an external auditor, director or 
chief executive officer of any financial institution in Malaysia must first be approved by 
the BNM. In addition, section 40 empowers the BNM to instruct the external auditor on 
the scope of the audit and to carry out any examination or procedures. Further, the BNM 
may require the auditor to submit report and any additional information. Though the 
auditor is instructed by the BNM, his/her audit fees shall be paid by the audited 
financial institutions.  
 
Further, in regulating the financial institutions, the BNM is also conferred the power to 
issue “Guidelines” directed to the said institutions. Some examples of the Guidelines 
                                                 
10
 The insurance Act 1996 also has similar provisions applicable to insurance firms. 
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issued to date are the Guidelines of Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions, 
Guidelines on Financial Reporting for Banking Institutions, Best Practices for Risk 
Management, Guidelines on Fit and Proper for Key Responsible Persons, and 
Appointment of External Auditors by Banking Institutions. 
 
In certain aspects, it can be said that BNM is a forerunner in promoting corporate 
governance in Malaysia. For example, the BNM was the first to initiate the setting up of 
audit committees in financial institutions in 1985. It regulated that a majority of the 
committee members should be independent non-executive directors. This requirement 
was subsequently extended to insurance firms (http://www.bnm.gov.my/) and other 
firms listed in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (now Bursa Malaysia). In 1994, the 
listing requirements made it mandatory for every firm seeking listing on the Exchange 
to form an audit committee comprising of members that are independent of the firm‟s 
management. This requirement was imposed to improve investors‟ confidence and 
corporate governance in the capital market.  
 
Further, realising the important role played by the internal auditors in the establishment 
and maintenance of the best possible internal control environment at the firms, the 
BNM required the establishment of the internal audit functions in financial institutions 
and insurance firms to support the audit committees in fulfilling their responsibilities.  
 
To promote the independence and objectivity of the internal audit function, the BNM 
issued BNM Guidelines on Minimum Audit Standards for Internal Auditor of Financial 
Institutions. Para 5.3.1 states that the internal auditor should immediately report to the 
audit committee and chief executive officer any significant audit findings uncovered in 
the course of audit that would adversely affect the financial institution‟s operation and 
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financial condition. In addition, the BNM should be promptly informed of such audit 
findings. The Guidelines also provide that the chief of internal auditors of a financial 
institution should monitor all corrective actions taken by the management with regard to 
the BNM examination findings and report to the BNM any instances where corrective 
actions have not been taken.  
 
It is noteworthy that the BNM‟s supervisory role to ensure safety, soundness and 
robustness of the financial institutions lies with the supervision functions of the BNM. 
In practice, the BNM works closely with both the audit committees and external 
auditors. As the work of the external auditor is used as input to BNM supervisory plans 
under its risk-based approach to supervision, BNM may, when necessary, expand the 
audit scope of the external auditors to address areas of supervisory concerns. This does 
not affect the expectation on external auditors to perform all necessary procedures in 
line with the auditing requirements. This communication keeps the channels open on the 
scope of audit assignments and problems arising from an audit, and on issues related to 
the application of the accounting standards (http://www.bnm.gov.my/).  
 
2.8.4 Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) 
In 1967, the government legislated in the Accountants Act 1967 for the establishment of 
the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA). According to the Act, the main function 
of the MIA is to regulate the practice and promote the interests of the accounting 
profession, to prescribe the minimum qualification of members and to register qualified 
accountants. MIA plays a vital role in ensuring that external auditing is conducted by 
qualified public accountants according to approved auditing standards. The MIA is 
responsible for issuing pronouncements on auditing matters and has issued By Laws 
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(On Professional Conduct and Ethics) for accountants in Malaysia. The role of the MIA 
will be further examined in Section 2.9.1. 
 
2.8.5 Bursa Malaysia (BM) 
Bursa Malaysia, as a front-line regulator of listed firms, is committed to maintaining 
high standards of corporate governance (CG) so as to maintain market integrity. BM 
was previously known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) which was 
established in 1973. It has continuously champion initiatives to promulgate the 
importance of listed firms embracing the best practices of CG.  
 
In recognizing and subscribing to the importance of CG in the context of global capital 
market, Bursa Malaysia has taken a leading role in enhancing the standard of CG 
practices of listed firms (http://www.bursamalaysia.com/). The listing requirements 
issued by Bursa Malaysia incorporated rules on corporate governance and the 
requirements are regularly revised to meet the current needs. In 2008, subsequent to the 
revision of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) by the SC in 2007, 
BM revised its listing requirements to enhance the effectiveness and independence of 
audit committee and to mandate the internal audit function by listed firms. Details of the 
amendments which are pertinent to this study are found in Table 4.1 of Chapter 4. 
 
2.8.6 Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) 
In 1997, the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) was established to 
harmonize the national accounting standards with the international accounting standards 
(http://www.masb.org.my). For this reason, MASB has been developing standards with 
reference to the accounting standards issued by the International Accounting Standards 
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Board (IASB). The MASB together with the Financial Reporting Foundation11, an 
oversight body to MASB, provide the new framework for developing financial 
reporting standards in Malaysia (http://www.masb.org.my).  
 
 
The new framework consists of an independent standard setting structure which 
incorporates the views of stakeholders including preparers, users, regulators and the 
accounting profession. 
                                                 
11 FRF is a trustee body, establish under the Financial Reporting Act 1997, which has the responsibility for the oversight of 
MASB‟s performance, financial and funding arrangements.  
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Figure 2.3:  Regulatory Agencies in Malaysia  
Source: Zakiah (2006) 
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2.9 Evolution of the Auditing Profession: A Summary 
 
The auditing developments that took place due to the establishment of accounting and 
auditing professional bodies expected the role of auditors to converge (Lee and Azham, 
2008). The changes made to the accounting and auditing regulations to a certain extent 
have implications for the role of external auditors in carrying out their audit 
engagements. The auditors do not only focus on preventing and detecting fraud and 
errors but also assess the truth and fairness of the firms‟ financial statements (Lee and 
Azham, 2008). The practice of auditing in Malaysia highlighted the financial reporting 
framework which includes the standards, legal responsibilities, codes of conduct and 
reporting requirements that guide an auditor‟s work. It also draws attention to the 
professional, regulatory and standard setting bodies that directly impact the auditing 
profession. Due to decisive changes made to the audit practice resulting from extensive 
global reforms, auditors are now expected to perform their duties to meet the 
expectations of the public, to maintain high standards of professionalism and to uphold 
a good reputation in the auditing profession (Lee and Azham, 2008).  
 
In the US, several provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have required 
additional audit procedures, and external auditors tend to charge higher audit fees (Jiang 
and Wu, 2009). Likewise in Malaysia, Yatim et al. (2006) support the finding that the 
increase in audit fees is due to changes in regulatory environment. Their results show 
there is an increase in audit fees after the corporate governance reforms in 2001. In 
2008, further reforms were carried out to strengthen the board of directors and audit 
committee of listed firms. This research studies the impact of the 2008 reforms on audit 
fees.   
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2.9.1 Lowest Regional Audit Fees  
In 1992, the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) was entrusted to promote and 
regulate the accounting profession and proposed a schedule for determining audit fees. 
The intention was to harmonise the fee setting basis and to minimize disparity in fees 
schedules (Akauntan Nasional, 1993).  
 
Further, it was discovered that there were many firms which were audited by 
unqualified or unregistered accountants. Some of these “accountants” charged lower 
fees and abetted their clients in the falsification of their accounts. Further, these bogus 
practitioners resulted in a loss of confidence in the profession by not only the general 
public but also foreign investors (Akauntan Nasional, 1994). 
 
Setting audit fees scales was thus essential to prevent undercutting and thus protect the 
auditing profession and industry. As stated by the then MIA‟s Public Practice 
Committee chairman‟s “in the past, there was no guideline whatsoever to say how much 
a firm should charge” (Akauntan Nasional, 1993). The audit fees schedule was 
approved by the MIA council in April 1993. Unfortunately, it did not have the force of 
law because the MIA issued it only as a guideline for audit practitioners in 1994 
(Akauntan Nasional, 1994).  
 
The guideline for audit pricing had not been fully adopted by most audit firms, yet there 
were numerous requests to review and regulate audit fees due to high costs incurred in 
maintaining office and hiring staff. To complicate matters, some auditors still practice 
undercutting. According to Lee, Azham and Gloeck (2009), this might be due to lack of 
enforcement by the regulatory authority.  
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2.9.2 Implications for Audit Fees and Audit Quality in Malaysia 
 
Several key developments have occurred to guide auditors in carrying out audit practice 
more diligently and to enhance the integrity of financial statement audit. Over the years, 
stringent rules and regulations were imposed by the government which need to be 
fulfilled by external auditors. Hence, extra audit procedures need to be undertaken in 
performing the audit assignment. According to the Auditor General of Malaysia in 
2010, Tan Sri Ambrin Buang, the number of fraud cases, forgery and corruption in 
corporate Malaysia are under control as the government has introduced new measures 
and policies to mitigate the risks (Business Times, July 26, 2010).  
 
However, the reforms undertaken this far to increase audit quality may be hampered due 
to the shortage of qualified accountants in Malaysia. It is possible that one of the 
reasons for the lack of qualified accountants is due to the low audit fees imposed by 
local audit firms. This is further compounded by the global competition for human 
capital. Local audit firms are experiencing difficulties in hiring and retaining a qualified 
audit workforce as qualified accountants are paid much better in other countries like 
Singapore, China and the Middle East (Lee and Azham, 2008). Consequently, audit 
firms in Malaysia compete to hire young graduates who lack experience. This leads to 
the issue of audit quality.  
 
The New Straits Times (April 11, 2011) reports that the audit fees charged by the 
auditors to their audited clients are too low to enable the auditors to perform their duties 
adequately. They are advised to command fees which commensurate with their duties in 
order to deliver high quality service that comply with international standards. 
Conversely, it may be argued that auditors could have performed the required duties but 
yet failed to prevent the financial scandals (Lee and Azham, 2008). As cited by Lee and 
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Azham (2008) from The Edge Malaysia on February 4, 2008 (p.20), an auditor 
commented that:  
An auditor can improve and analyze the books, but in the end, 
the key is for management to practice good governance.  
 
The issue of charging low audit fees is still a problem in Malaysia (Devi and Samujh, 
2010). To overcome this issue, audit firms should come to an agreement for a 
standardized audit pricing. Otherwise, auditors are likely to reduce audit procedures in 
order to cut the costs of performing the audit assignments. All in all, audit quality is 
likely to be sacrificed as a result of low audit fees while maintaining the profit margin. 
The issue of low audit fees has attracted a lot of interest among regulators and others, 
and thus this study is undertaken to find whether enhanced corporate governance 
reforms have contributed to raising audit fees. 
 
2.10 Research Questions 
Four research questions for the present study arose from the research gaps noted in this 
chapter. Whilst there are anecdotal claims that CG has been enhanced since 2007, there 
is no empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the revised BMLR 2008 on the internal 
governance mechanisms, namely, the audit committee and internal audit function, and 
their implications on audit fees for PCON and non-PCON firms.  
 
The amendment to the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR) in 2008 was 
designed to increase oversight and regulation for listed firms. The revised BMLR 2008 
strives to strengthen the role of audit committees specifically on the effectiveness and 
independence of audit committees and mandating an internal audit function for listed 
firms. Yet, no study to date has specifically examined the impact of these revised listing 
requirements on audit committees, internal audit function and their implications on 
audit fees for PCON and non-PCON firms. This study is important as it seeks to 
65 
 
evidence the moderating effect of political embeddedness on the enhanced CG 
environment on PCON and non-PCON firms. Since earlier studies have largely focused 
on PCON firms (Abdul Wahab et al., 2009; Gul, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 2003) and 
further the World Bank Report has raised concerns on the aspect of government equity 
ownership, this study also focuses on PCON firms which are said to be the favoured 
firms structure in Malaysia (Gomez and Jomo, 1999; Gul, 2006; Johnson and Mitton, 
2003), vis-a-vis other ownership structures of institutional and managerial ownership 
firms (INST&MGRL) and family ownership firms (FAMILY), in the analysis. Hence, 
based on these arguments, the study raises the first and second research questions:  
RQ1: Do PCON firms pay higher audit fees than non-PCON firms? 
 
RQ2:  Is the association between audit committee characteristics and internal audit 
function attributes, and audit fees stronger post BMLR 2008 implementation 
for PCON than non-PCON firms? 
 
Further, there are limited studies examining the effect of regulatory oversight on the 
association between the internal governance mechanisms and audit fees for highly 
regulated firms (HRFs) and less regulated firms (LRFs). As discussed in Section 1.2.2.2 
above, it is not clear whether the substitute or complement perspective will be observed 
in highly regulated firms in Malaysia. There is a gap in the audit fees research on the 
effect of regulatory oversight function on HRFs and LRFs in Malaysia. Thus, it is 
proposed that the regulatory regime in Malaysia should be examined in greater depth to 
offer a better and clearer understanding of the effect of regulatory oversight on the 
relationship between the internal governance mechanisms and audit fees. For that 
reason, this study investigates whether regulatory oversight moderates the relationship 
between the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes, and audit fees. Therefore, the study addresses the 
following research questions. 
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RQ3:   Do HRFs pay higher audit fees than LRFs? 
RQ4:  Is the association between audit committee characteristics and internal audit 
function attributes, and audit fees stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation 
for HRFs than LRFs? 
 
Based on the above research questions, this study extends the extant literature on audit 
fees and CG by evidencing the rise of the demand side explanation by investigating the 
internal governance mechanisms‟ impact post-BMLR 2008 implementation on audit 
fees for PCON and non-PCON firms and between highly regulated and less regulated 
firms, which assumes that:  
1) enhanced audit committee characteristics will improve corporate governance; 
hence there will be higher audit fees due to the demand to safeguard reputational 
capital by the audit committee, and 
2) enhanced internal audit function attributes will improve corporate governance, 
thus higher audit fees due to greater demand for extensive audit work by the audit 
committee, and 
3) stringent regulatory oversight will improve corporate governance and higher audit 
fees due to demand for greater level of responsibility imposed on the audit 
committee together with demand for better quality of audit work by the external 
auditor.  
 
2.11     Conclusion 
This Chapter has identified the research gaps in the extant corporate governance and 
audit fees literature in the context of the emerging Malaysian economy that has 
undergone regulatory reforms to enhance its corporate governance practices and to 
remain competitive in this global economy. Whilst the issue of corporate governance 
and its implications for audit fees have been widely discussed in the context of more 
advanced economies, there is limited evidence of the impacts of the reformed CG on the 
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audit fees in emerging economies. The next Chapter will discuss the theories related to 
the study, which are the agency theory, political embeddedness perspective and institutional 
theory to support the hypotheses development relating to the research questions identified in 
this Chapter.  
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Chapter 3 THEORIES UNDERLYING THIS RESEARCH 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This Chapter discusses the theories related to the study, which are the agency theory, 
political embeddedness perspective and institutional theory, to support the research 
questions identified in Chapter 2 and the hypotheses which will be developed in Chapter 
4.   
3.2 Underlying Theories in Research 
Three theories are specifically drawn upon to provide the perspective for the research 
questions highlighted in Chapter 2. These are (i) the agency theory; (ii) the political 
embeddedness perspective; and (iii) the institutional theory. 
 
3.2.1 Agency Theory 
Most of the auditing and accounting studies on governance issues rests upon the 
foundation of traditional agency literature (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright, 2008). 
These studies examine the monitoring roles of the board of directors and audit 
committee on managers to protect shareholders‟ interests. The principal-agent approach 
was carried out further by Jensen and Meckling (1976), which highlights the importance 
of the relationship between shareholders and managers and at the same time to 
minimize agency costs.  
 
This research uses an agency theory framework to examine the impact of having an 
audit committee that is independent, diligent and possesses accounting expertise, 
representing the interest of corporate owners as a counter to the potential self-interest of 
management. The 1970‟s work carried out by Jensen and Meckling (1976) resulted in a 
theory for understanding the implications of the separation of ownership from control. It 
identifies the agency relationship between the principal and its agent, whereby the 
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principal engages the agent to perform some services on the principal‟s behalf and the 
principal will normally delegate some decision making authority to the agent. 
 
Applying this to a corporate setup, managers have a conflict of interest with those of the 
shareholders. The managers, as agents, may be working to maximize their own personal 
gains rather than maximizing shareholders‟ value. Managers as agents are thus 
motivated by their own personal gains to the detriment of their principal‟s interests. 
According to Kiel and Nicholson (2003, p.29), 
 
Agency theory suggests that professional managers can, by 
virtue of their superior knowledge and expertise, gain advantage 
of the firm’s owners. 
 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) present the view that the agency theory was widely adopted 
in the 1970‟s and 1980‟s due to the „excesses‟ of the period. Managers making 
decisions on takeovers of firms were paying themselves large salary packages even 
when the businesses were non-performing. This type of behaviour needed to be 
controlled by the „widespread adoption of an independent board mechanism to monitor 
a corporation‟s management‟ (Kiel and Nicholson 2003, p.30). 
 
Gul and Leung (2004) highlight two problems related to the management process as a 
result of the separation between ownership and control. First, the goals of the principal 
and agent may not be aligned: the agent will act in his own self-interests and the 
principal is only interested in the financial returns. Secondly, the principal faces 
difficulties in observing its agent‟s action due to inadequate information about the 
business. Consequently, principals and agents have to invest in various information 
systems to reduce agency costs associated with information asymmetry (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
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Agency problems will also arise when shareholders and managers have different 
attitudes towards risks (Arnold and Lange, 2004). Therefore, managers may not act in 
the best interests of shareholders and may prefer different actions to shareholders 
because they have different interests and risk preferences. This conflict of interests issue 
eventually gives rise to agency costs such as the costs associated with monitoring 
management, creating and implementing effective corporate governance.  
 
In line with the positive accounting theory, opportunistic behaviour is assumed in 
agency theory, where individuals are assumed to act to maximise self interests. The 
positive theory which was introduced by Watts and Zimmerman in 1978 assumes that 
individuals act to maximise their own utility and consequently some decisions made by 
managers are motivated by self-interests, which reduces the welfare of the principal.  
 
To overcome such issues, the board of directors is given the responsibility to monitor 
the management, who otherwise may act in their personal best interest and not in the 
interests of the principal (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Effective governance structures for the control of managers are vital. Some of the 
recommended governance structures are the board of directors, who are predominantly 
outsiders with no personal relationship with management, a chairperson of the board 
who is not an executive manager of the firm and a chief executive officer whose 
personal interests is aligned with shareholders through stock ownership or a bonus 
compensation plan that is linked to shareholders‟ wealth (Donaldson 1990, p.376). The 
role of corporate governance here is to protect the shareholders by monitoring managers 
through the board of directors. This is also the view adopted by statements of best 
practices on corporate governance such as the Australian Stock Exchange Corporate 
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Governance Principles (2003), OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (1999) and 
the Revised Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (2007).  
 
The agency theory asserts that a firm can employ various mechanisms to align the 
interests of agents and principals, and to monitor agents‟ behaviour (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Preston and McMilan, 1991). Given its various responsibilities, the 
board normally delegates its financial oversight function to the audit committee (Mat 
Zain, 2005). Menon and Williams (1994) use the agency theory perspective to examine 
the argument that firms with high agency costs will attempt to mitigate these costs by 
undertaking increased monitoring activity through the audit committee. In other words, 
the presence of an audit committee who are independent, diligent and has financial 
expertise, functions as a monitoring mechanism that could reduce the agency costs. For 
the purpose of this study, the three (3) key organizational governance mechanisms of 
interest which will be examined are the audit committee, the internal audit function and 
the external audit as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
The role of the audit committee is to direct organizational resources towards 
establishing appropriate internal controls and other governance mechanisms. The 
internal audit function is another internal governance mechanism that undertakes 
analysis of activities within an organization and to make recommendations for the 
improvement of internal control and to promote efficiencies. The relationship between a 
firm‟s audit committee and internal auditors is crucial because the audit committee 
supports the internal audit function by reviewing the adequacy of the scope and the 
function of internal audit, providing adequate resources and facilitating communication 
with management (IIA, 1993). On the other hand, the internal auditors play an 
important role in overseeing the financial control and reporting environment of the firm. 
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Thus, it follows that an effective audit committee should improve internal control and 
act as a means of attenuating agency costs (Ho and Wong, 2001). 
 
In sum, as internal governance mechanisms, both the audit committee and internal audit 
function can increase the monitoring of management and reduce the incidence of 
irregularities in the financial reporting.  
 
However, it is observed that there is a preponderance of archival accounting and 
auditing literature that have taken solely an agency theory perspective, and are unable to 
detect the effectiveness of governance structure (Cohen et al., 2008). For example, 
measures of independence used in prior studies have led to inconclusive results because 
the proxies used may not reflect the actions and conduct of the board (Mac Avoy and 
Millstein, 2004). According to Mac Avoy and Millstein (2004), the construct 
„independence‟ has proved difficult to capture using the agency framework.  
 
This is also supported by Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) who state that causal 
links between measures of governance quality and the performance of the firm is 
difficult to establish using an agency framework. They also highlight in their study the 
issue of whether audit committee independence really has an influence on governance. 
Thus, as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), agency theory needs to be complemented with 
other theories. In the present study, the political embeddedness perspective and 
institutional theory are also applied to explain the governance issues. 
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Figure 3.1: The Relationship between the Audit Committees, Internal Audit Functions and 
External Auditors 
Source: Mat Zain (2005) 
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3.2.2 Political Embeddedness Perspective 
Embeddedness is the degree to which individuals or firms are entangled in a social 
network. The term embeddedness involves the overlap between social and economic 
ties within and between organizations (Granovetter, 1985). The embeddedness 
perspective was developed under the economic sociology discipline (Granovetter, 1985; 
Polanyi, 1944; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993; Zukin and DiMaggio, 1990). The 
concept of embeddedness, which highlights the economic activity in institutions, was 
first introduced by Polanyi (1944). Later, Granovetter (1985) emphasized 
embeddedness of economic activity in ongoing patterns of social relations. His 
approach was further extended by researchers whose interests were in inter-
organizational relationships (Dacin, Ventresca and Beal, 1999; Gulati and Gargiulo, 
1999; Hagedoorn, 2006; Uzzi, 1996 and 1997).  
 
The present study aims to extend the literature by (1) introducing the concept of 
political embeddedness to explain the position of politically connected firms, and (2) to 
highlight the professional and personal networking between the external auditors and 
former Big4 auditors employed by the audited firms.  
 
Political embeddedness can be divided into four folds. First, political settings for 
networks, where the government provides a framework of rules and regulations within 
which private actors have to play (Salmi, 1995, p. 68). Secondly, the political actors 
have great influence in the government. The political or institutional actors include the 
bureaucrats, government ministers, and members of parliament, opposition parties, 
interest groups and the media (Hadjikhani and Håkansson, 1996). Thirdly, political 
activities by the firms involved in the political system (Halinen and Törnroos, 1998), 
such as lobbyists of government‟s contracts and to obtain government‟s funding. Lastly, 
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the political resources that the firms hope to achieve from their political activities such 
as public sector contracts, licences and approvals, industry policies and legislative 
measures, support in the form of tax concessions, tariffs and other protectionist 
measures, funding for research and development and regional development (Hadjikhani 
and Sharma, 1996).  
 
Politically connected firms are identified as firms having officers or major shareholders 
with close relationships with key government officials (Gomez and Jomo, 1997), and 
are associated with easier access to the government‟s valuable resources. A review of 
the literature has demonstrated the benefits of being connected to the government, for 
instance, research associated with political connections with the state government 
(Hillman et al., 2004; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Xin and Pearce, 1996; Luo and Chen, 
1997; Peng and Luo, 2000; Lester et al., 2008: Siegel, 2007) and political networking 
(Faccio, 2006; Frynas, Mellahi and Pigman, 2006; Hillman, 2005; Peng and Luo, 2000). 
Generally, the politically connected firms will gain the upmost advantage by receiving 
valuable advice and by being in position to influence government policies.  
 
In addition, firms with former government officials on the board are also said to be 
politically connected, because the ties facilitate access to resources controlled by the 
government. Schaede (1995) explains the “Old Boys” network about the re-employment 
of retired former government officials in private or quasi-private firms, due to their 
expertise and networking during their stint as a bureaucrat. The intention is to get access 
to the governmental information and for lobbying with the government for continued 
protection. Besides that, these firms are given privileges over their competitors when 
applying for licences, tax exemptions, and government contracts. Thus, the presence of 
76 
 
current or former government officials on the board may create a situation of high 
political embeddedness. 
 
However, political embeddedness is also associated with costs. In a situation where the 
political connection is through the board of directors, the government officials in their 
capacity as the firm‟s directors influence the firm‟s governance process. Though the law 
requires directors to act for the benefit and best interest of the firm, the directors who 
are also government officials represent the government‟s interests. As the interest of the 
government might diverge from those of the firm and its shareholders (Aharoni, 1986), 
the directors may promote strategies from the government‟s view rather than from the 
firm‟s view.  
 
The political embeddedness perspective may also be pertinent to explain the corporate 
setting in Malaysia, where PCON firms have ties with certain political party or 
politician. As discussed earlier in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2, the existence of the PCON 
firms is due to the Malaysian government‟s intervention to increase Bumiputra equity 
ownership. The intervention started with the introduction of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) in 1971 and continues to grow since then. This is because from a political 
perspective, equitable distribution of corporate wealth is the key element under the 
national development policy.  
 
Further, the government has also given much attention and initiatives to ensure that the 
favoured firms perform in an effective way and assist the government to improve the 
economic growth. These favoured firms are now more conscious of good governance 
and are expected to improve its business performance
12
. Nevertheless, the government 
                                                 
12 Refer to Section 6.4.8 for further discussion 
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has also from time to time supported Chinese firms by channelling contracts to them. 
These favoured Bumiputra and Chinese firms could access resources, funds and 
opportunities to build new wealth through politics (Gomez and Jomo, 1999).  
 
It is also argued that politicians or political parties invest in the corporate sector by 
using Bumiputra leaders as proxy investors (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). With their close 
relationship with politicians, these favoured firms could influence policy making and 
make business opportunities more accessible for their firms. At the same time, they 
assist the government in fulfilling the objectives of socio-economic policy and raising 
the status of Bumiputra in the corporate sector. Thus, politics has a role in the favoured 
firms‟ performance by bringing growth and expansion to them through favourable deals 
and access to opportunities (Gomez and Jomo, 1999).  
 
In addition, the political embeddedness perspective may also be used to explain 
embedded relationship between the two key actors of the audit process namely, the 
external auditors with the members of the audit committee and employees of the audited 
firm. This is due to the fact that an external auditor plays an advisory role which embeds 
his relationship with the audited firm in the audit process. According to Richard (2006), 
the relationship between the audited firm and the external auditors‟ team can be divided 
into a professional and personal relationship.  
 
According to Williamson (1994), the professional relationship is described to be like an 
economic exchange, framed by professional standards with the intention to create 
barriers preventing the development of informal engagements during the formal audit 
process (Ring and Van De Ven, 1989). On the other hand, personal relationship is 
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defined as a social exchange, implying in particular obligations that are not specified a 
priori (Blau, 1964).  
 
Professional and personal relationships need to be based on trust. Trust between the 
manager and the auditor transpires from a professional and personal relationship. 
Professional trust can be defined as “the probability that this one carries out an action 
that is beneficial or at least non-prejudicial is rather strong according to us to consider 
that we can engage in a form of a cooperation with him” (Gambetta, 1988, p. 217). In 
contrast, personal trust is referred to as “a belief of a person in the integrity of another 
person” and “exists insofar as a person believes that another person is benevolent and 
honest” (Larzelere and Huston, 1980, p. 595).  
 
The audit committee nominates the external auditor, assesses its independence and 
discusses the audit scope. Open communication between the external auditor and audit 
committee is imperative for a successful relationship. It is important that the audit 
committee and the external auditor communicate effectively to ensure that an 
appropriate balance exists. In the audit process, professional relationship and personal 
relationship between the audit committee members who are former Big4 auditors and 
the external auditors also can be called the “Old Boy” network (Schaede, 1995). The 
former Big4 auditors have a better understanding of the audit process and empathise 
with the low fees. As supported by Devi and Samujh (2010) that Malaysia‟s audit fees 
are still the lowest in the ASEAN region and thus, the audit committee‟s demand for 
more audit procedures and are willing to pay higher audit fees to the external auditors.  
 
With regards to this study, Table 3.1 shows the number of the former Big4 auditors 
appointed by the politically connected firms in 2009. Out of 67 PCON firms, 40 firms 
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appointed former Big4 auditors as members of the audit committees (39), chief 
executive officers/managing directors (7), chief operating officers/chief financial 
officers (5) and non-executive directors (7). Thirty-three percent of audit committee 
members in PCON firms are former Big4 auditors; 17.5 percent of the chief executive 
officers/managing directors, 12.5 percent of the chief operating officers/chief finance 
officers and 10.1 percent of the other non-executive directors are also former Big4 
auditors.   
 
To conclude, existing literature on political embeddedness represents a useful starting 
point for research into the political dimensions of corporate governance in Malaysia due 
to its unique corporate settings. Political embeddedness perspective explains the 
political relationship between the government and its favoured firms. In a political 
relationship, exchange of information and interest are made between the favoured firms 
and government or political players, whereby, the firms obtain advantages of the 
government resources. In return, these firms will assist the government (Hadjikhani and 
Ghauri, 2001) by having acting government officials on the boards of firms (Hillman, 
2005). 
 
In adopting the political embeddedness perspective, this study incorporates the first 
dimension on ownership and directorship of government officials under political 
influence. It takes cognizant of the unique Malaysian political economy with politically 
connected (PCON) firms with strong ties with the government to achieve their mutual 
objectives.  Such favoured firms play an important role in corporate Malaysia. 
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Table 3.1:  PCON firms with former Big4 auditors in 2009  
 
Total 
number of 
AC 
members 
Total number 
of former 
Big4 auditor 
as AC 
members  
Total 
number 
of  
CEO/MD 
Total number 
of former Big4 
auditor as 
CEO/MD 
Total 
number 
of COO/ 
CFO 
Total number 
of former Big4 
auditor as 
COO/CFO 
Total 
number of 
NED other 
than AC 
Total number 
of former Big4 
auditor as NED 
 
117 
 
39 
 
(33.3%) 
 
40 
 
7 
 
(17.5%) 
 
40 
 
5 
 
(12.5%) 
 
69 
 
7 
 
(10.1%) 
Source: Respective PCON firms annual report 2009 
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In addition to the political embeddedness perspective, the Malaysian institutional setting is 
also unique in the sense that it has instituted strong regulatory oversights over its corporate 
sector. To accommodate this, the institutional theory is drawn upon to examine the existence 
of varying degree of oversight over Malaysian firms. 
 
3.2.3 Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory reinforces the importance of understanding the interactions between 
governance key players and other governance parties (Cohen et al., 2008). The institutional 
theory identifies the relationship between regulators and firms.  These regulatory agencies are 
empowered to monitor and inspect compliance using international and local standards, as well 
as to investigate suspected non-compliance and impose appropriate sanctions on delinquent 
firms. Fogarty and Kalbers (1998) apply the institutional theory in their study to evidence that 
institutional support together with strong management and board diligence enhance the 
effectiveness of the audit committee. They conclude that audit committee members are 
operating in an institutionalized environment in order to achieve their authority.  
 
An institution is defined as “the shared and taken for granted assumptions which identify 
categories of human actors and their activities and relationship” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, 
p.8). It does not only embrace the structures, policies and procedures of a specific 
organization, but it also consists of other organizational systems which come together to 
achieve the same objectives (Khadaroo and Shaikh, 2007). Some of the common objectives in 
relation to corporate governance are promoting corporate governance best practices, 
formulating and enforcing the accounting standards applicable to listed firms. These 
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structures and systems will develop progressively through changes in rules and regulations by 
the regulators.  
 
Institutions tend to function best under governmental units, highly regulated organizations and 
also private sector units which are highly dependent upon public financing (Fogarty, Bealing 
and Dirsmith, 1996). This common regulatory environment has been cited as one of the forces 
in dictating various characteristics of a firm‟s conduct and configuration including external 
reporting requirements. Organizations obey these rules and requirements not just on 
efficiency grounds but also to enhance their legitimacy, resources and survival capacities 
(Kondra and Hinings, 1998). 
 
It thus follows that apart from the agency theory, institutional theory has been applied to 
examine issues in corporate governance. Institutional theory provides a framework for better 
understanding of the socio-economic and legal influences on countries and organizations, and 
its strategic response to those influences (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Carruthers, 1995; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Hussain 
and Hoque, 2002; Khadaroo, 2005; Khadaroo and Shaikh, 2007). Institutional theorists refer 
to the possibility for countries and organizations to become similar overtime through the 
process of homogeneity. The process of homogenization is known as „isomorphism‟ 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
Isomorphism is divided into three avenues that are coercive, normative and mimetic pressures 
which operate in the institutional environment, to explain about organizations or countries 
adopting similar practice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Coercive isomorphism results from 
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external regulatory-type pressure for organizational convergence (Cohen et al., 2008). 
Organizations are experiencing formal and informal pressures from other organizations on 
which they are dependent. Such pressures may be felt as force or persuasion as a direct 
response to government directives. Normative isomorphism, however, is primarily from 
professionalization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and there are various kinds of professionals 
within an organization. Though they differ, they have similarities with their professional 
counterparts in other organizations. Mimetic isomorphism results from significant 
environmental uncertainty, which is a powerful force that encourages imitation (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). It happens when organizations tend to model themselves after other 
similar organizations that they perceive to be more successful. According to Cohen et al. 
(2008), the modelling is a response to uncertainty and the modelled organization may have no 
intention to be followed by other organizations. 
 
It has long been recognized that firms exercise vast powers in modern societies. The concern 
for regulating such power and ensuring its accountability has been at the centre of analysis 
and debate. The establishment of regulatory agencies, which have been charged with the 
responsibility for controlling the powers of firms, should be mandatory (MICG, 2001). This is 
because the collapse of conglomerates has affected not only developed countries but also 
developing countries such as Malaysia. In addition, financial scandals and irregularities have 
once again focused attention on the oversight roles of the accounting profession, Bursa 
Malaysia, Securities Commission and Bank Negara Malaysia. It is vital to have an institution 
or agency that can monitor the operation of the firms so as to reduce or minimize corporate 
failures. It has always been accepted that however many laws or regulations there are, 
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situations will occur from time to time highlighting the inadequacy of such laws or 
regulations. It is thus necessary to review the law and regulations regularly (MICG, 2001). 
 
Regulations articulate clear standards of corporate governance which reflect society‟s 
expectations of best practices and standards of ethical behaviour. Some of these standards are 
set down as codes of practices whilst others are embedded in law reforms proposal (MICG, 
2004).  It is the responsibility of the national regulatory agencies to ensure robust and 
effective monitoring and surveillance of firms and market operations. This task is made more 
difficult by the integration of financial institutions and activities, the impact of technology on 
the speed of financial and information flows, and the internationalization of economic activity 
(MICG, 2004).    
 
In the accounting literature, institutional theory has been applied to a wide variety of 
situations. For example, Bealing et al. (1996) studied the historical development of the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and in particular, the form and content of its 
early regulatory actions as a case example of an organization attempting to justify its 
existence and role in financial markets. Other management literature discusses institutional 
theory in terms of legitimacy. According to Suchman (1995), institutions respond to threats to 
legitimacy with organizational changes and organizational communication. Another study 
finds that leaders of an institution which is facing structural change tend to engage in fawning 
behaviour in order to preserve power (Westphal, 1998).  
 
In addition, institutional theory may also be used to explain the role of audit committees in 
firms. As indicated by Meyer and Rowan (1977), organizational structures become symbolic 
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displays of conformity and social accountability. The establishment of audit committees is 
said to offer an example where the theory suggest that organizational legitimacy may be 
secured by the use of myth and ceremony that link organizations to their external 
environments. Supported by Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson and Lapides (2000), the audit 
committee acts as a symbolic function and serve as a symbol of effective oversight. Some 
researchers use institutional theory  to investigate whether audit committee plays its role in 
monitoring by accomplishing a given task or is there any „loose coupling‟ in existence 
(Fogarty and Kalbers, 1993 and 1998; Spira, 1999).  
 
Eisenhardt (1988) finds that institutional theory is applicable in a complex and dynamic 
situation. In order for organizations and regulators to interact with one another, they have to 
comply with specific practices and procedures. Notwithstanding this apparent relevance of 
institutional theory to quasi government institutions such as the SEC in the US, Meyers and 
Rowan (1977) argue that listed firms are also facing significant institutional pressures to 
conform and legitimize their practices and operations. The effectiveness of regulations on 
firms varies among countries and many countries allocate few resources to enforce their 
regulations. Further, it is the responsibility of the regulatory agencies having oversight 
authority over accounting matters (Baker et al., 2006) to restore public confidence by 
enforcing governance practices. 
 
In the case of Malaysia, the regulatory framework has undergone tremendous changes so as to 
further strengthen the country‟s financial and capital markets (Abdul Rahman, 2006). The 
financial crisis in 1997 seems to have „coerced‟ South-East Asian countries, including 
Malaysia, into reforming their existing corporate governance structures. The diverse 
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institutions which were set up by the respective governments illustrates the „normative‟ 
influence of government securities market regulators, professional bodies, the market and 
other interest groups in promoting good corporate governance practices. These corporate 
governance best practices are not specific to any country but rather are adopted by many 
countries internationally through „mimetic‟ processes (Khadaroo and Shaikh, 2007).  
 
In Malaysia, several regulatory and administrative agencies were established to improve and 
also oversee the corporate governance of firms. These were examined in Section 2.8 of 
Chapter 2. For instance, the Securities Commission (SC) was established to encourage good 
governance among firms with the objective of raising shareholder value. In this regard, the 
Securities Commission has also identified numerous other specific recommendations for 
strengthening corporate governance, including further enhancing shareholder rights, 
especially those of minority shareholders‟ and broadening avenues for private enforcement of 
these rights to firms (http://www.sc.com.my).  
 
Thus, in 2001, the Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) was established to create 
awareness among minority shareholders of their rights, and to act on behalf of minority 
shareholders so as to deter abuses by majority shareholders. This is part of the broader capital 
market framework to protect the interest of minority shareholders through shareholder 
activism (Zakiah, 2006).  
 
Further, the establishment of the Audit Oversight Board (AOB) in 2010 follows the footsteps 
of the US (the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), the UK (the 
Professional Oversight Board for Accountancy), Australia (the Auditing & Assurance 
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Standards Board which sets auditing standards, and a Financial Reporting Council that 
monitors auditor independence), Egypt, Lithuania, Mauritius and Sri Lanka. All these 
countries have established some form of independent regulatory oversight over their 
respective auditing professions, but with differing levels of empowerment (Accountants 
Today, 2008).  
 
In Malaysia, the AOB was established to create a new governance structure that underscores 
auditors‟ responsibilities in financial statement reporting (The Star, April 2, 2010). The AOB 
was established under Part III of the Securities Commission Act 1993 to promote confidence 
in the quality and reliability of audited financial statements in Malaysia. The need to reform 
the current audit oversight framework is seen as a direct response to the serious irregularities 
in financial reporting in Malaysia (http://www.sc.com.my). The AOB is said to provide an 
independent oversight and regulation of external auditors of listed firms in Malaysia. The 
AOB has power to reprimand auditors who have committed wrongs including issuing 
penalties and deregistering them from audit practice (The Star, 2 April, 2010). Strengthening 
audit quality and ensuring ethical behaviour among accounting professionals is critical if 
Malaysia wants to be at par with the global financial and capital markets (Nazatul, 2009).  
 
The establishment of an independent oversight body is pertinent in view of the emergence of 
audit failures which has focused the world‟s attention on accounting standards and the role of 
auditors. One cause of corporate collapse is the lack of professionalism and the failure of the 
auditing profession itself. Thus, auditors are facing new challenges that require them to be 
more competent to face the global capital market (Lee and Azham, 2008). In order to diverge, 
auditors should be able to reinvent themselves and be prepared for more challenges. Due to 
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this, the government of Malaysia has made efforts to ensure that the board of directors, audit 
committee and external auditors are able to comply with stringent and rigorous standards 
imposed by the statutory bodies so as to enhance audit quality in line with international 
benchmarks (MICG, 2004).  
 
To overcome such issues, the Bursa Malaysia (BM) revised its Listing Requirements, 
mandating listed firms to comply with certain Best Practices recommended by the Malaysia 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG). Subsequent to the Revised Code 2007, the Bursa 
Malaysia further reviewed its listing requirements in 2008 to enhance the effectiveness of 
internal governance mechanisms in listed firms. The new BMLR 2008 stipulates the 
eligibility criteria for appointment to the audit committee, the composition of the committee, 
the frequency of meetings and the need for continuous training. In addition, internal audit 
functions are required in all listed firms and the reporting line for internal auditors are 
clarified (more specifically, Para (30) Appendix 9C, Para 15.10, 15.13 and 15.28 of BMLR 
2008).  
 
These amendments to the listing requirements by the Bursa Malaysia are primarily in 
response to the coercive pressures by the developments of domestic and international capital 
markets, and normative pressures from the shareholders and the public to assess and 
determine the standards of corporate governance by listed firms (Khadaroo and Shaikh, 
2007). It was expected that by mimicking the international best practices (MCCG, 2007), 
these amended listing requirements would strengthen the board and audit committees, 
ensuring that they discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively.  
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In addition, as discussed in Section 2.8.3 of Chapter 2, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
provides stringent regulatory oversight on all financial institutions and insurance firms. BNM 
has the power to examine the books and accounts of these highly regulated firms as well as 
the power to approve the appointment of external auditors, directors and chief executive 
offices of these firms. Further, BNM has power to instruct the external auditor to expend his 
/her audit scope as well as require the auditor to report and provide additional information to 
it. The presence of BNM as an additional industry-specific regulator for HRFs has enforced 
tighter regulations so as to ensure that effective policies and practices are followed
13
. 
 
Based on the above arguments on the regulatory reforms under institutional perspective, it can 
be concluded that the Securities Commission, Bursa Malaysia and Bank Negara Malaysia are 
the key players in „legislating‟ good governance to „coerce‟ firms to comply with the rules 
and regulations. These regulators do not act unilaterally but coordinate their activities by 
interacting and responding to pressures from professional bodies, industry participants and 
other organizations (i.e. MSWG, AOB, MCCG) (Khadaroo and Shaikh, 2007). They raise the 
standards of corporate governance in Malaysia by strengthening self and market discipline 
and promoting greater internalisation of the culture of good governance. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the Malaysian approach to corporate governance is rather geared towards 
regulation. Hence, the existence of the regulatory oversight and audit fees gaps arguably 
needs to be addressed and investigated so as to offer a better and clearer understanding on 
corporate governance issues. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 This will be further discussed in Section 2.8.3 of Chapter 6) 
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3.3  Gaps in Theoretical Arguments  
As noted from the above discussion, though the agency theory has dominated most of prior 
literature, studies which have taken solely an agency theory perspective have been unable to 
detect the effectiveness of governance structure comprehensively (Cohen et al., 2008). 
Scholars have criticised the enactment of government regulation, for instance the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) 2002 in the US (Cohen et al., 2008), which draws upon the prescriptions of 
the agency theory. There is little evidence to support the contention that the theory acts as an 
effective model for organizational behaviour. Cohen et al. (2008) in their literature survey, 
observe that there is limited auditing research that considers the institutional theory. The 
advantages of using multiple theoretical perspectives with regards to governance have been 
well recognized in the economics and behavioural literatures (Cohen et al., 2008). Due to the 
fact that the agency theory does not completely represent the complexity of an organization, 
additional perspectives such as the political embeddedness perspective and institutional theory 
can help to capture the reality. This study adopts the three theories to examine the interaction 
between the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and internal 
audit function attributes, and audit fees. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
Whilst extant corporate governance literature has largely drawn on the agency theory to 
explain the corporate governance mechanisms and their effects on audit fees, this study draws 
on two additional perspectives, political embeddedness and institutional theory to 
appropriately reflect the unique corporate setting in Malaysia.  
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Using the agency theory, political embeddedness perspective and institutional theory, the 
audit committee, internal audit function and regulatory oversight are seen as part of the 
corporate governance system. A review of previous literature indicates that even though 
considerable work has been done on politically connected firms and to determine the factors 
that influence audit fees, it is yet to be discussed if those findings still apply in a different 
institutional and regulatory regime post-2008.  
 
Additionally, the effective and efficient roles of regulators have significant implications on 
organizations. However, no studies have yet examined the moderating effect of regulatory 
oversight on the association between the internal governance mechanisms and audit fees in 
Malaysia.  
 
Thus, the aim of this study is to fill that knowledge gaps in research with the prime objective 
to investigate the effect of political embeddedness and regulatory oversight on the relationship 
between audit committee characteristics, internal audit function attributes and audit fees. The 
next chapter will discuss the research methodology and research framework and resulting 
hypotheses to be tested in this thesis. 
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Chapter 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss the research methodology, develop the research 
models drawing upon the theories discussed in Chapter 3 and formulate the hypotheses 
relating to the research questions. The study comprises of two research models. The first 
research model addresses the moderating effect of political connections on the association 
between audit committee (AC) and internal audit function (IAF), and audit fees using sampled 
firms comprising PCON and non-PCON firms operating within a low regulatory regime. The 
second research model examines the moderating effect of regulatory oversight on the 
association between AC and IAF, and audit fees using sampled firms operating in high and 
low regulatory regime. Prior to formulating the hypotheses, the definition and the reasons for 
selecting the variables of this study are provided. Appropriate research models are developed 
to support the hypotheses development. 
 
4.2  Methodology 
In general, methodological approaches can be divided into three views, namely the positivist 
perspective, interpretive perspective and critical perspective. Positivism is associated with 
scientific, experimental, quantitative and deductive frameworks (Ticehurst and Veal, 1999, 
p.20). Positivist researchers seek precise quantifiable observations and they often use statistics 
and experiments to test their hypotheses (Neuman, 1997, p.63). The interpretative approach 
attempts to understand the view point from the subjects‟ perspective. The researcher 
„interprets‟ the information provided based on the understanding of the situation and is 
therefore „part of the research process‟ (Ticehurst and Veal, 1999, p.20). The critical 
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perspective expands the interpretive approach by focusing on the ownership of knowledge 
and the associated social, economic and political implications (Smith, 2003). 
 
Audit pricing research has always been approached from the traditional positivist research 
methodology which yields results that may not give a full account of what determines and 
influences audit fees. This mainstream approach gives the perception that the actors within the 
audit pricing discourse are objective and rational by nature during the course of their 
interactions. Positivists believe it is possible to classify the social world in an objective way 
which can be quantified using statistical data. Using these classifications, it is then possible to 
count sets of observable social facts and to produce statistics (Smith et al., 2002). Whilst there 
are increasing studies using alternative paradigms to investigate corporate governance 
phenomena, the audit fees issue has been largely situated in the positivist paradigm. The 
reason why the positivist approach is dominant in the literature is because researchers tend to 
build upon the work of their predecessors who identify key variables and ideas that are 
expanded in future research under a positivist methodology. In doing so, they have tended to 
advocate the use of quantitative methods.  
 
Large body of research has examined the determinants of audit fees over the past 25 years and 
much of the research has followed from the original seminal work by Simunic (1980) (as cited 
in Hay et al., 2006). The majority of the previous studies use mainstream accounting research 
method and have tended to advocate the use of quantitative methods and undertake a 
positivist perspective. This is also supported by Chua (1986), whereby positivism has become 
the mainstream accounting research method and leading accounting academic journal 
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preference. According to Lowe and Lock (2005 and 2008), the majority of accounting 
research is still in the positivist paradigm. 
 
This study starts with three theories namely, the agency theory, the political embeddedness 
perspective and the institutional theory, and proceeds to generate specific predictions to test 
the hypotheses as a deductive reasoning. In general, there are two major processes of 
reasoning that will provide better explanations and more reliable predictions (Smith, 2003). 
The two processes of reasoning are deductive and inductive reasoning. The deductive research 
process involves the development of a theory and proceeds to generate specific predictions 
which follow from its application. The inductive approach is used when data is collected first, 
and a theory is developed as a result of the data analysis. The deductive approach tends to be 
favoured by positivist researchers (Ticehurst and Veal 1999, p.22). It is dominant in the 
natural sciences where research is carried out to explain causal relationships. The research 
approach uses „a highly structured methodology‟ and collects data that „can be measured 
quantitatively‟ (Saunders and Lewis, 2003, p.86). On the other hand, the inductive approach 
emerged due to the problems with rigid methodology of the deductive approach. The 
development of the social sciences required researchers to be able to understand the different 
ways people interpret their situation. This approach may be considered more appropriate for 
small sample studies using qualitative data gathering techniques (Saunders and Lewis, 2003, 
p.88). 
4.3  Data Collection Review 
To gather a full range of views on the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee 
characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and their implications on audit fees, this 
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study employed mixed methods whereby, both semi-structured interviews and secondary data 
were collected. In the first phase of data collection, interviews were conducted with two 
regulators, three external auditors and three heads of internal auditors to elicit their 
perceptions on the BMLR 2008 on audit committee characteristics and internal audit function 
attributes, and their implications on audit fees. 
 
The second phase of the of data collection aims to investigate the enhanced internal 
governance mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and internal audit function 
attributes, and their implication on audit fees. In addition, this study also aims to examine the 
moderating effects of political connections and regulatory oversight on the association 
between the enhanced internal governance mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes, and audit fees.  
 
4.4  Phase 1: Interviews 
The interview phase was conducted prior to determining the research questions and 
hypotheses in order to confirm the predominance of the demand perspective. The interviews 
were also useful to provide insights to the archival data analysis in Phase 2. 
 
4.4.1 Interview Administration 
In Phase 1, data was collected through interviews with selected external auditors and heads of 
internal auditors. They were chosen based on their in-depth understanding of the audit fees 
issue and its impact on other internal governance mechanisms such as audit committee and 
internal audit function. Due to growing attention given to the issue of audit fees, regulators 
were also included as participants in this study. Respondents from these different groups were 
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selected based on the research expectation on the interrelationships between the various actors 
and mechanisms within corporate governance. The interactions among these corporate 
governance key players are important in order to achieve effective governance in an 
organization, as described in Chapter 2.  
 
The face-to-face interview method was chosen so as to obtain a better understanding about the 
enhanced corporate governance and its implications on audit fees. Semi-structured interviews 
which are appropriate for exploratory study of this nature (Kidder and Judd, 1986) were 
conducted. The interviews were designed to enhance and supplement the information gained 
from archival data collection. The use of this method is important because it provides an 
interpretation of people‟s opinions and experience which helps to gather in-depth knowledge 
in addition to quantitative findings. This approach also enables the researcher to gain better 
understanding from the viewpoint of the participants (Parker and Roffey, 1997).  
 
The interviews were conducted in the respondents‟ respective offices and a semi-structured 
interview guide was given prior to the interview. The average time for the interviews was 45 
minutes. The interview sessions started with the general question “How would you describe 
corporate governance in Malaysia?” The number of questions asked in each interview was 
not predetermined. During the interviews, the discussion flowed according to the information 
furnished by the interviewee but was guided by the semi-structured interview guide.  
 
4.4.2 Sample Selection 
The total number of respondents sampled in this study is eight. Sampling was stopped once 
data saturation occured that is when the sample did not yield new information relevant to the 
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emerging themes in the study. The subjects for the interviews in this study were the regulators 
(2), heads of internal auditors (3) and external auditors (3). The respondents were chosen 
based on their experience and knowledge for this research. Five out of eight interviews were 
tape-recorded with the permission of the respondents and the other three respondents did not 
grant permission. As a result, notes were taken to document responses from them. 
 
All respondents appeared to be confident and had a thorough understanding of their scope of 
work. The data from the interviews were transcribed into written text before analysis. The 
transcribed data were then coded using individual themes as the unit of analysis, which are 
related to the main research questions (Patton, 2002). Coding sample text, checking coding 
consistency, and revising coding rules were done continuously until sufficient coding 
consistency was achieved (Weber, 1990). A matrix framework was used to compare the 
responses across eight respondents are further discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
4.4.3 Semi-structured Questionnaires 
The questionnaire was divided into five sections as follows: 
Section A comprises of a number of general questions pertaining to the demographic 
background details such as the respondent‟s gender, age group, professional memberships, 
and his/her working experience in the relevant field. 
 
Section B begins by asking questions in relation to corporate governance and auditing issues, 
such as the role of audit committee and internal auditors, the BMLR 2008 revision affecting 
the job functions of external auditors, and the reliance on internal audit function contribution 
by external auditors. 
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Section C requires the respondents to provide his/her opinion on PCON and non-PCON firms 
in Malaysia, and the governance practices for the different types of ownership structured 
firms and the audit fees charged. 
 
Section D enquires about governance of highly regulated and less regulated firms, and the 
respondents‟ understanding and knowledge on the implication of BMLR 2008 on these firms. 
It also seeks the respondents‟ opinion on the effectiveness of the additional industry-specific 
regulator, and audit fees charged for the HRFs.  
 
Section E enquires about the enhanced CG‟s implications on audit fees, and the audit fees 
charged by external auditor for audit client.  
 
A copy of the semi-structured interview and statement of confidentiality are attached in 
Appendix C.  
 
4.5  Phase 2: Archival Data 
The main objective of the secondary data collection in this study is to test the hypotheses 
which were developed in Chapter 4. With regards to quantitative method of data collection, 
this study uses sample firms from year 2005 until 2009 annual reports that are before and after 
the revision of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 2008 (BMLR 2008). The pre-test 
period covers the time frame from 2005 until 2007 and the post-test period covers years 2008 
and 2009. This gives allowance to the timeframe for compliance which took effect at latest by 
31 January 2009.  
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With reference to Table 4.1 below, the functions and composition of audit committee need to 
be disclosed in the annual report latest by 1 April 2008 and 31 January 2009 respectively. As 
for the statement of internal audit function, the information must be disclosed in the annual 
report for financial year ending on or after 31 January 2009. The other amendments to the 
BMLR relevant to this study took effect immediately. In addition to the above in 2004, the 
BNM issued guidelines on Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions to promote the 
adoption of effective and high standards of corporate governance practices by financial firms 
and their holding firms (Appendix A).  
 
The broad principles, standards and requirements under the guidelines are aligned with, 
among others, the principles enshrined in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and 
the Bank for International Settlement (BIS) Guidelines. The guidelines on corporate 
governance for financial firms were revised in 2011. 
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Table 4.1:  Amendments to the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements in 2008 
 
Existing Provisions (BMLR 2001) 
 
Amended provisions (BMLR 2008) 
 
Timeframe for compliance 
 
Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
 Para 15.10, (1): Composition of the audit 
committee 
  
 
(a) the audit committee must be composed of no 
fewer than 3 members. 
 
(b) a majority the audit committee members must be  
independent directors. 
 
 
 (c)     at least one member of the audit committee: 
          (i)  must be a member of the Malaysian Institute 
of Accountants; or 
          (ii) if he is not a member of the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants, he must have at least 
3 years‟ working experience and:- 
               (aa)  he must have passed the examinations 
specified in Part I of the 1
st
 Schedule of 
the Accountants Act 1967; or 
 
               (bb) he must be a member of one of the 
associations of accountants specified in 
Part II of the 1
st
 Schedule of the 
Accountants Act 1967; or 
 
          (iii) fulfils such other requirements as prescribed 
by the Exchange.   
Para 15.10, (1): Composition of the audit 
committee   
 
(a) (no change) 
 
 
(b) all the audit committee members must be 
non-executive directors, with a majority of 
them being independent directors. 
 
(c)  (no change) 
 
 
By 31 January 2009. 
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Para 15.13 (1): Functions of the audit committee 
 
(e)   the adequacy of the scope, functions and resources 
of the internal audit functions and that it has the 
necessary authority to carry out its work. 
 
Para 15.13 (1): Functions of the audit committee 
 
(e) the adequacy of the scope, functions, 
competency and resources of the internal audit 
functions and that it has the necessary authority 
to carry out its work.  
 
 
 
Audit committee must begin 
discharging this function with effect 
from 1 April 2008. 
Para 15.16 (3): Audit committee report 
 
(c) the number of audit committee meetings held 
during the financial year and details of 
attendance of each audit committee member. 
 
(e)    the existence of an internal audit function or 
activity and where there is such a function or 
activity, a summary of the activities of the 
function or activity. Where such a function or 
activity does not exist, an explanation of the 
mechanisms that exist to enable the audit 
committee to discharge its function effectively. 
 
Para 15.16 (3): Audit committee report 
 
(c)     (no change) 
 
 
 
(e)   a summary of the activities of the internal audit 
function or activity. 
 
 
Para 15.18: Rights of the audit committee 
 
(f)   be able to convene meetings with the external 
auditors, excluding the attendance of the 
executive members of the committee, whenever 
deemed necessary. 
 
Para 15.18: Rights of the audit committee 
 
(f)    be able to convene meetings with the external 
auditors, the internal auditors or both, 
excluding the attendance of other directors 
and employees of the listed issuer, whenever 
deemed necessary. 
 
 
(d) Have direct communication channels with  
the external auditors and person(s) carrying 
out the IA function or activity 
(d)   have direct communication channels with the 
external auditors and person(s) carrying out the 
IA function or activity 
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Internal Audit Function Attributes 
 
Appendix 9C Part A Para 30: Statement on internal 
audit function 
 
None 
 
Appendix 9C Part A Para 30: Statement on 
internal audit function 
 
A statement relating to the internal audit function 
of the listed issuer, i.e. whether the internal audit 
function is performed in-house or its outsourced 
and the costs incurred for the internal audit 
function in respect of the financial year. 
 
 
 
 
Annual reports for financial years 
ending on or after 31 January 2009 
must contain the statement on 
internal audit function. 
Para 15.28 Part F : Internal audit function 
 
 
None 
 
Para 15.28 Part F : Internal audit function 
 
(1) A listed issuer must establish an internal audit 
function which is independent of the activities 
its audits. 
(2) A listed issuer must ensure its internal audit 
function reports directly to the audit 
committee. 
 
 
 
By 31 January 2009. 
Source: Compiled from Bursa Malaysia (2001 and 2008) 
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The population of the study are the firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia. There are 831 listed 
firms as at January 6, 2011. This study limits its sample to annual reports for 209 firms 
(1045 firm year-observations) in financial and non-financial industries for years 2005 to 
2009, representing 25.2 percent of the population. The main criterions for selecting the 
sample are based on (a) the availability of full set of data from annual reports and 
DataStream for years 2005 to 2009, (b) firms that are no longer in existence are excluded 
from the sample, and (c) firms that are in the process of merger, acquisition or joint venture 
are also excluded from the sample. 
 
Table 4.2 shows the industry classification of sampled firms. The majority of the sampled 
firms are from three main sectors from industrial product, trading and services, and 
consumer products.  
 
Table 4.2: Number of Observations by Industry 
Industry  
Classification 
Total  
Firms 
Sample Firm 
Frequency 
Number of  
Firm Year-Observation 
Industrial Product 
Trading and Services 
Consumer Product 
Properties 
Plantation 
Technology 
Construction 
Infrastructure 
Hotel 
Finance 
267 
179 
139 
88 
41 
31 
54 
7 
5 
20 
44 
39 
34 
27 
16 
10 
15 
3 
 1 
20 
220 
195 
170 
135 
80 
50 
75 
15 
 5 
100 
Total 831 209 1045 
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Tables 4.3 and 4.4 below show the two phases of studies for this research. The first phase 
of the research categorizes the less regulated firms (LRFs) into three ownership structured 
groups: politically connected (PCON) firms (67), institutional ownership and managerial 
(INST&MGRL) ownership firms (54), and family (FAMILY) owned firms (68). The non-
PCON firms are firms belonging to the categories INST&MGRL and FAMILY. The 
second phase categorises the samples into highly regulated firms (HRFs) (20) and less 
regulated firms (LRFs) (189). The highly regulated firms are firms classified in the finance 
industry. 
 
Table 4.3: Total Sample Firms by Ownership Structured Groups 
 
 Number of Firms 
 
 
Politically Connected Firms 
   
67 
 
Institutional and Managerial 
Ownership Firms 
 54 
 
Family Ownership Firms 
  
 68 
 
Total 
        ___ 
189 
 
Table 4.4: Total Sample Firms by Industries 
 Number of Firms 
 
   
Highly Regulated Firms 
 
Less Regulated Firms 
 
Total 
   20 
 
189 
___ 
209 
 
The PCON firms are identified from the studies of Johnson and Mitton (2003), Mohamad et 
al. (2006), Abdul Wahab et al. (2009 and 2011) as well as Khazanah Berhad web site 
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(www.khazanah.com.my). However, firms which are listed in the said previous studies as 
PCONs but do not have complete data are excluded from this study. Similarly, financial 
firms are not included in the list of PCON firms. 
 
Non-PCON firms are firms other than PCON firms. As discussed in Chapter 2, non-PCON 
firms are further categorised into institutional and managerial ownership firms, a family 
owned firms based on its ownership structure to provide a more comprehensive analysis. 
The ownership structures are identified based on the top five majority shareholders 
disclosed in the annual report (under the lists of 30 largest shareholders). The institutional 
ownership (INSTL) is measured using the proportion of shares owned by five largest 
investors to total number of shares issued (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007; Hashim and Devi, 
2008). The five largest institutional investors include Employee Provident Fund (EPF), 
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), Social 
Security Organization (SOCSO) and Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB). Managerial 
Ownership (MGRL) is measured using percentage of shares held by independent non-
executive directors, executive directors and non-independent non-executive directors 
(Hashim and Devi, 2008). Family ownership (FAMILY) is measured using the ratio of 
family members on the board to total number of directors (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; 
Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Hashim and Devi, 2008).  
 
4.6 Research Models and Hypotheses Development 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the study entails two phases as one is set in a low 
regulatory environment and the other compares the two different regulatory regimes: the 
highly regulated and the less regulated. Thus, the hypotheses for the study are related to 
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two models. Model 1 (see Figure 4.1) focuses on the moderating effect of political 
connections on the association between the internal governance mechanisms of audit 
committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and audit fees for PCON 
and non-PCON firms (H1 to H3).  Model 2 (see Figure 4.2) examines the moderating 
effects of regulatory oversight on the association between the audit committee 
characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and audit fees for highly regulated 
firms and less regulated firms (H4 to H6).  
                                                Moderating Variable 
                                           (Political Embeddedness) 
 
Independent Variables 
(Agency Theory)                                                                          Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Research Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit Committee 
Characteristics 
 
 Independence (H2a) 
  Diligence (H2b) 
  Expertise (H2c) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audit Fees 
 
 
Internal Audit 
Function Attributes 
 
  Objectivity (H3a) 
 Work Competency 
(H3b) 
 
 
Political 
Connections 
(H1) 
Control 
Variables 
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4.6.1 Politically Connected (PCON) Firms and Audit Fees 
In Malaysia, significant government equity holdings (Abdullah, 2006) and other types of 
ownership structures distinguish the ownership pattern of Malaysian firms that may 
complicate the corporate governance systems. According to Abdul Samad (2004), 
ownership structure is one of the important factors in determining the nature of agency cost 
in a governance system.  
 
With regards to the role of institutional investors, Claessen and Fan (2002) find that such 
investors may improve corporate governance practices and alleviate the conflict of interests 
between controlling owners and minority shareholders in Asian firms. Their active role in 
monitoring the actions of management prevents managers‟ opportunistic behaviour (Wan 
Hussin and Ibrahim, 2003), and thus should reduce agency costs.  
 
Further, Malaysia has a “relationship-based” economy resulting from the existence of 
PCON firms (Bliss and Gul, 2012). These PCON firms have exclusive business 
relationships with the state-owned enterprises and have the ability to access government‟s 
major contracts (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Most interestingly, not many countries exhibit 
such corporate phenomenon among their listed firms. It is evidenced that, in the early 
stages of the Asian Financial Crisis, PCON firms were perceived by the market as being 
inefficient and that the government was unlikely to be able to support these favoured firms 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003). Studies on PCON firms and Bumiputra-controlled firms 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Gul, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006; Eichenseher, 1995) argue that 
these favoured firms are generally perceived to be riskier than other types of ownership 
structured firms. They observed that PCON firms suffered the most during the early stages 
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of the Asian Financial Crisis when the government was unable to implement capital 
controls. However, once capital controls
14
 were imposed, the returns of these favoured 
firms were higher on average. It can thus, be concluded that favoured firms in Malaysia 
appear to be closely connected to influential political figures (Gul, 2006).  
 
Since PCON firms are perceived to be riskier than non-PCON firms, it is reasonable to 
expect PCON firms to implement good governance system to improve the compliance 
level, consequently to protect their reputational capital. Furthermore, good governance 
practices help to reduce audit risk due to business failure or the likelihood of financial 
misreporting. Having good governance indicates demand for a substantive audit testing 
from auditors and to produce reliable financial statement audit. It will seen be in Section 
6.4 of Chapter 6 that the findings from the interviews conducted in this current study (IA1, 
IA3, EA2 and EA3) also support the view that PCON firms adopt corporate governance 
reforms that enhance the quality of good corporate governance practice.  
 
However, during the pre-2007 period, Gul (2006) finds a greater increase in audit fees for 
PCON firms than for other ownership structured firms, suggesting a supply-side 
explanation for audit fees. Abdul Wahab et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between 
institutional ownership and audit fees and they too found that the audit fees are higher for 
PCON firms during the pre-2007 period. No studies have been reported to date on the 
impact of the BMLR 2008 on audit fees for PCON and other ownership structured firms. 
Based on prior literature for pre-2007 period and the arguments presented above, we 
propose the following hypothesis: 
                                                 
14
 Government‟s implementation of capital controls in 1998 to benefit political-connected firms due to 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
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Hypothesis 1: 
PCON firms pay higher audit fees than non-PCON firms. 
 
4.6.2  Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees 
One implication which agency theory holds for understanding corporate governance is the 
role of an audit committee. Parker (1992, p.10) defines an audit committee as “a committee 
appointed by a company as a liaison between the board of directors and the external 
auditors. The committee normally has a majority of independent non-executive directors 
and is expected to view the company’s affairs in a detached and dispassionate manner”. 
An audit committee should have the characteristics of being independent, diligent and have 
financial or accounting expertise. 
 
4.6.3  Audit Committee Independence 
One of the important key characteristics of an audit committee‟s effectiveness is its 
independence from management (BRC, 1999; POB, 1993). As reported by the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (BRC, 1999; MCCG, 2007), independence is defined as having “no 
relationship to the corporation that may interfere with the exercise of their independence 
from management and the corporation”. Likewise, Goodwin and Yeow (2001, p.109) refer 
to independence “as not having a relationship which would interfere with the exercise of 
independent judgement in carrying out the functions of the committee”.  
 
The Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR) have not specifically defined 
independence but emphasized it in Para 15.10 (b). It requires all audit committee members 
to be non-executive directors with a majority of them being independent directors, and the 
chairman of the audit committee is an independent director. Comparatively, prior to the 
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revision in 2008, the BMLR merely required a majority of the audit committee to be 
independent directors. Para 15.10 (b) of the new BMLR 2008 adopted the Securities 
Commission‟s recommendations for corporate governance that an audit committee should 
comprise all non-executive directors, a majority of whom are independent (BM, 2008).   
 
Past literature has put forward the idea that an independent audit committee is an effective 
monitor as it is not part of the management and has no financial interest in the firm. This is 
because the board and audit committee are in place to monitor the management who 
otherwise may act in their best personal interests and not the interests of their principal 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Due to the separation of ownership 
and control, the agency theory also views managers as self-interested actors who could 
engage in opportunistic behaviour (Jensen and Meckling, 2007). The decision making 
process is delegated by shareholders to the managers, who are the executives. Due to 
managers pursuing their own interests, board and audit committee are involved in 
monitoring managerial decision-making and performance of the organization. A most 
common way to reduce agency costs is the provision for an independent party which is the 
board and audit committee, to monitor the agent (management) and report back to the 
owners who are the shareholders (Cohen et al., 2008). 
 
Since the accounting and auditing literature draws heavily upon the agency theory, a 
primary focus has been on the understanding of the impact of the independence of the 
board or audit committee or both on a number of financial reporting and auditing issues 
(Cohen et al., 2008). For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that the appointment 
of outside directors was associated with positive abnormal returns in the stock market. In 
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addition, firms that committed financial statement fraud were less likely to have a strong 
and independent audit committee (Abbott et al., 2003; Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 2000). 
Consistent with the risk-based approach, an independent audit committee leads to an 
effective audit committee oversight of the financial reporting process which reduces the 
incidence of financial reporting issues (Abbott et al., 2004; BRC, 1999; Dechow et al., 
1996; McMullen, 1996). Thus, it is not surprising that Abbott et al. (2003) and Vafeas and 
Waegelein (2007) find that audit committee independence has a significant positive impact 
on audit fees when the audit committee is made up of either solely or a majority of 
independent members. It also lends support that an independent audit committee is 
connected with higher audit fees due to greater demand for audit quality in order to protect 
its members‟ reputation (Abbott and Parker, 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2000).  
 
Bedard et al. (2004) also argue that higher director independence on audit committee 
provides more effective oversight of the financial reporting process. In order to protect the 
audit committee members‟ reputation capital, they will demand additional assurance from 
external auditors. Thus, this study expects that audit committee independence contributes to 
higher audit fees. It will be disclosed in Section 6.4 of Chapter 6 that PCON firms aim at 
enhancing corporate governance. Thus, it is hypothesized that their audit committees 
should be more independent and provides superior oversight over financial reporting 
process. As the firms require more extensive audit testing, higher external audit fees are 
expected. Therefore, the foregoing argument leads to the following hypothesis stated in an 
alternate form: 
Hypothesis 2a: 
The association between audit committee independence and audit fees is stronger post-
BMLR 2008 implementation for PCON firms than non-PCON firms. 
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4.6.4  Audit Committee Diligence 
Several independent advisory bodies have developed guidelines proposing the reform of 
both the audit process and the audit committee. One of the important guidelines of an audit 
committee is being diligent in carrying out their work. The Blue Ribbon Committee Report 
(1999) and the Treadway Commission (1987) recommended that the audit committee 
should have direct communication channels with the external auditor to discuss and review 
specific issues as appropriate.  
 
Accordingly, the BMLR 2008 Para 15.18 (f) sets out the rights of an audit committee to 
convene meetings with the external auditors, the internal auditors or both, and exclude the 
attendance of other directors and employees whenever necessary. This is an improvement 
from the previous position whereby it was provided that the audit committee could convene 
meetings with the external auditors, excluding the attendance of the executive members of 
the committee.  
 
It is noteworthy that the frequency of audit committee meeting is also found crucial by the 
National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) (2000) which proposes that audit 
committee should meet at least four half-day in a year. Likewise, the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council (2010) recognises the need for the audit committee to meet regularly 
so as to effectively carry out their duties. In Malaysia, the MCCG (2007) best practices 
highlight that audit committees should meet at least four times in a year or once on a 
quarterly basis. Although BMLR 2008 did not specify the minimum number of audit 
committee meetings, Para 15.16 (3)(c) of the new Listing Requirements requires the 
disclosure in the audit committee report the number of meetings held during the financial 
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year and the details of the attendance of each member of the audit committee. Further, the 
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) contended that audit committees need to sacrifice their 
valuable time in executing their duties in order to be effective. This is consistent with 
Conger, Finegold and Lawler (1998) and Vafeas (1999) who suggest that board 
effectiveness depends on the number of meetings held annually as higher frequency of 
meetings increases board effectiveness (Vafeas, 1999) and signals its diligence (Menon and 
Williams, 1994).  
 
Past studies and governance best practices called for audit committees to be diligent in 
carrying out their duties (Abbot, Parker and Peters, 2004). Further, according to Yatim et 
al. (2006), frequent audit committee meetings can reduce the tendency for financial 
reporting problems as they provide a forum for the audit committee and internal auditor to 
exchange relevant and important information and also allow the audit committee to notify 
the auditor of issues that require greater attention from the auditor (Raghunandan, Rama 
and Scarbrough, 1998).  
 
As found by Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) and Goodwin and Kent (2006), audit committees 
that meet frequently are more likely to be better informed and more diligent in discharging 
their responsibilities. As such, it is reasonable to expect that audit committees who meet 
frequently will demonstrate greater diligence in performing their duties. Consequently, as 
supported by Yatim et al. (2006) external audit fees are positively and significantly related 
to the frequency of audit committee meetings. Studies by Carcello et al. (2002) and Abbott 
et al. (2003) which are consistent with the demand approach, argue that more diligent audit 
114 
 
committee is likely to seek higher quality audits from external auditors, resulting in higher 
audit fees.  
 
It will be disclosed in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6 that two of the respondents from the 
interviews conducted in this present study support that the frequency of audit committee 
meetings reveals much about the committee‟s effectiveness and diligence. These 
recommendations and requirements support the arguments that: (1) meeting frequency is an 
important element of audit effectiveness, and (2) meeting frequency is often used as a 
proxy for audit committee diligence. 
 
From the extant literature review, we predict that more diligent audit committees would 
demand substantive audit testing by the external auditor which results in higher audit fees 
for PCON firms. This is due to the fact that the government has put much attention and 
initiatives to make sure that these firms always perform in an effective way. As a diligent 
audit committee is able to request for a substantive audit testing from the external auditor 
should any auditing issue arise, we predict that a diligent audit committee will result in 
higher audit fees. This supports prior research (Yatim et al., 2006; Carcello et al., 2002; and 
Abbott et al., 2003) which determined that a diligent audit committee will seek higher 
quality audits from the external auditor resulting in higher audit fees, and conjectures the 
next hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2b: 
The association between audit committee diligence and audit fees is stronger post-BMLR 
2008 implementation for PCON firms than non-PCON firms. 
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4.6.5 Audit Committee Expertise 
In 1999, the Blue Ribbon Committee (BRC) gave ten recommendations concerning the 
effectiveness of audit committees. Amongst others is Recommendation 2 which relates to 
the audit committee expertise (BRC, 1999). According to Coates, Marais and Weil, (2007, 
p176), “each member of the audit committee shall be financially literate, as such 
qualification is interpreted by the firm’s Board of Directors in its business judgment, or 
must become financially literate within a reasonable period of time after his or her 
appointment to the audit committee”. An audit committee is expected to be financially 
literate and knowledgeable about technical auditing matters. This is because auditors are 
less likely to refer complicated auditing issues to an audit committee if they perceive the 
audit committee as less knowledgeable about technical auditing matters (Cohen et al., 
2002).  
 
Further, even though the financial information which is pertinent to the evaluation of the 
firm‟s performance is prepared by the managers and has to be reviewed and attested by an 
independent party i.e. the external auditors, it is still necessary for the information to be 
reviewed by the audit committee. This is because one of the primary functions of an audit 
committee is to monitor and control the operation of a firm especially when it involves 
auditing. Thus, the expertise of the audit committee is crucial in understanding the audit 
work carried out by the external auditor. 
 
Hence, in the 2007 Revised Malaysia Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2007), it 
was recommended that  all members of the audit committee should be able to read, analyze 
and interpret financial statements so that they will be able to effectively discharge their 
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functions. Bursa Malaysia when revising its Listing Requirements did not adopt the 
recommendation fully. Instead it retained the regulation that at least one member of the 
audit committee has one of the following qualifications:  
 
(a) a member of the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA); or 
 
(b) at least three (3) year‟s working experience and:- 
 
(i) have passed the examinations specified in Part 1 of the 1st Schedule to the 
Accountants Act 1967; or 
(ii) a member of one of the associations of accountants specified in Part II of the 1st 
Schedule to the Accountants Act 1967; or 
 
(c) fulfils such other requirements as prescribed by the Exchange. 
 
However, the BMLR 2008 Para 15.13 (e) spells out the function of the audit committee to 
include the review of the adequacy of the competency of the internal audit function. 
Additionally, Para 15.16 (3) (e) provides that the audit committee report shall include a 
summary of the activities of the internal audit function or activity. This is an improvement 
compared to the previous provision where the audit committee report should include the 
internal audit function only if there was such a function or activity. However, an 
explanation was required if such activity or function did not exist.  
 
Having a financial expert on the board helps when reviewing the internal audit proposals 
(Read and Raghunandan, 2001) and investigating accounting irregularities. Moreover, past 
experience and knowledge in accounting and auditing enhance the accuracy of the 
investigation and produce better financial reporting quality. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) 
find that audit committee‟s professional judgments on auditor-management issues 
pertaining to accounting policy differed between those with and without accounting and 
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auditing knowledge.  As such, Sharma, Naiker and Lee (2009) reveal that audit committee 
accounting experts and independent directors play an important role in monitoring by 
demanding frequent audit committee meetings when management adopts aggressive 
accounting practices.  
 
Further, Gendron and Bedard (2006) reveal that an audit committee who is financially 
literate is more effective in adhering to best practices, and to secure a high quality of 
reported earnings. Thus, the more number of experts there are in the audit committee, the 
better will be the monitoring and adherence to best practices.  
 
According to Abbott et al. (2003), audit committee financial expertise has a significant 
positive impact on audit fees. Yatim et al. (2006) find a significant and positive association 
between audit committee expertise (proportion of audit committee members with 
accounting and finance qualifications) and audit fees. This is because a financially literate 
and knowledgeable audit committee will demand audit quality as the members are 
knowledgeable on technical auditing issues, and hence the increase in audit fees. This is 
supported by empirical evidence (Abbott et al,. 2003). As PCON firms are expected to 
adopt stronger governance which includes having an audit committee with financial 
expertise, it is hypothesized as follows: 
Hypothesis 2c: 
The association between audit committee expertise and audit fees is stronger post-BMLR 
2008 implementation for PCON firms than non-PCON firms. 
 
 
4.6.6  Internal Audit Function Attributes and Audit Fees 
 
As discussed earlier, the role of internal audit function is important in the corporate 
governance structure. It assesses the firm‟s internal controls, examines the effectiveness 
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and efficiency of the firm‟s operation and ensures compliance of policies and procedures. 
Hence, it is important for the internal auditors to maintain a close working relationship with 
the firm‟s audit committee so as to reduce material misstatements in financial reports 
(Treadway Commission, 1987). In order to obtain maximum benefit, the Blue Ribbon 
Committee (1999) recommends that open lines of communication should exist between 
internal audit and audit committee. Likewise, Para 15.18 (d) of BMLR (2008) states that 
audit committee must have direct communication channels with external and internal 
auditors. The interaction between internal audit function and audit committee in a variety of 
activities (Raghunadan et al., 1998) is important for the effectiveness of both parties. 
Further, section 404 of Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 has expanded the role and duties of 
external auditor in evaluating and testing internal controls (Cohen et al., 2008). Thus, it is 
important to study the association between internal audit functions and audit fees. 
 
Following studies on internal control which used internal audit function as proxy, prior 
studies measure internal audit function by using internal audit expenditures, internal audit 
assistance, and ratio of internal audit costs to total costs, internal audit payroll and number 
of internal auditors (Hay et al., 2006).  In addition, the size of the function is used to 
measure the IAF contribution. However, Prawitt et al. (2008) highlight that this 
measurement is closely related to the demand for auditing rather than the quality of IAF. 
Hence, this study proposes to use other measurement.  
 
According to SAS No. 65, the Auditor’s Consideration of the Internal Audit Function of 
Financial Statements (AICPA, 1997) describes that IAF quality characteristics comprised 
of competence (e.g. educational level, certification), objectivity (e.g. reporting relationship, 
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group responsible for IAF employment) and quality of work performance (e.g. scope of 
work performed, adequacy of audit programs). The PCAOB, in Auditing Standard 5 (AS5), 
restates that external auditors should also base the reliance decision in these three areas 
(PCAOB, 2007). 
 
Abdel-Khalik, Snowball and Wragge (1983) rank objectivity as the most significant factor 
in assessing the IAF. However, a study done by Grambling, Maletta, Arnold and Bryan 
(2004) show that quality of work performance is an important factor in assessing IAF 
quality as compared to objectivity and competence. This is consistent with Schneider 
(1984, 1985, and 1985) and Brown and Karan (1986), that the most important factor in 
evaluating IAF quality is work performance, followed by competence and objectivity. This 
is not surprising, for the external auditor will not rely on the work performed by the internal 
auditor unless it meets the minimum standard. As Al-Twaijry, Brierley and GWilliam 
(2004) conclude, the extent of reliance on the work of the internal auditor by an external 
auditor depends on the quality of work carried out by the internal audit department. An 
increase in internal audit contribution to external audit work results in overall audit 
coverage and improves audit quality (Mat Zain, 2005). Further, it permits the external 
auditor to log in fewer hours. However, as was found by many studies, the reliance on 
internal audit function does not lead to any reduction of audit fees (Mat Zain, 2005; Carey, 
Craswell and Simnett, 2000; Stein, Simunic and O‟Keefe, 1994).  
 
Following the discussion, Goodwin and Kent (2006) suggest a significant positive 
association between the existences of internal audit function and audit fees.  Mat Zain 
(2005) finds that audit fees are not reduced even though the external auditors rely on the 
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internal audit work, as the external auditors expand their time on examining more critical 
and important areas. Besides that, as it will be observed in Section 6.3 of Chapter 6, the 
interview findings (EA3, IA3 and R1) from the present study support the argument that 
greater reliance can be placed by the external auditors on the work of internal auditor 
provided that they are assured of the reliability of the information and the quality of internal 
audit function. However, it may not necessarily lead to a reduction in audit fees. This 
suggests that firms use internal audit as complementary rather than as a substitute to 
external audit. Additionally, audit fees are higher when firms use internal audit as 
complementary means of increasing overall monitoring (Hay et al., 2006; Leung et al., 
2004).  This is because directors and audit committee members may choose to increase 
investment in both internal and external auditing in order to protect their reputations 
(Knechel and Willekens, 2006).  
 
In Malaysia, the MCCG (revised 2007) recognizes the importance of the internal audit 
function by recommending that firms carry out their own internal audit functions.  Further, 
the amended BMLR 2008 (Para 15.28) mandates all listed firms to establish an internal 
audit function which is independent of the activities it audits and to report directly to the 
audit committee. Moreover, Appendix 9C (30) of the BMLR 2008 enhances disclosure in 
the annual report to include information pertaining to the activities carried out and the cost 
incurred for an internal audit function regardless of whether the internal audit function is 
performed in-house or is outsourced. Therefore, such expectations on the internal audit 
function to improve corporate governance and demand for further quality audit work would 
undoubtedly increase audit fees. Further, even though the external auditing standards 
permit the external auditors to rely on the work of internal auditors in performing a 
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financial statement audit to the extent that the internal auditors are competent, objective and 
perform work that is relevant to the external audit (AICPA 1997; PCAOB 2007), it is 
anticipated that PCON audit members may still demand for audit quality. Thus, additional 
audit testing will lead to higher audit fees.  
 
However, the focus in this study is only on the aspects of objectivity and work performance 
in this particular research due to the changes in BMLR 2008 on the internal audit function. 
The internal audit function quality is omitted due to non-availability of data. It is 
hypothesized that: 
Hypothesis 3a: 
The association between internal audit function attribute, namely objectivity and audit 
fees is stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation for PCON firms than non-PCON 
firms. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: 
The association between internal audit function attribute, namely work performance and 
audit fees is stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation for PCON firms than non-PCON 
firms. 
 
 
4.7  Highly Regulated Firms (HRFs) and Audit Fees 
Figure 4.2 presents Model 2 which examines the moderating effects of regulatory oversight 
on the association between the audit committee characteristics and internal audit function 
attributes, and audit fees for highly regulated firms and less regulated firms (H4 to H6). In 
Malaysia, the financial institutions and insurance firms are subject to the regular oversight 
by Bank Negara Malaysia. As discussed in Chapter 2, the BNM‟s supervision on these 
firms are extensive and thus they qualify as highly regulated firms for the purpose of this 
study. An issue is whether the regulatory oversight by BNM could impact the demand for 
additional assurance from the external auditor.  
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Figure 4.2:  Research Model 2 
 
Past literature suggests that effective regulatory oversight has an influence on firm‟s 
corporate governance. Bryan and Klein (2005) propose that direct monitoring by regulators 
decreases information asymmetries in regulated industries as compared to less regulated 
industries. They also argue that regulatory oversight provides close monitoring that 
eventually will reduce the role of external auditing as a control mechanism. By relying on 
the effective external and internal monitoring processes, auditors could reduce the extent of 
costly testing procedures in highly regulated firms. Therefore, effective regulation and 
oversight of regulators provide better incentives in a situation where directors with 
reputation capital at stake demand more extensive audit, resulting in higher audit fees.  
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Similarly, Boo and Sharma (2008) investigate regulatory oversight impact on internal 
corporate governance and audit fees for a sample of 469 large US highly regulated and less 
regulated firms. They find that regulatory oversight influences audit fees and the 
association between internal governance and audit fees. They attribute lower audit fees to 
highly regulated firms as compared to less regulated firms. This is due to close monitoring 
by industry-specific regulators which reduces information asymmetries and level of 
oversight required from corporate governance mechanism such as the board, audit 
committee and external auditor.  
 
Hence, regulatory oversight has the potential to diminish the important role of corporate 
governance key players such as the board of directors and the audit committee. The greater 
vigilance and stronger internal control in response to close regulatory monitoring reduces 
the level of audit risk, which hinders the need for closer audit scrutiny. Corporate 
governance mechanisms such as board and audit committee do not require an extensive 
audit when there is regulatory oversight. Therefore, there will be lower audit effort and 
eventually lower audit fees for highly regulated firms than less regulated firms (Boo and 
Sharma, 2008).  
 
Although Malaysia has a well developed set of regulations and rules related to corporate 
governance performance areas, it was rated among the lowest in the region in terms of 
enforcement (Miles, 2009). The reality is that, enforcement has been selective in the past 
and is perceived to be politically determined (Gul, 2006). This has provoked increased 
awareness about issues concerning the role of regulators and the need for improved 
disclosure and corporate governance. Due to the ineffective enforcement by regulators, it 
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has brought to light instances of corporate abuses which are attributable in part to 
ineffective corporate governance structures. 
 
In addition, Fields et al. (2004) find that high levels of litigation risk in highly regulated 
industries also affect the relationship between industry-specific regulated firms and their 
auditors. When the auditors are subject to extensive regulatory scrutiny, they are likely to 
charge higher audit fee due to the increased regulatory risks. According to Bedard et al. 
(2004), auditors will strategically respond to client risks through appropriate adjustments to 
the audit procedures. Auditors who observe higher client risks will increase their audit 
effort, resulting in higher audit fees. Therefore, the foregoing argument leads to the 
following hypothesis stated in an alternate form: 
Hypothesis 4: 
Highly regulated firms pay higher audit fees than less regulated firms. 
 
 
4.7.1  Audit Committee Characteristics and Audit Fees 
 
Regulators emphasize on the need for audit committees to comprise of members who are 
independent and at least one member should be financially literate. They also require audit 
committees to be diligent in carrying out their duties (BRC, 1999; NYSE, 2002; BMLR, 
2008). The literature suggests that these characteristics impact the effectiveness of an audit 
committee (Beasley et al., 2000; Carcello and Neal, 2000; Abbott et al., 2004) because the 
audit committee plays an important role in monitoring the financial reporting process. As 
Vafeas (2007), Carcello (2009) and Goh (2009) find the board of directors and its sub-
committees are important components of internal control mechanisms for monitoring 
management‟s activities. The audit committee assists the board in fulfilling its 
responsibility by providing oversight with respect to financial statements and reports, and 
125 
 
other disclosures provided to shareholders, as well as the system of internal controls and the 
audit process.  
 
Further, prior studies by Carcello et al. (2002), Abbott et al. (2003), Knechel and Willekens 
(2006), and Goodwin and Kent (2006) suggest that audit committees who are independent, 
diligent and financially literate demand expanded audit scope in order to avoid being 
associated with financial misstatement and to preserve reputation capital. This is because 
investors, depositors and regulators have direct interest and are concerned with the 
performance of the firms. For that reason, audit committees in industry-specific regulated 
firms demand higher external audit monitoring and auditing services.  
 
Thus, this study extends the literature by examining the impact of regulatory oversight on 
the association between audit committee characteristics (independence, diligence and 
expertise) and audit fees for highly regulated firms. This study predicts that the presence of 
efficient regulatory oversight and audit committee which is independent, diligent and has 
expert contributes to a better external and internal monitoring. This results in higher audit 
testing by external auditors, and hence higher audit fees. Consequently, the study predicts 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 5a: 
The association between audit committee independence and audit fees is stronger post-
BMLR 2008 implementation for HRFs than LRFs. 
 
Hypothesis 5b: 
The association between audit committee diligence and audit fees is stronger post-BMLR 
2008 implementation for HRFs than LRFs. 
 
Hypothesis 5c: 
The association between audit committee expertise and audit fees is stronger post-BMLR 
2008 implementation for HRFs than LRFs. 
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4.7.2  Internal Audit Function (IAF) Attributes and Audit Fees 
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) highlighted the importance of interaction between 
audit committee and internal audit to prevent material misstatement in financial reporting. 
Similarly, the Guidelines on Internal Audit Function for Directors of Public Listed 
Companies in Malaysia (IIA, 2000) have drawn attention to the need for close relationship 
between the audit committee and internal audit to contribute to the firm‟s success. Under 
the new listing requirements by Bursa Malaysia (2008), the internal audit department has a 
responsibility to report directly to the audit committee (objectivity). Consequently, the audit 
committee is required to review the internal audit activities, to the extent to which such 
activities are coordinated with the external audit program (work performance).  
 
Past studies that examine the relationship between audit fees and the existence of internal 
audit find that audit fees are higher when firms use internal audit as a means of increasing 
overall monitoring (i.e. Goodwin and Kent, 2006). Additionally, greater vigilance and 
stronger internal control in response to close regulatory monitoring increases the need for 
closer audit scrutiny by the external auditor. Corporate governance mechanisms such as 
boards and audit committees demand for extensive audit when there is regulatory oversight. 
Hence, regulators play an important role as corporate governance key players.  
 
The external auditing is likely to be influenced by the effectiveness of other internal 
corporate governance mechanisms. Better internal corporate governance implies that the 
control environment in the firm is more effective and financial statements are credible, 
hence influencing the external audit effort and audit fees. Abbott et al. (2003) posit that 
from the point of view of the audit committees, they demand a higher level of audit 
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assurance, resulting in an increased level of audit coverage, and higher audit fees. 
Therefore, the changes in the IAF to improve corporate governance and demand for further 
quality audit work are expected to increase audit fees.  
 
For that reason, this study extends the literature by examining the impact of regulatory 
oversight on the relationship between IAF attributes and audit fees for HRFs and LRFs. 
The study predicts that the presence of an efficient regulatory oversight and IAF attributes 
contribute to a better internal and external monitoring. This results in higher audit testing 
by external auditors, and hence higher audit fees. Therefore, the foregoing leads to the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 6a: 
The association between IAF attributes, namely objectivity and audit fees is stronger 
post-BMLR 2008 implementation for HRFs than LRFs. 
 
Hypothesis 6b: 
The association between IAF attributes, namely work performance and audit fees is 
stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation for HRFs than LRFs. 
 
 
4.8         Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the research methodology and the research models underlying the 
hypotheses developed in this chapter and provide the definition and reasons for selecting 
the variables for both Models 1 and 2. Model 1 depicts the moderating effect of political 
connections (represented by PCON versus non-PCON firms) on the association between 
enhanced internal governance mechanisms of AC characteristics and IAF attributes and 
audit fees. Model 2 in turn examines the moderating effect of regulatory oversight 
(represented by HRFs and LRFs) on the association between the AC characteristics and 
IAF attributes, and audit fees.  
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This study applies the demand-based perspective to explain the audit fees phenomenon. 
The view taken is that the audit committee will demand greater audit procedures from the 
external auditor to safeguard their reputational capital, thus resulting in higher audit fees. It 
assumes that better AC characteristics and IAF attributes improve corporate governance. 
Further, this perspective assumes that stringent regulatory oversight improves corporate 
governance and increases audit fees due to demand for a greater level of responsibility on 
the part of the AC together with better quality of audit work by the external auditors. The 
next chapter will provide the research design of the study.  
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Chapter 5   RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the framework of this study that incorporates three theories, 
namely the agency theory, political embeddedness perspective and institutional theory, and 
conjectured the hypotheses. Hence, by establishing key variables of interests and other 
potentially influential factors, it gives a better impression of the breadth of the problem of 
this study. This chapter discusses the research design for testing the hypotheses and 
measurement of the variables involved. This chapter also describes the sample selection 
and the semi-structured questions used during the interviews.  
5.2  Model Specification 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, there are two research models in this study, i.e. model one is in 
the context of a low regulatory environment, and in the second model, the highly regulated 
and less regulated firms are compared. Model 1 focuses on the moderating effect of 
political connections on the association between audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes, and audit fees. Model 2 examines the moderating effect of 
regulatory oversight on the association between the audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes, and audit fees.  
5.2.1 Effects of Political Connections: Implication on Audit Fees 
 
The first research model examines the moderating effects of political connections on the 
internal governance mechanisms of audit committee (AC) characteristics and internal audit 
function (IAF) attributes, and audit fees (PCON versus non-PCON). Drawing from 
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Craswell and Francis, (1999), Tsui et al. (2001), and Carcello et al. (2002), the following 
audit fee model is used to test Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. 
 
Model 1: 
 
LAF = β₀ + β₁TA + β₂NAF + β₃SUB + β₄FOREIGN + β₅SEG + ß₆ROA + ß₇ LEV + β₈AQ 
+ β₉LOSS + β₁₀PRD + β₁₁PCON + β₁₂IND + β₁₃DIL + β₁₄EXP + β₁₅OBJ +β₁₆WP + 
β₁₇IND_PCON + β₁₈DIL_PCON +β₁₉EXP_PCON + β₂₀OBJ_PCON + 
WP_PCON + ε, 
 
Where:  
 
Hypotheses Dependent 
Variable 
Exp
Sign 
Measurement of Variables 
 AF  Audit fees paid by the client (Natural 
logarithm of audit fees used in regression 
model). 
AC 
Characteristics 
Experimental 
Variables 
 Measurement of  Variables 
 IND + 
 
The proportion of independent non-executive 
directors to AC. 
 DIL + Number of AC meetings. 
 EXP + Number of AC with accounting or finance 
qualification. 
IAF  
Attributes 
Experimental 
Variables 
 Measurement of  Variables 
 OBJ + An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the IAF 
reports directly to AC and „0‟ if otherwise. 
 WP + Voluntary disclosure under IAF as per Para 
43 of Statement of Internal Control (SIC) 
 Control 
Variables 
 Measurement of  Variables 
 TA + Total assets for client at the end of fiscal year 
(Natural logarithm of TA). 
 NAF + Total non-audit fee paid by client (Natural 
logarithm of NAF). 
 SUB + Number of client‟s local subsidiaries. 
 FOREIGN + Number of client‟s foreign subsidiaries. 
 SEG + Number of business segments. 
 LEV - Proportion of total liability over TA 
 ROA - Profit before tax over TA. 
 LOSS 
 
 
+ An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm 
has made loss in any of the periods and „0‟ if 
otherwise. 
 PRD + An indicator variable equals to „1‟ for post-
test period and „0‟ if otherwise. 
 AQ + An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm 
hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise. 
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Hypothesis 1 PCON + An indicator variable, „1‟ for PCON firms 
and „0‟ if otherwise. 
Hypothesis 2a IND_PCON    Interaction between IND and PCON 
Hypothesis 2b DIL_PCON         Interaction between DIL and PCON 
Hypothesis 2c EXP_PCON       Interaction between EXP and PCON 
Hypothesis 3a OBJ_PCON            Interaction between OBJ and PCON 
Hypothesis 3b WP_PCON         Interaction between WP and PCON 
 
5.2.2 Audit Fees 
The dependent variable of audit fees is measured by the Ringgit Malaysia (RM) value of 
the audit fee paid by the firm to its auditors. Similar with the law in other British 
Commonwealth countries, the Companies Act 1965 of Malaysia also requires firms to 
disclose their statutory audit and non-statutory audit fees under notes to accounts in the 
firms‟ annual reports. A substantial penalty will be charged for none or inaccurate 
disclosure (Che-Ahmad and Houghton, 2001). For the purpose of this study, data on the 
sample firms‟ statutory audit fees were extracted and reclassified as audit fees. Consistent 
with previous studies (Francis, 1984; Francis and Simon, 1987), the following tests of 
normality, logarithmic transformation are applied to the audit fees.  
5.2.3 Control variables 
Audit fees models employed in past research have used a variety of variables to control 
sectional differences which are primarily influenced by size, complexity and risk of the 
audit client (Simunic, 1980; Craswell, 1992; Gul and Tsui, 1997; Francis, 1984; Chan et 
al., 1993). The set of control variables selected in this study is consistent with the variables 
generally identified in much of the literature on audit fees (Hay et al., 2006; Hay, 2012). 
These empirical models have demonstrated good explanatory power and have been used 
across different samples and different time periods (Mat Zain, 2005). Thus, the following 
control variables are also included in analyzing the enhanced internal governance 
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mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and 
their implications on audit fees for PCON and non-PCON firms.  
 
Prior studies have found that the most significant determinant of audit fees is the size of the 
auditee, which is usually measured by total assets (TA) (Craswell, 1992; Palmrose, 1986; 
Simunic, 1980; Turpen, 1990). A positive relationship between firm size and audit fees is 
predicted since larger firms are more complex and require more audit effort, hence higher 
audit fees (Simunic, 1980; Francis, 1984).  
 
Further, the number of local subsidiaries (SUB), number of foreign subsidiaries 
(FOREIGN) and business segments (SEG) have been previously used to control for audit 
complexity (Simunic, 1980; Hackenbrack and Knechel, 1997), and hence they are taken 
into account in this study. This is because more subsidiaries and business segments will 
lead to greater amount of work and audit hours of consolidating and eliminating intra-group 
transactions (Chan et al., 1993; Pong and Whittington, 1994).  
 
As profitability has also been argued to influence audit fees (Chan et al., 1993), return on 
assets (ROA) is measured by dividing the profit before tax over total assets and a negative 
relationship between ROA and audit fees is predicted. It is considered another measure of 
risk because it reflects the extent to which the auditor may be exposed to loss in a situation 
where the client is not financially strong (Simunic, 1980). In addition, a dummy variable 
for loss-making (LOSS) in any of the years is included and a positive relationship is 
predicted.  This is because the risk is higher to the external auditors if the firm is under 
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performing and thus, higher audit fee is expected. In addition, Zmijewski score (ZFC)
15
 is 
computed for each firm to control for financial crisis (Model 2). 
 
Past studies also argued that leverage (LEV) will also affect audit fees.  The ratio of total 
liability to total assets is used to control for leverage which potentially exposes the auditor 
to risk if the client fails (Simunic, 1980). It is expected that the association between fees 
and leverage ratio is negative. Non-audit fees (NAF) are also included as a control variable 
because it is significantly associated with audit fees (Whisenant, Sankaraguruswamy and 
Raghunandan, 2003; Hay et al., 2006). Prior studies have found that in certain 
circumstances, a fee premium exists for Big Eight/Six/Five/Four audit firms (Simon and 
Francis, 1998; Francis and Simon, 1987; Francis and Strokes, 1986). It is usually assumed 
the Big Eight/Six/Five/Four audit firms perform higher quality audit and charge higher 
audit fees (DeAngelo, 1981; Collier and Gregory, 1996; Palmrose, 1989). Therefore, a 
dummy variable for Big4 controls for differences in audit quality (AQ) (Craswell and 
Francis, 1999; Tsui et al. 2001) and it is expected that client firms of Big4 purchase a 
higher level of audit quality.  
 
An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if PCON firms and „0‟ if otherwise is tested in Model 1. 
Post-test period (PRD) take a value of „1‟ and „0‟ if otherwise. Finally, a dummy variable 
take a value of „1‟ and „0‟ if otherwise for Regulated (REG) is incorporated to control for 
financial firms in Model 2. 
                                                 
15
 Zmijewski financial distress score: The model incorporates three weighted financial ratios taken from 
Zmijewski (1984). 
1. Net income/Total assets (X₁) 
2. Total debt/Total assets (X₂) 
3. Current assets/Current liability (X₃) 
The above ratios are used to compute the Zmijewski score using the following model: 
Z = 4.3 – 4.5 X₁  + 5.7 X₂ - 0.004 X₃ 
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5.2.4  Experimental Variables 
The experimental variables in this study are the internal governance mechanisms of audit 
committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes. They are discussed below. 
 
5.2.5  Audit Committee (AC) Characteristics  
The variables for audit committee characteristics are independence, diligence and expertise. 
The measurements for the respective characteristics are stated below. 
 
5.2.5.1 Audit Committee Independence 
An independent audit committee is likely to result in an effective oversight and is able to 
protect the reliability of the financial reporting process, hence reduce the incidence of 
financial reporting problems (Dechow et al., 1996; Abbott et al., 2004; BRC, 1999). 
According to Abbott et al. (2003), firms with audit committee members who are 
independent, meet frequently (diligent) and have financial expertise are less likely to 
experience material misstatement in financial reporting. The audit committee independence 
(IND) is measured by the proportion of independent non-executive directors in the audit 
committee (Balachandran, 2007; Goodwin et al., 2006; Yatim et al., 2006).  
 
5.2.5.2  Audit Committee Diligence 
The measurement of the variable audit committee diligence (DIL) is based on that used in 
previous studies such as Abbott et al. (2003), Goodwin and Kent (2006), and Yatim et al. 
(2006). DIL is measured using the number of meetings held annually. Prior research 
suggests that an audit committee that meets frequently can reduce the incidence of financial 
reporting problems. By meeting and communicating frequently, the audit committee is able 
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to alert the external auditor on issues that require immediate attention from them 
(Raghunandan et al., 1998).  
 
5.2.5.3  Audit Committee Expertise 
The effectiveness of an audit committee is further enhanced if members of an audit 
committee possess accounting and financial expertise. Bursa Malaysia mandates that audit 
committee members of listed firms should comprised of at least three members and at least 
one member must have the prescribed financial or accounting qualification. Empirical 
findings also support the assertion that an audit committee should at least consist of one 
member with accounting and financial expertise. This is because it allows for better 
understanding of auditing issues and risks (DeZoort and Salterio, 2001) and a firm with 
financial or accounting expert in its audit committee is  less likely to experience restatement 
of earnings (Abbott et al., 2003). Thus, in this study the audit committee expertise is 
measured by the number of audit committee members with accounting or finance 
qualification (Gendron and Bedard, 2006). 
5.2.6 Internal Audit Function (IAF) Attributes 
Past research on internal audit reliance (Brown, 1983; Margheim, 1986; Messier and 
Schneider, 1988; Schneider, 1984 and 1985; Abdel Khalik et al., 1983; Edge and Farley, 
1991) adopts SAS No.9
16
, which requires external auditors to evaluate internal audit 
competence, objectivity and work performance when making a reliance decision. These 
studies focused on identifying the relative importance that external auditors place on the 
                                                 
16
 Statement of Auditing (SAS) No. 9 is now known as SAS No. 65 
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three previously mentioned factors in their assessment of the strength of the audit client‟s 
internal audit function. 
 
In fact, SAS No. 65, Auditor’s Consideration of the Internal Audit Function of Financial 
Statements provides external auditors with a framework in evaluating the audit client firm‟s 
characteristics of the IAF to determine the extent of possible reliance on the internal 
auditor‟s work. Importance is placed on the characteristics of IAF in terms of work 
performance, competence and objectivity (AICPA, 1997). Previous research has been done 
to determine whether external auditors rely on the work of IAF and whether the level of 
reliance is increased depending on the competence, objectivity and relevance of work 
performed by the internal auditors (Gramling, Maletta, Schneider and Church, 2004). In 
SAS No 65, the IAF quality characteristics comprised of competency (e.g. educational 
level, certification), objectivity (e.g. reporting relationship, group responsible for IAF 
employment) and quality of work performance (e.g. scope of work performed, adequacy of 
audit programs).  
 
However, it is observed that the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA) internal auditing 
guidelines (ISA 610, International Standard on Auditing using the work of internal 
auditor’s) require external auditors to obtain an understanding of their internal auditing to 
make a preliminary assessment of its effects in determining external audit procedures. The 
ISA 610 guidelines encourage the external auditor to utilise internal auditors‟ work only if 
it has been assessed as reliable. Specifically, the reliability of the internal audit function is 
assessed based on objectivity, technical competence, due professional care and 
communication. 
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Nevertheless, instead of adopting the measurement prescribed by the MIA ISA 610 for 
internal audit function attributes this study adopts the measurements prescribed in the SAS 
No. 65 (AICPA, 1997). This is because there is no available data to measure the factors 
under the ISA 610 (i.e. technical competence, due professional care and communication). 
In addition, this study also follows past research by Mat Zain, (2005) and Haron, 
Chambers, Ramsi and Ismail (2004) which used SAS No. 65 for Malaysian data. However, 
only objectivity and work performance are applied in this research since there is no 
available data to measure the competency of the IA function. 
 
5.2.6.1    Internal Audit Function - Objectivity 
To measure objectivity, this study uses a binary measure of whether the head of the internal 
audit reports directly to the audit committee. If the head of internal audit function reports 
functionally to audit committee then value „1‟ is assigned and if it is to somebody else, then 
„0‟ is assigned (Prawitt et al., 2008).  
 
5.2.6.2 Internal Audit Function - Work Performance 
 
As for the quality of work performed by the IAF, SAS No. 65 specifies two different 
dimensions for examining the work performed by the IAF. First, by examining whether the 
work performed by the internal auditors is relevant to the financial statement audit and 
secondly, by examining the quality and effectiveness of the internal auditor‟s work. Since 
this study uses archival data, the latter measurement is unavailable. Therefore, it will focus 
on the first measure. This can be done in two ways that are: (1) to determine whether the 
internal auditor provides any assistance in completing the external audit work; and (2) to 
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determine the activities performed by the internal auditors during the year which the 
external auditor can rely upon (Prawitt et al., 2008).  
 
In this study, the IAF activities performed during the year are used as proxy for the work 
performed by the IAF is relevant to the external audit, for this information is publicly 
available. Para 15.16 (3) of the BMLR 2008 requires the information pertaining to the IAF 
activities to be disclosed in the audit committee report. Further, Para 43 of the Statement of 
Internal Control (SIC) provides for voluntary disclosures on internal audit function 
activities. Para 43 states that the board may wish to provide any additional information in 
the annual report to assist understanding of the firm risk management processes and system 
of internal control. This suggests that disclosures in excess of the minimum disclosure 
items are a way of signalling to shareholders of the firm‟s commitment to maintain an 
effective internal control (Haron et al., 2009). In this study, the number of IAF activities 
voluntarily disclosed in the audit committee report is collected and compared against a total 
number of 19 voluntary disclosure as stated in Para 43, as shown in Table 5.1 below. 
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Table 5.1: Measurement for Work Performance  
 
Internal Audit Function Activities 
1) Statements disclosing IAF activities. 
2) Describing the nature of re-sourcing of the IAF. 
3) Internal Audit Plan was based on annual risk assessment. 
4) Disclosing support of the IAF from the AC and the board. 
5) Direct reporting relationship to the committee. 
6) Disclosing that the internal audit charter was approved by the AC. 
7) Statements disclosing regular meetings with the head of IAF without the presence 
of management. 
8) Describing that the IAF provide reasonable assurance opinion to the board on the 
state of internal control. 
9) Discussing that the scope of the IAF includes control, risk assessment and 
governance processes. 
10) Describing the timely reporting of control weaknesses to the AC and management 
11) Disclosing that audit reports were issued to the right audience. 
12) Statements disclosing that internal audit observations were acted upon. 
13) Describing the provision of advisory services by the IAF. 
14) Disclosures on open lines of communication with AC and management. 
15) Describing that the AC decides on the hiring, remuneration and firing of the head 
of the IAF. 
16) Disclosures that the IAF is adequately staff. 
17) Statements disclosing that internal auditors possess the appropriate level of 
expertise and qualifications. 
18) Describing the existence of quality assurance of the performance of the IAF. 
19) Statements disclosing that the audit conducted by the IAF is in accordance with 
Internal Standards for the professional practice of Internal Auditing.  
Source: Haron, Ibrahim, Jeyaraman and Chye (2009)  
5.3 Effects of Regulatory Oversight: Implication on Audit Fees  
 
We extend the above audit fees model by including the regulatory oversight (REG) as a 
moderating variable. For the audit fees, Model 2 is used to test Hypotheses 4, 5 and 6 and is 
represented in the equation below. This model was also adapted from the basic audit fee 
model by Simunic (1980). 
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Model 2: 
AF = β₀ + β₁TA + β₂NAF + β₃SUB + β₄FOREIGN + β₅SEG + ß₆ZFC + ß₇LEV + β₈ROA + 
β₉ LOSS + β₁₀PRD + β₁₁AQ + β₁₂REG + β₁₃IND + β₁₄DIL + β₁₅EXP + β₁₆OBJ + 
β₁₇WP + β₁₈IND_REG + β₁₉DIL_REG + β₂₀EXP_REG + β₂₁OBJ_REG + 
β₂₂WP_REG + ε, 
 
Where: 
Hypotheses Dependent 
Variable 
Exp 
Sign 
Measurement of Variables 
 AF  Audit fees paid by the client (Natural logarithm of 
audit fees). 
AC 
Characteristics 
Experimental 
Variables 
 Measurement of  Variables 
 IND + 
 
The proportion of independent non-executive 
directors to AC. 
 DIL + Number of AC meetings. 
 EXP + Number of AC members with accounting or finance 
qualification. 
IAF  
Attributes 
Experimental 
Variables 
 Measurement of  Variables 
 OBJ + An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the IAF 
reports directly to AC and „0‟ if otherwise. 
 WP + Voluntary disclosure under IAF as per Para 43 of 
Statement of Internal Control (SIC). 
 Control 
Variables 
 Measurement of  Variables 
 TA + The total assets (in RM) (Natural logarithm of TA). 
 NAF + The non-audit fees (in RM) (Natural logarithm of 
NAF). 
 SUB + The number of local subsidiaries. 
 FOREIGN + The number of foreign subsidiaries. 
 SEG + The number of business segments. 
 ZFC + The Zmijewski scores for financial crisis. 
 LEV - Proportion of total liability over TA. 
 ROA - Profit before tax over TA. 
 LOSS 
 
 
+ An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has 
made a loss in any of the periods and „0‟ if 
otherwise. 
 PRD + An indicator variable equals to „1‟ for post-test 
period and „0‟ if otherwise. 
 AQ + An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires 
Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise. 
Hypothesis 4 REG + As an indicator variable, „1‟ for REGULATED, and 
„0‟ if otherwise. 
Hypothesis 5a IND_REG + Interaction between IND and REG 
Hypothesis 5b DIL_REG + Interaction between DIL and REG 
Hypothesis 5c EXP_REG + Interaction between EXP and REG 
Hypothesis 6a OBJ_REG + Interaction between OBJ and REG 
Hypothesis 6b WP_REG + Interaction between WP and REG 
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5.3.1 Moderating Effects of Regulatory Oversight  
 
The purpose of Model 2 is to test the moderating effects of regulatory oversight on the 
association between the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee (AC) 
characteristics and internal audit function (IAF) attributes, and audit fees for high regulated 
firms. The moderating variable, REG, is set to „1‟ for highly regulated firms and „0‟ if 
otherwise. On the assumption that regulatory oversight has a complementary effect on 
external auditing, the study posits that the extensiveness of the external audit is higher in 
highly regulated firms with stronger corporate governance than in less regulated firms. 
Under the quantitative method of analysis, regressions are used to describe the strength and 
direction of the linear relationship between AC characteristics and IAF attributes with audit 
fees. Linear regressions are used to test the moderating effect of regulatory oversight on the 
association between the internal governance mechanisms of AC characteristics and IAF 
attributes, and audit fees. In order to test the internal governance mechanisms on audit fees 
and in comparing between highly regulated and less regulated firms, t-tests analysis is 
conducted to further extend the basic findings.  
 
5.4  Conclusion 
This chapter provides the basis and reasoning for selecting the variables to be tested in the 
hypotheses based on audit committee (AC) characteristics and internal audit function (IAF) 
attributes. This chapter also gives an overview of the quantitative approach used in Phase 2 
of this study. The next chapter will discuss the findings from the interviews with selected 
regulators, head of internal auditors and external auditors. 
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Chapter 6 PHASE 1: INTERVIEW FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to present the results of Phase 1 of this study which 
involved a series of interviews with two (2) regulators (R1 and R2), three (3) heads of 
internal auditors (IA1, IA2 and IA3) and three (3) external auditors (EA1, EA2 and EA3). 
The aim of the interviews is to shed further light on the inter-relationships between 
regulators, internal auditors and external auditors and its implications on audit fees, and to 
develop the research questions and hypotheses.  
 
6.2  Interview Findings 
In the next section, the findings from the semi-structured interviews are discussed under 
three (3) main themes. First, the interviews gathered the perception of the selected 
respondents on whether the revised Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR, 2008) 
on audit committee characteristics (AC) and internal audit function (IAF) attributes have an 
impact on the audit fees. Secondly, the interviews focused on investigating the 
interviewee‟s perceptions on the effect of the enhanced listing requirements and audit fees 
for different types of ownership structured firms in Malaysia, specifically on PCON firms. 
Thirdly, the interviews centred on explicating the moderating effect of regulatory 
oversights on the association between audit committee characteristics (AC) and internal 
audit function (IAF) attributes, with audit fees for high regulated firms and less regulated 
firms.  
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Of the respondents who participated in the interviews, six (6) were males and two (2) were 
females. All eight (8) respondents have accounting qualifications and six (6) of them also 
held professional qualifications. Two (2) of the participants were members of the Institute 
of Internal Auditors Malaysia (IIAM) and four (4) were also members of the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants (MIA). The respondents reported having at least six (6) years 
experience in the accounting and auditing field. The data matrix framework as provided in 
Table 6.1 below compares and contrasts the perception of the internal auditors, external 
auditors and regulators on the internal governance mechanisms, regulatory oversight and 
audit fees. The interview guide which is found in Appendix C was given to the respondents 
prior to the interview. Their responses are discussed below. 
 
6.3 Perceptions on the Internal Governance Mechanisms and Audit Fees 
In this section, the focus of the interviews was on the perceptions of the interviewees in 
terms of the enhanced BMLR 2008 on audit committee (AC) characteristics and internal 
audit function (IAF) attributes, and its implications on audit fees. 
 
Audit committee is as an important self-regulatory governance mechanism with significant 
oversight responsibilities over financial reporting, internal control and audit activities 
(BRC, 1999; SEC, 1999; United States Congress, 2002). To ensure that audit committee 
serves as an effective check on the management of a company, the BMLR 2008 spells out 
the composition of an audit committee, the frequency of meetings and the need for audit 
committee members to attend continuous training to keep abreast with developments in 
relevant financial and other related developments. In addition, executive directors can no 
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longer be a member of the audit committee in order to preserve the independence of the 
committee.  
 
Thus, more research needs to be conducted to understand the impact of BMLR 2008 on 
audit fees. This present study interviewed eight (8) respondents, i.e. three (3) internal 
auditors, three (3) external auditors and two (2) regulators to get their perceptions on this. 
Interestingly, all eight (8) respondents
17
 concurred that the BMLR 2008 has improved the 
role of audit committee and internal audit function in the governance of a listed firm. This 
is consistent with Cohen et al. (2002) that corporate governance developments have 
increased the focus on internal control systems, and the internal audit function has been 
identified as a key role in assessing and improving the quality of such system. Further, the 
audit committee plays a crucial role in improving the firm‟s internal controls through its 
monitoring of the work of internal and external auditors (Collier, 1992). Thus, it is 
anticipated that internal controls are stronger in firms which have an effective and efficient 
audit committee as noted by interviewee IA3: 
Audit committee involvement towards internal audit activities was 
not critical before, as they were looking only at reports. But now 
they are very much involved and the interaction between audit 
committee and head of internal auditors is good. As per last year, 
the company had seven or eight audit committee meetings and we 
even had a meeting without the presence of the management. 
 
 
IA1 noting a similar viewpoint, states that: 
 
Corporate governance in Malaysia is good and will be better due to 
the support from Bursa Malaysia. Compared to previous years, a lot 
of differences have taken place especially in 2008 due to the 
additional roles of audit committee and internal audit function. 
 
                                                 
17
 Respondents for the interview in the current study are categorized as Internal Auditors (IA), External 
Auditors (EA) and Regulators (R). 
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Table 6.1:  The Structured Interviews Data Matrix 
 IA1 IA2 IA3 EA1 EA2 EA3 R1 R2 
Demographic Details         
Age group 36-40 46-50 41-45 36-40 46-50 36-40 46 – 50 36-40 
Gender Male Male Male Female Male Female Male Male 
Professional Qualification/ Membership IIAM/ 
ICSA 
IIAM/ 
CIA 
MIA MIA MIA/ 
CPA 
AUST 
MICPA MIA/ 
CPA 
AUST 
CISA/ 
ISACA 
No. of years working experience >11 
Years 
>11 
Years 
>11 
Years 
>11 
Years 
>11 
Years 
6–10 
Years 
>11 
Years 
>11 
Years 
Content Theme         
A) Perceptions on the enhanced CG on 
AC characteristics and IAF attributes 
and AF implications. 
        
The revision BMLR 2008/09 affecting the 
role of AC. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
The revision BMLR 2008/09 affecting the 
role of IA. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Role of AC and IA Very 
Effective 
Very 
Effective 
 
Effective 
 
Effective 
 
Effective 
 
Effective 
Very 
Effective 
Very 
Effective 
The revision on the role of AC and IAF 
contributes to the preparation of financial 
statement audit. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
External auditor still needs to conduct 
substantive audit testing. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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 IA1 IA2 IA3 EA1 EA2 EA3 R1 R2 
Does the contribution of the IA assist in 
reducing external audit fees. 
No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Audit fee is lowest in the region. Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree Agree 
B) Perceptions on the enhanced CG for 
different types of ownership structure, 
specifically on PCON firms and audit 
fees implications. 
        
PCON firms are perceived to have poor 
corporate governance and riskier than non-
PCON firms.  
 
No 
 
No  
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
The enhanced CG on AC and IAF attribute 
affecting PCON the most. (H2, H3) 
 
No 
 
No  
 
Not sure 
 
No 
 
Not sure 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
Most of the PCON firms have complied 
with the BMLR 2008 even before it became 
mandatory. 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Not sure 
 
Agree 
 
Not sure 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
C) Perceptions on the regulatory 
oversights for high regulated and less 
regulated firms and its implications on 
audit fees. 
        
HRFs are more governed than LRFs. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HRFs pay higher audit fees than LRS. (H4) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
The role of regulatory oversight. (H5, H6) Very 
Effective 
Very 
Effective 
 
Effective 
Very 
Effective 
Very 
Effective 
Very 
Effective 
Very 
Effective 
Very 
Effective 
Most of the HRFs have complied with the 
BMLR 2008 even before it became 
mandatory. 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Agree 
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Hence, the new requirements by the Bursa Malaysia further strengthen the role and 
responsibilities of an audit committee vis-a-vis the internal audit function, such as 
reviewing the adequacy, functions, competency and resources of internal audit and other 
audit activities. The audit committee has the ability to enhance the effectiveness of the 
internal audit function, and this in turn has implications for internal auditors‟ contribution 
to external audit work.  
 
All eight (8) respondents agreed that the internal audit function contributes to the financial 
statement audit. The internal auditors provided reasonable assistance to their external 
auditors in areas that needed clarifications but they are not directly involved in the 
preparation of the financial statement. However, they did provide assistance to their 
external auditors during the course of the audit through various ways including getting 
more information about internal control systems in the organization. Normally, external 
auditors will review the internal auditors‟ work and if the work of the internal auditors is of 
reasonable quality, they tend to use the work completed by the internal auditors, 
particularly in areas such as internal control reviews. 
 
The internal audit function also contributes to the financial statement audit. This was 
confirmed by the respondents who were interviewed in this present study. They affirmed 
that internal auditors do contribute towards the preparation of financial statements even 
though they are not directly involved. The internal auditors provide reasonable assistance to 
the external auditors in areas that need clarifications during the course of the audit exercise. 
In addition, the internal auditor may supply information about the firm‟s internal control 
systems. Further, external auditors review the internal auditors‟ work and if the work of the 
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internal auditors is of reasonable quality, they tend to use the work completed by the 
internal auditors, particularly in areas such as internal control reviews. 
 
Notwithstanding the role played by the internal auditors, most respondents when queried 
whether such assistance rendered by the internal auditors have any impact on audit fees, 
claimed that the contribution of the internal audit does not result in a reduction in the 
external audit fees. This is because external auditors tend to cover areas which are not fully 
covered by the internal auditors. 
 
Further, as one of the respondents (IA3) said: 
 
External auditor does not fully rely on internal auditors report but 
they will drop by at the internal audit department to get information 
that they will use in doing the audit. External auditor only relies on 
controls but not financial matters because they have to be assured 
and need to do their own verification and testing. 
 
 
Nevertheless, there are respondents who believed otherwise. For instance, EA2 said that the 
amount of audit fees charged is usually fixed and agreed upon before the external auditor‟s 
appointed.  However, as audit fees are charged based on audit hours and number of staff 
assigned to audit the audited client, the fixed fees charged can be lowered if the number of 
audit hours and auditors are reduced. Thus, if the external auditors can rely on the internal 
audit work, the audit fees can be reduced. However, before the external auditors rely on the 
internal audit, they must be assured that the information is reliable and the internal audit 
function is of high quality.  
 
According to one of the respondents (EA3) interviewed by the researcher: 
If the internal audit standards are met, the reliance on IAF can be in 
full, but if the firm does not meet the standards, we can rely to 
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certain extend but not to reduce our work. It can reduce the audit 
effort but not that much. 
 
 
Further, respondent R1 commented that: 
 
External auditors do not rely on internal audit function because they 
need to give their own opinion on how internal control and 
governance mechanisms are operating in the company. Reliance 
does not absorb them from responsibilities. Good corporate 
governance may reduce audit work to a certain extend because they 
need to focus on areas that are not being covered. External auditors 
need to assess and review the internal audit function before they can 
put some reliance. 
 
 
Interestingly, findings indicate that the greater the objectivity, technical competence and 
quality of work performance, the larger the potential for internal auditors to contribute to 
the external audit (Krishnamoorty, Wright and Cohen, 2002).  
 
Additionally, audit fees also depend on the level of substantive testing required (Sherer and 
Turley, 1991). The external auditors do cover areas which are not included in the internal 
audit work. Though the external auditor may rely on internal audit work and reduce the 
substantive testing resulting in lower audit fees, the external auditor cannot do so if 
compliance tests indicate that internal controls are not operating properly. Further, Devi and 
Samujh (2010) find that Malaysia‟s audit fees are still the lowest in the ASEAN region and 
this might be a reason for no reduction of audit fees despite reliance by the external auditor 
on the audited clients‟ internal audit function.  
 
This is supported by the respondent (IA1) interviewed in this current study which claimed 
that:  
With the changes in regulation, the role and responsibilities of the 
audit committee and internal audit function are more, external 
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auditors can rely on the job function of audit committee and internal 
audit function; however, the amount of audit fees charged would 
not be reduced but keep on increasing every year. This is because 
audit fees in Malaysia are the lowest in the region. 
 
Likewise, another respondent (EA3) in this study also highlighted that: 
In Indonesia, audit fees are paid in US dollar unlike in Malaysia. 
Our audit fees are the lowest in the region and it will never reduce 
because the work and effort that we have to put in is great. 
 
6.4 Perceptions on the Internal Governance Mechanisms and Audit Fees for 
PCON firms 
 
Prior studies have shown that the presence of government ownership gives rise to 
inefficiencies and poor performance (Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh, 1994; and 
Megginson and Netter, 2001: Johnson and Mitton, 2003) to the government favoured firms. 
According to Mak and Li (2001), the government is likely to be less active in monitoring 
their investments in these firms. As a result, weaker accountability for financial 
performance, easier access to financing, lack of exposure to a market for corporate control, 
and weaker monitoring by shareholders are likely to reduce the incentives for PCON firms 
to adopt strong governance.  
 
In addition, Gul (2006) evidenced that favoured firms in Malaysia are closely connected to 
influential political figures. His study documents evidence of „crony-capitalism‟ in 
Malaysia. The favoured firms‟ political linkages influence the accumulation and 
concentration of wealth in Malaysian business (Gomez and Jomo, 1999). However, despite 
the close connection with the influential politicians, the favoured firms are conscious of 
good governance.  
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From the interviews conducted in this current study, one of the interviewee (IA3) explains: 
Our company and other government linked firms are very strict 
with corporate governance activities. We have a lot to lose if we do 
not comply because of government intervention. Same goes with 
politically connected firms, the political people on board must show 
their capabilities, they really need to comply if not they will fail. If 
government firms keep on failing, it doesn‟t look good in their track 
record and later on it is difficult to ask assistance from the 
government. 
 
Likewise, other respondent (EA3) stated that: 
Probably at the beginning the politically connected firms are having 
poor performance and the corporate governance is not strong. But 
now they are strict and moving towards corporate governance and 
need to keep up with the KPIs.  But still certain companies which 
have less focus from the government are a bit weak. However, they 
are striving towards good corporate governance practices too. 
 
According to another respondent (IA1): 
 
Politically connected firms having lower risk because being backed 
up by the government most of the time and their corporate 
governance have improved especially after 2005 due to the 
transformation program
18
. 
 
 
The government intervention is expected to produce better governance and improve the 
firm‟s business performance. In fact, through its representatives from the Ministry of 
Finance who sit on the board of directors, the government who owns shares in these firms 
can prevent any conflict of interest by the managers. The said representatives are 
responsible to control and monitor the management activities. Hence, it can be said that 
there is an increase in the accountability and efficiency of the Malaysian PCON firms 
through an effective ownership by the government. Interestingly, from the interviews 
conducted in this study, six (6) out of eight (8) respondents agreed that most of the PCON 
                                                 
18
 Transformation Program includes various strategies aimed at enhancing corporate developing social leaders 
and clarifying social leaders and upgrading the effectiveness of the Board. 
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firms have complied with the BMLR 2008 even before it became mandatory. As confirmed 
by one of the respondents (IA3): 
PCON firms are forming under Public Interest Entity (PIE), all 
requirements must be complied with and all documentation for 
audit must be updated. If any new regulation imposed by Bursa 
PCON firms will have to implement them. Some of the firms have 
complied with the regulations even before. It was voluntary during 
that time. 
 
Likewise, another respondent (EA2) illustrates this point: 
 
The changes in regulations do not affect these firms that much 
because they are moving towards good governance. There are also 
firms complying with the good practices even before they became 
mandatory by Bursa. 
 
The respondent (IA3) stresses that: 
 
The changes don‟t have any impact, they just want it to be clear and 
documented on the existence of requirements, but most of the firms 
already have that in place. 
 
In summary, the launch of the Government Linked Firms (GLFs) Transformation Program 
by the Malaysian government to, among others, enhance the performance of GLFs in 2005 
has improved the corporate governance practices and it was followed suit by politically 
connected firms.  
 
It is to be noted that one of the objectives of the program is to upgrade the effectiveness of 
the board and reinforce the governance of the said firms. Further, the government expects 
its favoured firms to increase their investments and spending to make up for the shortfall 
arising from the government‟s move to cut its own expenditure and reduce the budget 
deficit (Najid and Abdul Rahman, 2011). 
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With the continuous improvement on corporate governance practices, the PCON firms are 
perceived to have better corporate governance and it is envisaged that these firms will 
reinforce this mindset of continuous improvement in their day-to-day operations. This is 
important because Malaysian PCON firms were once perceived to be associated with 
higher business risk and poor performance. Therefore, it is crucial that their performance 
which forms the backbone of the country's economy should improve and make a significant 
contribution to the nation‟s development and create value for other key stakeholders. As 
explained by one of the respondents (IA3) that: 
PCON firms are not 100% owned by government, we have 
shareholders and private owned which we are liable to them as well. 
We are answerable to these people. I don‟t agree that PCON firms 
carry higher risk and poor performance. We have a lot of things in 
place and complying with all these requirements. 
 
6.5 Perceptions on the Regulatory Oversight and Audit Fees for HRFs 
What then is the perception of the role of regulatory oversight vis-a-vis audit fees in 
Malaysia? From the interviews conducted in this present study, of the eight (8) respondents 
interviewed seven (7) of the respondents IA1, IA2, IA3, EA2, EA3, R1, and R2 opined that 
the role of regulators in Malaysia is very effective. The remaining respondent (EA1) 
viewed that the role of regulators in Malaysia as only effective.  Further, all eight (8) 
respondents agreed that due to the role played by BNM, banking institutions and insurance 
firms are more governed as compared to firms in other industries. Since these highly 
regulated firms are subject to additional industry-specific oversight, they have to ensure 
that effective policies and practices are followed. Respondent (IA3) explained: 
Highly regulated firms are more governed because of Bank Negara, 
when there is a directive from Bank Negara, these firms have to 
comply…if not, their license will be revoked. 
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Further, as required by BNM, highly regulated firms have implemented most of the listing 
requirements even before it was mandated by Bursa Malaysia in 2008.  As respondent 
(IA1) said: 
Highly regulated firms have implemented most of the listing 
requirements even before it was mandated by Bursa 
Malaysia…they have no choice but to comply especially if it is 
being enforced under Banking and Financial Institutions Act. 
 
The enforcement of tighter regulations and greater emphasis for risk management and 
governance practices within the Malaysian financial institutions further indicate the 
growing importance of having strong audit committees and internal audit functions in 
fulfilling corporate governance responsibilities. Therefore, audit committee members are 
more likely to demand extensive audit to protect their reputation (Abbott and Parker, 2000; 
Carcello and Neal, 2000) and to avoid financial misstatement and non-compliance. It 
requires substantive audit testing and consequently higher audit fees. Seven (7) of the eight 
(8) respondents (IA1, IA2, EA1, EA2, EA3, R1 and R2) interviewed claimed that highly 
regulated firms pay higher audit fees as compared to less regulated firms. As noted by one 
of the respondents (EA3) that: 
Financial institutions are highly regulated and in terms of internal 
control, they are far better than the rest. When we audit banks, there 
will be a situation where we cannot find any misstatement or non-
compliance because they have been audited several times in a year. 
Most of the times, we have nothing to report on but audit still needs 
to be done and audit fees need to be charged. Banks will always 
comply with the requirements even before they became mandatory 
by Bursa Malaysia. 
 
Likewise, another respondent (EA1) also highlighted that highly regulated firms are also 
high risk firms and thus the auditors respond to the risk accordingly by subjecting them to 
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appropriate audit testing. This is in line with Bedard et al. (2004). As respondent (EA1) 
said: 
Highly regulated firms are more governed. External auditor still 
needs to do proper audit because banks and insurance firms are 
considered as high risk firms. Because they are being monitored by 
an industry-specific regulator, we need to conduct a thorough audit 
testing. It doesn‟t mean that good governance and compliance will 
reduce the audit fee, but rather it depends on audit hours, audit work 
and the risk of signing the report. 
 
In summary, the general perception of the respondents is that in Malaysia, regulatory 
oversight complements external audit monitoring. Thus, there should be an increase in the 
demand for extensive audit resulting in higher audit fees. The external auditors still need to 
carry out audit work even though they could, to some extent, rely on the audited clients‟ 
internal audit functions. 
 
6.6 Summary of the Interview Findings 
In summary, the interviews provide a more in-depth understanding of the relationship 
between the enhanced BMLR 2008 on audit committee characteristics and internal audit 
function attributes, and its implication on audit fees. The interviews are also focused on 
PCON firms and HRFs.  
 
With reference to the findings of the interviews, the interviewees suggest that PCON firms 
and HRFs have been complying with the listing requirements specifically in relation to 
audit committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes. Audit committees 
have a duty not just overseeing the conduct of business in compliance with laws, they 
should also be effective stewards and guardians of the firm in respect of ethical values, and 
ensuring an effective governance structure for the appropriate management of risks and 
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level of internal controls. Their involvement in strengthening internal controls is more 
likely to demand for higher audit quality in order to protect their reputation and at the same 
time does not compromise the quality of audit. The interviews also highlighted that PCON 
firms and HRFs engage in greater level of internal monitoring through the use of internal 
audit, which also demand higher quality external auditing. This is because they recognize 
the importance of both types of audit as mechanisms to strengthen corporate governance, 
thus they would complement each other‟s work. Due to this reason, audit committee 
members of PCON firms and HRFs would demand the external auditor to conduct 
substantive audit work and are willing to pay higher audit fees. It also indicates that 
regulatory oversight plays a vital role in enhancing good corporate governance practices 
and it complements the external audit as a monitoring mechanism. 
 
The interviews also evidenced that the extent of external auditor reliance on internal audit 
function may not necessarily lead to a reduction in audit fees. It appears that the majority of 
the interviewees agreed that the external auditors to a certain extend are able to place some 
reliance on internal audit contribution. However, itt would not assist in reducing the 
external audit fees, hence, the PCON firms and high regulated firms pay higher audit fees.  
 
6.7  Conclusion  
This chapter provides a summary of interviews with eight (8) respondents who are 
regulators, heads of internal auditors and external auditors. This chapter gives an overview 
of the qualitative approach used in this research to support the quantitative results. The next 
chapter will discuss the results of the quantitative data analysis. 
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Chapter 7 PHASE 2: DATA ANALYSIS, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
   
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the data analysis for the study. While Chapters 4 and 5 explain the 
research design and method of analytical procedures, this chapter elaborates on each 
analysis for the two research models of Model 1 and Model 2, commencing with the 
descriptive statistics, Univariate analysis followed by the linear multivariate analysis. 
Statistical analyses for Model 1 and 2 are based on the t-tests and Chi-square analysis and 
both models used multiple regression statistical techniques. Detailed descriptions of the 
data screening and tests for assumptions of the regression analysis are provided. 
Subsequently, it will be followed with sensitivity analysis, conclusion and summary of 
findings at the end of the chapter.  
 
7.2 Data Analysis 
7.2.1 Data Screening and Cleaning 
Prior to data analysis, the data used in this study is checked for errors. This is to ensure the 
accuracy of data entry and that there are no missing values when entering the data. Data 
screening and transformation techniques are also used to ensure that the data have been 
correctly entered and the distributions of variables are normal. Each continuous 
independent variable for Model 1 (Table 7.6) and Model 2 (Table 7.12) is tested for 
normality. This is because the parametric tests make assumptions about the shape of the 
population distribution, which is normally distributed. A normal curve is used to describe a 
symmetrical, bell shape curve, which has the greatest frequency of scores in the middle, 
with smaller frequencies towards the extremes (Gravetter and Wallnau, 2000). Normality 
can be assessed to some extent by obtaining skewness and kurtosis values. On a Univariate 
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basis, the normality of the data can be assessed in four steps (Hair, Anderson, Tatham and 
Black, 1996). First, the skew value for each variable can be determined by calculating the Z 
value. Second, the kurtosis value is considered by using the critical non-normality value of 
greater than 10. Third, inspection is done for any deviations that exist in the frequency 
distributions. The fourth step involves the transformation of the data which can further 
reduce the normality assumptions by skewness and/or kurtosis. For each of the variable that 
violates the assumption of normality, a natural logarithmic transformation is applied.  
 
Many of the statistical techniques are sensitive to outliers and at the initial data screening 
process, the researcher checks for extreme scores. The Univariate in the data set is 
identified through the use of box-plot, histogram, normal probability plots or detrended 
normal probability plots. According to Tabachnick and Fidell (1996), outliers are those 
with standardised residual values above 3.3 or less than -3.3. In this study, the above 
methods are used to examine the outliers. Once the outliers had been identified, the data are 
re-checked for its accuracy and the distribution of scores. A variable transformation which 
involves mathematically modifying the scores is feasible for Univariate outliers with 
extreme values. As suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), the first option for reducing 
the impact of Univariate outliers is through variable transformation. Multivariate outliers 
are checked by inspecting the Mahalanobis distances that are produced using SPSS 
regression program. 
 
In this study, the value of skewness and kurtosis revealed that audit fees (AF), total assets 
(TA) and non-audit fees (NAF) have violated the assumption of normality. Further, the 
examinations of box-plot, histogram, normal probability plots or detrended normal 
159 
 
probability plots and standardized residual values above 3.3 evidenced that extreme cases 
of outliers are found in these variables. Since those variables do not have normal 
distribution, they are transformed (Simunic, 1980; Francis and Simon, 1987; Craswell and 
Francis, 1999; Felix, Gramling and Maletta,, 2001) using natural log of the variables. 
Observations having a zero for log non-audit fees (LNAF) are re-coded to a small positive 
value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
 
7.2.2 Appropriateness of Regression Models 
Multiple regressions make a number of assumptions about the data and it should not be 
violated. In this study, regression analysis is used for testing the hypotheses for Model 1 
(H2a, 2b 2c, 3a and 3b) and Model 2 (H5a, 5b, 5c, 6a and 6b).  Data set was analysed for its 
compatibility with the assumptions of multiple regression. More specifically, Tabachnick 
and Fidell (1996) suggested four major assumptions for multiple regression analysis which 
are: 
(a) Sample Size 
Different authors tend to give different guidelines concerning the number of cases required 
for multiple regressions. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) give a formula for calculating 
sample size requirements taking into account the number of independent variables : N > 50 
+ 8m, where m = number of independent variables. For Model 1, the total number of the 
independent variables is 16 with 945 numbers of firm-year observations and there are 17 
independent variables in Model 2 with 1045 numbers of firm-year observations. Hence, in 
both models, the sample size requirements are satisfied.  
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(b) Multicollinearity  
Multicollinearity refers to high correlations among the independent variables and exists 
when the independent variables are highly correlated (r = 0.9 and above) (Pallant, 2001). In 
this study, the tolerance and VIF measures for each regression models were computed and 
analysed. If the value of tolerance is very low (near 0) and VIF > 10, this might indicate 
that multiple correlation with other variables is high, suggesting the possibility of 
multicollinearity. The result for Model 1 as shown in Table 7.6 [Model C, (I)] shows that 
the interaction term between audit committee independence and PCON (IND_PCON) VIF 
= 18.777. It indicates that the interaction term IND_PCON has violated the assumption of 
multicollinearity. However, Model 2 as shown in Table 7.12 [Model C (I), (II), (III), (IV) 
and (V)] indicates that tolerance of greater than 0.10 with the VIF of below 10, indicating 
that it does not appear to have violated this assumption. 
 
(c) Outliers 
Checking for extreme values is part of the initial data screening process. Outliers with 
extreme cases have considerable impact on the regression analysis and should be deleted or 
modified to reduce their influence. Univariate outliers are detected during data screening 
and multivariate outliers are detected using statistical methods such as Mahalanobis 
distance.  
 
With reference to the Univariate outliers, no extreme outliers for the transformed variables 
were found for Model 1 and Model 2. However, for Model 1, an examination of the 
Mahalanobis distance values indicated that cases 78, 127 and 145 were multivariate outliers 
among the independent variables. The value for case 78 was 58.220, case 127 was 66.693 
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and case 145 was 71.161, were greater than the critical Chi-square of 40.790 at an alpha 
level of 0.001.
19
 For Model 2, an examination of the Mahalanobis distance values indicated 
that cases 961 (82.033), 981 (72.695), 983 (86.520), 1001 (72.470) and 1023 (76.430) were 
multivariate outliers since the values were greater than the critical Chi-square of 40.790 at 
an alpha level of 0.001. For Model 1, regression analyses were undertaken with the 
multivariate outliers removed from the sample. Further analysis indicated that the exclusion 
of the multivariate outliers did not result in any significant differences in terms of the value 
of adjusted R² for Model 1. According to Pallant (2001), with large samples, it is common 
to find multivariate outliers, and if it is only a few, it may not be necessary to take any 
action. Thus, in this study the multivariate outliers were retained for Model 1. However, for 
Model 2 regression analyses were undertaken with the multivariate outliers removed from 
the sample. This is because the analysis indicated that the exclusion of the multivariate 
outliers resulted in significant differences in terms of the value of adjusted R² for Model 2. 
Hence, in this study, the multivariate outliers were removed for Model 2. 
 
(d) Normality, linearity, homoscedasticity and independence of residuals 
 
An examination of residuals scatter plots and the Normal Probability Plot are used to test 
the above assumptions. It is assumed that the differences between the obtained and 
predicted dependent variable scores are normally distributed. Further, it is also assumed 
that the residuals have a linear relationship with the predicted dependent variable scores, 
and that the variance of the residuals is the same for all predicted scores. In this study, 
Model 1 and Model 2 indicated that there is no clear relationship between residuals and 
predicted values, thus the assumption of linearity is not violated. The normal probability 
                                                 
19
 An alpha of 0.001 is recommended by Coakes and Steed (2003) 
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plot of the regression standardised residuals for the dependent variable and histogram also 
indicated a relatively normal distribution, suggesting no major deviations from normality.  
 
 7.3 Model 1: Politically Connected (PCON) Firms and non-Politically 
Connected (non-PCON) Firms 
 
7.3.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The sample data comprises of 945 firm-year observations for 2005 to 2009. Descriptive 
analysis is used to describe the characteristics of the sample and the control sample. Table 7.1 
below provides descriptive statistics for the continuous and indicator variables which 
contain summary statistics for the pre-test period and post-test period. Since the descriptive 
statistics are for continuous and dichotomous variables, both t-tests and Chi-square tests are 
used where appropriate to test for the differences. The descriptive analysis shows that the 
average audit fees (AF) increased from RM311,428 during the pre-test period to 
RM392,038 during post-test period. On average, audit committee independence (IND) 
increased from 81.9 percent in pre-test period to 97.1 percent for post-test period. 
Additionally, the sample firms have audit committee members that are predominantly 
diligent (DIL) (5.04 and 5.18) having financial or accounting expertise (EXP) (1.37 and 
1.42). The objectivity (OBJ) increased from 72 percent to 95 percent, on which it shows an 
increase on the internal audit function direct reporting to the audit committee. Finally, the 
mean on the work performance (WP) on activities performed and disclosed during the year 
by the internal audit function increased from 10.05 to 11.76, respectively.  
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Table 7.1: Panel A - Descriptive statistics for the number of observations (n= 945)  
  
               Pre-test period (Year 2005 to 2007)   Post-test period (Year 2008 to 2009) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev Median t-tests/Chi-square 
 
LAF 
 
11.885 
 
0.968 
 
11.751 
 
12.094 
 
0.993 
 
11.9530 
 
-3.188* 
AF 311428.010 806839.072 127000.000 392038.280 1089342.132 157350.00 -1.305* 
 LTA 13.2863 1.483 13.099 13.424 1.485 13.120 -1.394 
TA 2578740.300 8119084.347 489796.000 2973801.510 7970066.839 505049.000 -0.738 
 LNAFº 3.264 10.599 9.305 4.327 10.13587 9.648 -1.551 
NAF 178291.090 789427.163 11000.000 193984.700 15500.000 822656.012 -0.294 
SUB 20.720 12.000 31.270 22.740 33.511 13.000 -0.945 
 FOREIGN 2.080 8.920 0.000 2.380 9.486 0.000 -0.485 
SEG 3.090 1.594 3.000 3.090 1.594 3.000 -0.025 
ZFC -2.957 1.020 -3.076 -2.947 1.037 -3.041 -0.138 
ROA 0.066 0.085 0.061 0.060 0.090 0.0622 0.966 
LEV 0.269 0.164 0.248 0.268 0.164 0.245 0.093 
LOSS 0.180 * 0.000 0.190 * 0.000 ©0.733 
AQ 0.690 * 1.000 0.680 * 1.000 ©0.774 
PCON 0.350 * 0.000 0.350 * 0.000 ©0.528 
INST&MGRL 0.290 * 0.000 0.290 * 0.000 ©0.505 
FAMILY 0.370 * 0.000 0.370 * 0.000 ©0.397 
IND 0.819 0.167 0.750 0.971 0.091 1.000 -17.928* 
DIL 5.040 1.559 5.000 5.180 1.677 5.000 -1.297 
EXP 1.370 0.613 1.000 1.420 0.626 1.000 -1.053 
OBJ 0.720 * 1.000 0.950 * 1.000 ©0.000* 
WP 10.050 2.789 10.000 11.760 2.340 12.000 -10.191* 
*p < 0.05; © Chi-square tests for dichotomous variables; t-tests for other variables   ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. *not necessary 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG 
is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator 
variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; INST&MGRL is an indicator variable „1‟, with reference to PCON and „0‟ otherwise; FAMILY is an indicator variable „1‟, with reference to PCON and „0‟ otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit 
committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
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For the control variables, the mean of total assets (TA) of the firms for pre and post-test 
periods are RM2,578,740 and RM2,973,801, respectively. The mean for the variable 
indicating non-audit fees (NAF) is RM178,291 (pre-test period) and RM193,984 (post-test 
period) while the mean ratio of total liabilities over total assets (LEV) is 0.269 and 0.268 
for pre and post-test period respectively. The mean for Zmijewski score (ZFC), indicating 
financial condition index is -2.957 (pre-test period) and -2.947 (post-test period) 
respectively and the average of ROA for both periods is 0.06. The average number of local 
subsidiaries (SUB) is 20.72 (pre-test period) and 22.74 (post-test period), and the mean for 
foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN) is 2.08 and 2.38 for pre-test and post-test periods. 
(Descriptive statistics results for years 2005 to 2009 are attached in Appendix D). 
 
Panel B of Table 7.1 reports the frequency of ownership structure for the sample firms. 
Thirty-six percent of the samples are politically connected (PCON) firms, 34% belongs to 
family-owned firms (FAMILY), followed by the institutional and managerial owned firms 
(INSTL&MGRL) of 30%. 
 
Table 7.1: Panel B - Frequency of Ownership Structure 
 
                
           Frequency               Percentage        
 
Politically Connected Firms 
Non-Politically Connected Firms: 
Family Ownership Firms 
Institutional Ownership Firms& 
Managerial Ownership Firms 
                                                                                      
            
           68 
                  171 
 65                                34% 
 56                                 30% 
                 ____ 
                  189_        
   
 36% 
   64% 
            
          
  _____    
   100% 
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7.3.2  Univariate Analysis 
The analysis includes the Univariate test, t-tests analysis and Pearson‟s correlation tests 
between the dependent variable (audit fees) and independent variables of audit committee 
characteristics and internal audit function attributes. 
 
Table 7.2 shows Univariate analysis for the continuous and indicator variables in Panels A 
and B respectively. Panel A represents pre-test period and Panel B represents post-test 
period sample for PCON, FAMILY and INST&MGRL firms, with the descriptive of mean, 
standard deviation and median. The descriptive statistics show that for samples in both 
periods, PCON firms are bigger in terms of total assets and have a larger number of local 
subsidiaries (SUB) and foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN). The PCON firms also have higher 
non-audit fees (NAF), a higher audit quality (AQ) and a lower financial crisis index (ZFC). 
 
In general, PCON firms have higher average audit fees than non-PCON firms in both 
periods. The descriptive statistics also show that the average audit fees for PCON firms 
increased from RM598,771 during the pre-test period to RM739,045 during post-test 
period. However, the average audit fees for FAMILY and INST&MGRL firms experienced 
a small increase for the respective periods (i.e., RM148,641 and RM159,899 for the pre-test 
period, RM189,890 and RM216,048 for the post-test period). 
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Table 7.2: Univariate Analysis for sample firms (n = 945) 
Panel A: Pre-test period (Year 2005 to 2007) 
 
                                   
                        PCON   Firms (n=340)                                                                           Non-PCON Firms 
                                                                       FAMILY    (n=325) INST&MGRL (n=280) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev Median 
LAF 12.408 1.084 12.370 11.540 0.767 11.494 11.684 0.758 11.648 
AF 598771.870 1278824.347 241000.000 148641.270 247116.808 96125.000 159899.500 142376.015 114500.000 
 LTA 14.263 1.502 14.115 12.631 1.071 12.575 12.925 1.283 12.799 
TA 5733265.990 12757264.082 1362503.000 597571.000 985081.186 289265.000 696097.310 2987325.527 362192.000 
 LNAFº 7.068 9.309 10.905 1.603 10.494 8.699 0.577 10.916 8.047 
NAF 365415.530 831497.136 54500.000 23350.490 41619.141 6000.000 55842.250 155820.726 3127.000 
SUB 32.580 46.663 19.000 14.480 15.819 9.000 13.850 12.031 10.000 
 FOREIGN 5.120 14.405 0.000 0.270 0.850 0.000 0.590 1.757 0.000 
SEG 3.400 1.724 3.000 2.720 1.330 3.000 3.170 1.647 3.000 
ZFC -2.923 0. 842 -3.017 -3.212 0.842 -3.256 -3.002 0.889 -3.001 
ROA 0.061 0.065 0.063 0.061 0.053 0.061 0.055 0.062 0.060 
LEV 0.292 0.160 0.256 0.225 0.128 0.220 0.296 0.197 0.286 
LOSS 0.200 * 1.000 0.140 * 0.000 0.210 * 0.000 
AQ 0.790 * 1.000 0.620 * 1.000 0.660 * 1.000 
IND 0.883 0.157 1.000 0.796 0.144 0.750 0.769 0.182 0.750 
DIL 5.470 2.143 5.000 4.790 1.099 5.000 4.830 0.982 5.000 
EXP 1.370 0.628 1.000 1.350 0.613 1.000 1.410 0.596 1.000 
OBJ 0.740 * 1.000 0.750 * 1.000 0.670 * 1.000 
WP 10.000 3.050 11.000 9.970 2.644 10.000 10.220 2.632 10.000 
*p < 0.05; © Chi-square tests *not necessary 
ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the 
number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has 
made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit 
committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
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Panel B: Post-test period (Year 2007 to 2008) 
                            
                                                     PCON   Firms  (n=340)                                                                 Non-PCON Firms 
                                                                        FAMILY    (n=325) INST&MGRL (n=280) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev Median 
LAF 12.631 1.066 12.582 11.719 0.808 11.700 11.916 0.825 11.774 
AF 739045.690 1727857.350 301500.000 189890.490 371583.932 120300.00 216048.510 248825.789 130000.000 
 LTA 14.313 1.510 14.058 12.775 1.064 12.673 13.105 1.315 12.948 
TA 5945714.890 11669897.660 1468634.500 690219.490 1235117.632 318293.500 1839621.100 5107855.012 434299.000 
 LNAFº 8.248 8.009 10.819 2.131 10.495 110.158 2.228 10.649 9.023 
NAF 461066.970 1324152.273 50000.000 33455.290 69257.859 5500.000 64752.970 245056.721 8300.000 
SUB 34.630 49.865 19.000 15.590 15.611 10.000 16.970 16.815 12.000 
 FOREIGN 5.630 15.282 1.000 0.400 0.953 0.000 0.820 2.212 0.000 
SEG 3.400 1.726 3.000 2.730 1.330 3.000 3.170 1.649 3.000 
ZFC -2.989 0.857 -2.957 -3.267 0.849 -3.281 -2.911 0.890 -2.942 
ROA 0.057 0.067 0.060 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.045 0.069 0.050 
LEV 0.283 0.168 0.254 0.217 0.123 0.213 0.312 0.188 0.275 
LOSS 0.210 * 0.000 0.150 * 0.000 0.220 * 0.000 
AQ 0.790 * 1.000 0.630 * 1.000 0.620 * 1.000 
IND 0.969 0.087 1.000 0.981 0.712 1.000 0.960 0.115 1.000 
DIL 5.630 2.332 5.000 4.800 0.876 5.000 5.110 1.321 5.000 
EXP 1.470 0.668 1.000 1.350 0.639 1.000 1.430 0.550 1.000 
OBJ 0.980 * 1.000 0.970 * 1.000 0.880 * 1.000 
WP 11.940 2.368 12.000 11.53 2.500 12.000 11.820 2.082 12.000 
*p < 0.05; © Chi-square tests *not necessary 
ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the 
number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has 
made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit 
committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
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As expected, the sample firms‟ audit committee characteristics and internal audit functions 
attributes record significantly higher scores for the post-test period. Corporate governance 
generally improves after 2008 especially for PCON firms in comparison with FAMILY and 
INST&MGRL firms in terms of DIL, EXP, OBJ and WP. It shows that the PCON firms are 
complying with the newly amended BMLR 2008 on audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes. This is consistent with past studies (Abdul Wahab et al., 
2011; Chan et al., 1993; Collier and Gregory, 1996; O‟Sullivan, 1999 and 2000; Carcello et 
al., 2002) that document higher audit fees for firms with improved governance, which is in 
line with the demand side explanation. It was further supported by the interviews conducted 
in the present study where the respondents IA1, IA3, EA2, and EA3 (see Chapter 6, Section 
6.4) perceive that PCON firms are now more conscious and moving towards good 
governance practices.  
 
7.3.3 Correlation 
Table 7.3 reports the correlations between the variables used in the regressions for pre-test 
and post-test periods for Model 1. Test of correlation is used to test the degree of 
relationships between the variables under study. The objective is to determine if there is 
any multicollinearity problem among the variables. Multicollinearity problem exists if the 
independent variables are highly correlated at each other with correlation values exceeding 
0.9 (Pallant, 2001).  
 
Table 7.3 shows the correlation matrix between audit fees and other variables. From the 
table, audit committee independence and diligence have a positive and significant 
association with audit fees for pre-test period (post-test period: diligence and expertise), 
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suggesting that audit committee‟s independence, diligence and with expertise demand for 
higher quality audit from external auditors, hence higher audit fees. Further, internal audit 
function attributes, namely objectivity and work performance are positively significant with 
audit fees for both testing periods, suggesting as internal audit function increases, the audit 
fees increase too.  
 
This association helps to answer the second research question on the internal governance 
mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and 
audit fees. The signs for the control variables are all in the right direction and significant in 
the testing periods except for the coefficient for LOSS, ROA and LEV. Significant results 
in the predicted direction are obtained for the coefficients for TA, NAF, SUB, FOREIGN, 
SEG, AQ and FAMILY. While a few governance variables are significantly correlated with 
each other, their correlations do not indicate that multicollinearity is a serious problem.  
 
7.3.4 T-tests and Chi-square Analysis for PCON Firms  
Table 7.4 shows t-tests and Chi-square analysis for PCON firms and non-PCON firms. The 
analytical procedure is applied to answer the first research question as to whether PCON 
firms pay higher audit fees than non-PCON firms and to test the following hypothesis: 
H1: PCON firms pay higher audit fees than non-PCON firms. 
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Table 7.3:  Pearson Correlation Matrix for sample firms (Year 2005 – 2009, n = 945) 
  
LAF 
 
AF 
 
LTA 
 
TA 
 
LNAF 
 
NAF 
 
SUB 
 
FOREIGN 
 
SEG 
 
ZFC 
 
ROA 
 
LEV 
 
LOSS 
 
AQ 
 
INST& 
MGRL 
 
FAMILY 
 
IND 
 
DIL 
 
EXP 
 
OBJ 
 
WP 
Panel A: Pre-test period (2005 to 2007) 
LAF 1 0.809** 0.769** 0.446** 0.315** 0.434** 0.744** 0.469** 0.386** 0.204** 0.107* 0.183** -0.124** 0.262**  -0.139** -0.253** 0.089* 0.254** 0.058 0.120** 0.197** 
AF  1 0.642** 0.421** 0.185** 0.649** 0.888** 0.875** 0.275** 0.037 0.138** 0.040 -0.074 0.115**  -0.120** -0.137** 0.076 0.092* 0.098* -0.051 0.001 
LTA   1 0.626** 0.286** 0.440** 0.546** 0.400** 0.270** 0.198** 0.093* 0.190** -0.134** 0.312**  -0.162** -0.312** 0.173** 0.283** 0.057 0.081 0.109** 
TA    1 0.159** 0.526** 0.378** 0.344** 0.161** 0.134** 0.053 0.129** -0.095* 0.124**  -0.113** -0.168** 0.135** 0.318** 0.047 0.035 0.124** 
LNAF     1 0.292** 0.203** 0.151** 0.070 0.047 0.124** 0.086* -0.066 0.211**  -0.163** -0.099* 0.125** 0.127** 0.038 0.057 0.108* 
NAF      1 0.539** 0.596** 0.138** 0.044 0.114** 0.065 -0.033 0.147**  -0.119** -0.167** 0.078 0.287** 0.110** 0.043 0.099* 
SUB       1 0.819** 0.399** 0.088* 0.100* 0.089* -0.066 0.116**  -0.139** -0.142** 0.093* 0.101* 0.103*  -0.067 0.006 
FOREIGN        1 0.212** 0.003 0.154** 0.020 -0.061 0.104*  -0.106* -0.126** 0.079 0.000 0.062  -0.071 -0.012 
SEG         1 0.031 -0.046 0.049 -0.038 0.016 0.028 -0.176** -0.020 0.036 0.101*  -0.037 0.015 
ZFC          1 -0.294** 0.808**  0.235** 0.061 0.031 -0.150** -0.088* 0.099*  -0.008 0.054 0.079 
ROA           1 -0.065 -0.616** 0.043  -0.042  0.040 0.099*  -0.036 0.006 0.025 0.032 
LEV            1  0.107* 0.034 0.102* -0.211** -0.088* 0.124**  -0.067 0.034 0.065 
LOSS             1 -0.053 0.048 -0.077 -0.024 0.001 0.042 0.036 0.026 
AQ              1  -0.047 -0.099* 0.032 0.073  -0.002  -0.070 0.010 
INST_MGRL               1 -0.475** -0.182**  -0.086* 0.039  -0.074 0.034 
FAMILY                1 -0.087*  -0.115**  -0.031 0.050 -0.017 
IND                 1 0.125** 0.059 0.140** 0.048 
DIL                  1 0.086* 0.063 0.081 
EXP                   1  -0.068 0.044 
OBJ                    1 0.462** 
WP                     1 
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Table 7.3 – continued 
 
  
LAF 
 
AF 
 
LTA 
 
TA 
 
LNAF 
 
NAF 
 
SUB 
 
FOREIGN 
 
SEG 
 
ZFC 
 
ROA 
 
LEV 
 
LOSS 
 
AQ 
 
INST& 
MGRL 
 
FAMILY 
 
IND 
 
DIL 
 
EXP 
 
OBJ 
 
WP 
Panel B: Post-test period (2008 to 2009) 
LAF 1 .805** 0.782** 0.504** 0.318** 0.349** 0.745** 0.481** 0.385** 0.255** 0.152** 0.252** -0.052 0.272** -0.114* -0.285**  0.007  0.252** 0.161** 0.145** 0.170** 
AF  1 0.630** 0.611** 0.165** 0.616** 0.814** 0.796** 0.264**  -0.016 0.105*  -0.003 -0.050 0.110* -0.102* -0.139**  0.047  0.112* 0.185** 0.061 -0.016 
LTA   1 0.638** 0.275** 0.384** 0.569** 0.364** 0.240** 0.117* 0.179** 0.220** -0.103* 0.324** -0.131* -0.325** -0.003  0.264** 0.142** 0.068 0.095 
TA    1 0.132* 0.436** 0.484** 0.400** 0.130* 0.137** 0.065 0.196** -0.099 0.139** -0.084 -0.210**  0.042  0.343** 0.144** 0.064 0.130* 
LNAF     1 0.234** 0.204** 0.172** 0.115* 0.085 0.071 0.093  0.003 0.255** -0.118* -0.175**   0.056  0.188** 0.145** 0.116*  -0.005 
NAF      1 0.600** 0.742** 0.218** 0.022 0.112* 0.009 -0.022 0.146** -0.099 -0.147**  0.051  0.160** 0.221** 0.049 0.016 
SUB       1 0.808** 0.382** 0.030 0.127* 0.018 -0.063 0.126* -0.109* -0.160**  0.031  0.093 0.199** 0.073  -0.035 
FOREIGN        1 0.195**  -0.067 0.113*  -0.064 -0.036 0.112* -0.102* -0.158**  0.060  0.039 0.192** 0.044  -0.035 
SEG         1 0.066  -0.012 0.053 -0.032  -0.014  0.029 -0.172** -0.061  0.047 0.137** 0.014 0.017 
ZFC          1  -0.283** 0.779** 0.280**  -0.002  0.115* -0.174** -0.035  0.119*  -0.047 0.045 0.072 
RISK           1  -0.106* -0.596** 0.129* -0.107*  0.074 -0.076 -0.056 0.096  -0.011  -0.081 
LEV            1 0.160** 0.030  0.174** -0.233** -0.054  0.143**  -0.068  -0.002 0.111* 
LOSS             1  -0.103*  0.051 -0.083  0.092  0.060  -0.107* 0.054 0.001 
AQ              1 -0.072 -0.105*  0.043  0.078 0.017  -0.009 0.017 
INST_MGRL               1 -0.474** -0.071 -0.030 0.011  -0.191** 0.018 
FAMILY                1  0.081 -0.167**  -0.075 0.079  -0.074 
IND                 1  0.034  -0.030 0.096 0.016 
DIL                  1 0.223**  -0.010 0.110* 
EXP                   1 0.006 0.058 
OBJ                    1 0.365** 
WP                     1 
Significant at *10, **5 and ***1 per cent levels. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; 
FOREIGN is the number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an 
indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit 
committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary 
disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
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The results generally show significant differences for the groups except for ZFC, 
ROA, LEV, LOSS, audit committee EXP, internal audit OBJ and WP. There was a 
statistically significant difference at the p<0.05 level in AF scores for the groups 
(t=11.914). The t-tests indicates that the mean score for AF for PCON firms 
(µ=RM654,881.400, SD=RM1,474,057.761) is significantly different from non-
PCON firms (µ=RM172,762.100 SD=RM260,455.637). From the table, it shows 
that PCON firms pay higher audit fees in comparison with non-PCON firms, thus 
fully support Hypothesis 1. This indicates that PCON firms demand for substantive 
audit testing and improve audit quality from external auditors and willing to pay 
higher audit fees. 
 
The audit committee IND is significant at t=5.418 for the groups. The PCON firms 
have higher IND mean score of 91.7 percent compared to non-PCON firms of 85.9 
percent. It indicates that the PCON firms have higher percentage of audit committee 
members who are independent non-executive directors. Similarly, audit committee 
DIL is also significant at t=6.285 for both groups. It indicates that the mean score for 
PCON firms (µ=5.530 SD=2.218) is significantly different from non-PCON firms 
(µ=4.860 SD=1.071). It can be further concluded that the audit committee members 
in PCON firms conduct an average of 5.5 meetings in a year.  
 
Similarly, given the t-value of 15.151 with a significant level of p<0.05, the NAF is 
statistically significant for both groups. The mean score for PCON firms (µ= 
RM403790.660 SD= RM1056255.037) is significantly different from non-PCON 
firms (µ= RM41562.600 SD= RM137426.720). The client size measured by total 
assets (TA) is statistically significant for both groups, with PCON firms having 
larger total assets (t=5817479.970 SD=12320223.663). 
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Table 7.4: T-tests and Chi-square results for PCON firms for sample firms (2005 to 2009)                                                                  
 PCON Firms (n = 340) non-PCON Firms (n = 605)  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
t-value/ 
Chi-square 
LAF 12.497 1.081 11.686 0.793 11.914* 
AF 654881.400 1474057.761 172762.100 260455.637                    5.936* 
 LTA 14.283 1.503 12.824 1.183 15.151* 
TA 5817479.970 12320223.660 987390.520 2795028.070 7.056* 
 LNAFº 7.541 8.817 1.559 10.628 9.253* 
NAF 403790.660 1056255.037 41562.600 137426.720 6.239* 
SUB 33.400 47.906 15.000 15.053 6.846* 
 FOREIGN 5.330 14.742 0.480 1.469 5.997* 
SEG 3.400 1.742 2.920 1.498  4.323* 
ZFC -2.949 0.848 -3.115 0.874                    2.818 
ROA 0.059 0.065 0.059 0.059                   0.704 
LEV 0.288 0.164 0.257 0.164                   2.782 
LOSS 0.200 * 0.180 *                                   ©0.295 
AQ 0.790 * 0.630 *                                    ©0.000* 
IND 0.917 0.139 0.859 0.166 5.418* 
DIL 5.530 2.218 4.860 1.071 6.285* 
EXP 1.410 0.645 1.380 0.603                    0.720 
OBJ 0.830 * 0.800 *                                  ©0.258 
WP 10.770 2.952 10.710 2.632                  0.327 
*p < 0.05; © Chi-square tests for dichotomous; t-tests for other variables; *not necessary ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-corded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in M$) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non audit fees (in M$) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the 
number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to 1 if the 
company has made loss in any of the years, 0 otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to 1 if the company hire Big4 auditor and 0 otherwise; PCON an indicator variable, 1 for  politically connected firms, and 0 otherwise; IND is the proportion of non executive directors to 
audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of AC with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, 1 if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and 0 otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of 
SIC. 
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Additionally, comparable evidence of significance was also noted for the measure of 
audit complexity namely, local subsidiaries (SUB), foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN) 
and business segments (SEG) at p<0.05 level of significance for the groups.  
 
7.3.5  Multivariate Analysis 
A multiple regression was performed between audit fees (AF) as the dependent 
variable and audit committee characteristics (IND, DIL, and EXP) and internal audit 
functions attributes (OBJ and WP) as the experimental variable. Analysis was 
performed using SPSS REGRESSION for evaluation of assumptions. Model 1 is as 
shown below: 
 
LAF = β₀ + β₁TA + β₂NAF + β₃SUB + β₄FOREIGN + β₅SEG + ß₆ROA + ß₇ LEV + 
β₈AQ + β₉LOSS + β₁₀PRD + β₁₁PCON + β₁₂IND + β₁₃DIL + β₁₄EXP + 
β₁₅OBJ +β₁₆WP + β₁₇IND_PCON + β₁₈DIL_PCON +β₁₉EXP_PCON + 
β₂₀OBJ_PCON + WP_PCON + ε, 
 
Where: 
 
LAF       = Audit fees paid by the client (natural logarithm of AF) 
Control  
Variables 
  
TA                           = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
NAF                        = Natural logarithm of non audit fees. 
SUB                         = Number of client local subsidiaries. 
FOREIGN               = Number of client foreign subsidiaries. 
SEG                        = Number of business segments. 
ROA                      = Profit before tax over total assets. 
LEV   = Proportion of total liability over total assets. 
AQ                    = An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if Big4 auditor, and „0‟ 
if otherwise. 
 
LOSS                      
 
= 
 
An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made 
loss in   any of the years and „0‟ if otherwise. 
PRD                        = An indicator variable equals to „1‟ for post-test period and 
0 if otherwise. 
PCON      = An indicator variable equals to „1‟ for PCON firms and „0‟ 
if otherwise. 
Experimental 
Variables 
  
IND                           = Proportion of independent non-executive directors to AC. 
DIL                            = Number of AC meetings. 
EXP                           = Number of AC with accounting or finance qualification. 
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OBJ                           = An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the IA reports to AC 
and „0‟ if otherwise 
WP                             = Number of voluntary disclosure under IAF as per Para 
43 of Statement of Internal Control (SIC) 
IND_PCON      = Interaction between IND and PCON 
DIL_ PCON                   = Interaction between DIL and PCON 
EXP_ PCON                  = Interaction between EXP and PCON 
OBJ_ PCON                     = Interaction between OBJ and PCON 
WP_ PCON             = Interaction between WP and PCON 
ε 
 
    = Error term 
Table 7.5 describes the variables and the expected direction of their relationship with 
the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and internal 
audit functions attributes.  
 
Table 7.5:  Variables Description and Expected Direction for Model 1 
 
Variable(s) Description and Measurement Exp 
Sign 
 
Hypo 
Dependent Variable 
AF Audit fees paid by the client (Natural logarithm of 
audit fees used in regression model). 
  
Experimental Variables 
AC Characteristics 
IND The proportion of independent non-executive 
directors to audit committee. 
+ 
 
 
DIL Number of audit committee meetings +  
EXP Number of audit committee members with 
accounting or finance qualification 
+  
OBJ An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the internal 
audit function reports directly to audit committee 
and „0‟ otherwise. 
+  
WP Voluntary disclosure under IAF as per Para 43 of 
Statement of Internal Control (SIC) 
+  
Control Variables 
TA Total assets of client at the end of fiscal year 
(Natural logarithm of total assets). 
+  
NAF Total non-audit fees paid by client (Natural 
logarithm of NAF). 
+  
SUB Number of client‟s local subsidiaries. +  
FOREIGN Number of client‟s foreign subsidiaries. +  
SEG Number of business segments. +  
ROA Profit before tax over total assets. -  
LEV Total liability over total assets -  
AQ An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hire 
Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise. 
+  
LOSS 
 
An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has 
made loss in any of the periods and „0‟ if 
otherwise. 
+  
PRD An indicator variable equals to „1‟ for post-test 
period and „0‟ if otherwise. 
+  
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PCON An indicator variable, „1‟ for PCON firms and „0‟ 
if otherwise. 
+  
IND_PCON     Interaction between IND and PCON + 2a 
DIL_PCON    Interaction between DIL and PCON + 2b 
EXP_PCON     Interaction between EXP and PCON + 
 
2c 
OBJ_PCON           Interaction between OBJ and PCON + 3a 
WP_PCON            Interaction between WP and PCON + 3b 
 
Table 7.6 tabulates the results of the analysis for the 189 non-financial sample firms 
from 2005 to 2009 and it presents the linear regression results for testing the 
hypotheses. The analytical procedure is applied to answer the second research 
question on the moderating effect of political connections on the association between 
audit committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and audit fees 
for PCON firms and to test the following hypotheses:  
H2a:  The association between AC independence and audit fees is stronger post-
BMLR 2008 implementation for PCON than non-PCON firms. 
 
 H2b:  The association between AC diligence and audit fees is stronger post-   
BMLR 2008 implementation for PCON than non-PCON firms. 
 
H2c:  The association between AC expertise and audit fees is stronger post-BMLR 
2008 implementation for PCON than non-PCON firms. 
 
H3a:  The association between internal audit function attribute, namely 
objectivity and audit fees is stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation for 
PCON than non-PCON firms. 
 
H3b: The association between internal audit function attribute, namely work 
performance and audit fees is stronger post-BMLR 2008 implementation 
for PCON than non-PCON firms. 
 
 
Table 7.6 presents the multiple regression results for testing the hypotheses. In 
testing the validity of the models used in the study, the traditional audit fee model 
introduced by Simunic (1980) is employed whereby the natural log of audit fees is 
regressed on control (Simunic, 1980; Yatim et al., 2006; Gul, 2006; Ferguson, 2005) 
and experimental variables. Results in Models A, B and C are significant at one 
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percent significant level (p=0.000), with an adjusted R² of at least 79.2 percent 
which is comparable with other Malaysian studies in this area (Yatim et al., 2006; 
Abdul Wahab et al., 2011).  
 
Model A shows the association between external audit fees on 11 control variables 
derived from extant literature (Abbott et al., 2003, Goodwin and Kent, 2006; Yatim 
et al., 2006; Abdul Wahab et al., 2009). The client size (TA) coefficient (0.032, 
t=1.506) is positive and significant at one percent significant level indicating that the 
larger the size of firms, the higher the audit fees charged. The coefficient (0.050, 
t=2.245) on NAF is also positive and significant at one percent significant level. 
Besides that, SUB coefficient is found to be positive and significant at one percent 
significant level (0.688, t=21.745) and has the largest beta coefficient indicating that 
SUB makes the strongest unique contribution to explain the dependent variable, 
when the variance explained by all other variables in the model is controlled for. 
FOREIGN and SEG indicate a positive and significant relationship with the 
coefficients of 0.257 and 0.226 respectively. It indicates that as the complexity 
becomes higher, the audit fees also increase. Audit quality (AQ) and period (PRD) 
are also positive and significant at p<0.01. Further, the PCON variable coefficient is 
positive and significant at t=0.040. However, LEV is negatively associated with 
audit fees at (t=-4.412), indicating that audit fees are higher if external auditors are 
expose to higher risk. 
 
Model B introduces the audit committee characteristics IND, DIL and EXP, and 
internal audit function attributes OBJ and WP. The results show that external audit 
fees are positively and significantly associated with the audit committee 
independence (IND) and diligence (DIL) at p<0.01. Similarly, internal audit function 
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attributes namely objectivity (OBJ) and work performance (WP) are also positively 
and significantly associated with audit fees at one percent significant level (p<0.01).  
 
Prior research recommends that stronger audit committees demand for higher quality 
audits (Goodwin and Kent, 2006) and firms with strong governance practices engage 
in greater level of internal auditing and are connected with higher audit fees. 
Carcello et al. (2002) argue that high quality board demands for more external 
monitoring from external auditors. Further, as noted by the interviewees (IA1 and 
IA3) in the current study (see Chapter 6, Section 6.3), the audit committee members 
are very much involved in internal audit activities due to the additional roles 
mandated by the listing requirements in 2008. Thus, audit committee members who 
are independent, diligent and have financial expertise coupled with stronger internal 
audit function in PCON firms, demand for additional audit procedures from the 
external auditors especially for areas that subsequently reveal greater amounts of 
contention or risk, consequently higher audit fees. 
  
The signs for the control variables are all in predicted directions. Following prior 
research (Simunic, 1980; Francis and Simon, 1987; Craswell et al., 1995), audit fees 
(AF) is positively associated with TA, NAF, SUB, AQ, and SEG. All other variables 
remain significant with the exception of LOSS and audit committee EXP. 
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Table 7.6: Audit Fee Regression Models (n =945) (dependent variable is log audit fees)                    
   Model A Model B  
Variable Sign Hypo Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value VIF 
Constant    35.816 
 
 33.116  
LTA  +  0.444 17.702*** 0.416 17.793*** 2.762 
TA +  0.032   1.506*** 0.053   2.648*** 1.994 
LNAF +  0.075   4.512** 0.061   3.930*** 1.209 
NAF  +  0.050   2.245** 0.076   3.652*** 2.192 
SUB +  0.688 21.745*** 0.699   23.802*** 4.370 
FOREIGN +  0.257   8.371*** 0.226   7.840*** 4.206 
SEG +  0.051   2.975*** 0.053   3.312*** 1.276 
ROA  -  -0.030   -1.533 -0.039  -2.121** 1.671 
LEV  -  -0.070   -4.412*** -0.056   -3.766*** 1.118 
AQ +   0.051    3.137**  0.062    4.040*** 1.180 
LOSS +  0.004   0.210 0.001   0.028 1.671 
PRD +  0.070   2.432*** 0.041   2.464* 1.400 
PCON +  0.040   2.272** 0.051   3.057** 1.410 
IND  +    0.053   3.205*** 1.387 
DIL  +    0.069   4.406*** 1.241 
EXP  +    0.018   1.239 1.078 
OBJ +    0.055   3.322*** 1.396 
WP  +    0.124   7.452*** 1.400 
 
F-statistic 
                                          
                                          231.272 
                         
                         271.012 
   2 
p-value                                              0.000                              0.000 
Adj. R²                                              0.792                              0.818 
*p < 0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01             
 ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-corded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of 
foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator 
variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; PRD an indicator variable equals to „1‟ for post-test period and „0‟ otherwise; PCON is an indicator variable „1‟, if PCON firms and „0‟ otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit 
committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of 
SIC. 
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Table 7.6 - continued 
                             Model C 
    I  II  III  
Variable Sign Hypo Coefficient t-value VIF Coefficient t-value VIF Coefficient t-value VIF 
Constant    32.846   31.996   32.192  
LTA  +   0.418 17.825***   2.782  0.417 17.973*** 2.762 0.405 17.381***
****** 
2.796 
TA +   0.055   2.739***   2.011  0.067   3.325*** 2.060 0.050   2.551*** 1.995 
LNAF +   0.060   3.868***   1.212  0.061   3.978*** 1.209 0.062   4.030*** 1.210 
NAF  +   0.076   3.646***   2.192  0.085   4.072*** 2.216 0.064   3.088*** 2.232 
SUB +   0.699 23.811***   4.370  0.706 24.169*** 4.384 0.715 24.357*** 4.441 
FOREIGN +   0.227   7.866***   4.209  0.220   7.697*** 4.217 0.233   8.144*** 4.221 
SEG +   0.053   3.357**   1.278  0.057   3.589* 1.282 0.055   3.492*** 1.278 
ROA  -   -0.040  -2.175**   1.675 -0.038  -2.120** 1.671 -0.032  -1.769* 1.683 
LEV  -   -0.057  -3.824**   1.122 -0.056  -3.794*** 1.118 -0.050  -3.392** 1.128 
AQ +   0.061   3.989***   1.183  0.058   3.840*** 1.184 0.063   4.134*** 1.181 
LOSS +   0.001   0.045   1.672  0.002   0.090 1.673 0.000   0.019 1.671 
PRD +   0.043   2.587*   1.424  0.040   2.415* 1.400 0.040   2.455* 1.400 
PCON +   0.048   0.526 17.484  0.141   2.719* 8.391
5 
0.186   5.140*** 6.772 
IND  +   -0.063  -3.336***   1.830 -0.046  -2.778* 1.404 -0.052  -3.191*** 1.387 
DIL  +   0.070   4.459***   1.245  0.015   0.564 3.621 0.081   5.118*** 1.281 
EXP  +   0.019   1.310   1.083  0.025   1.733 1.096 0.027   1.493 1.669 
OBJ +   0.053   3.142***  1.422  0.053   3.243*** 1.397 0.059   3.561*** 1.399 
WP  +   0.123 
0 
 
  7.390***  1.403  0.124   7.525*** 1.400 0.125   7.567*** 1.400 
            
IND_PCON + 2a   0.102   1.108 17.830       
DIL_PCON + 2b     0.236  3.903***   8.750    
EXP_PCON + 2c       0.161 4.195*** 7.619 
 
 
181 
 
F-statistic 219.049 223.178 223.875 
p-value   0.000    0.000    0.000 
Adj. R²   0.818    0.821    0.821 
 
*p < 0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01             
 ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-corded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of 
foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator 
variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; PRD an indicator variable equals to „1‟ for post-test period and „0‟ otherwise; PCON is an indicator variable „1‟, if PCON firms and „0‟ otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit 
committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of 
SIC. 
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Table 7.6 - continued 
                                  Model C 
   IV  V  
Variable Sign Hypo Coefficient t-value VIF Coefficient t-value VIF 
Constant    32.529      31.640  
LTA  +  0.409 17.509*** 2.787 0.413 17.738*** 2.766 
TA +   0.051   2.574*** 1.995 0.057 2.895*** 2.007 
LNAF +  0.063   4.072*** 1.211 0.058 3.763*** 1.214 
NAF  +  0.082   3.955*** 2.213 0.077 3.739*** 2.193 
SUB +  0.711 24.109*** 4.447 0.699 23.915*** 4.370 
FOREIGN +  0.226   7.891*** 4.206 0.222 7.716*** 4.217 
SEG +  0.055   3.486*** 1.280 0.055 3.483*** 1.280 
ROA  -  -0.038  -2.111* 1.671 -0.037      -2.046* 1.672 
LEV  -  -0.061  -4.076*** 1.130 -0.060 -4.020*** 1.126 
AQ +  0.062   4.075*** 1.181 0.060      3.965 1.182 
LOSS +  0.000   0.002 1.671 0.001       0.044* 1.672 
PRD +  0.042   2.544* 1.401 0.041       2.502* 1.400 
PCON +  0.045   1.271*** 6.390 -0.110     -1.956* 6.058 
IND  +  0.058   3.493*** 1.399 0.054 3.259*** 1.387 
DIL  +  0.068   4.375 1.242 0.067 4.317*** 1.243 
EXP  +  0.020   1.406 1.081 -0.019      -1.327 1.079 
OBJ +  0.028   1.489*** 1.797 0.055 3.341*** 1.396 
WP  +  0.119   7.161 1.413 0.089 4.434*** 2.076 
 
 
OBJ_PCON + 3a 0.112  3.073*** 6.801    
WP_PCON + 3b     0.173  3.000*** 6.993 
183 
 
F-statistic 221.472 221.340 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R² 0.820 0.820 
*p < 0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01             
 ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-corded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of 
foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator 
variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; PRD an indicator variable equals to „1‟ for post-test period and „0‟ otherwise; PCON is an indicator variable „1‟, if PCON firms and „0‟ otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit 
committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of 
SIC. 
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Model C brings in the interaction variables, political connections (PCON) which 
comprise of Models I, II, III, IV and V. Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 2c predict a stronger 
relationship between AC characteristics, IND, DIL and EXP with AF for PCON firms 
post-BMLR 2008. The results indicate that the interaction term audit committee 
DIL_PCON is significant at p<0.01, with coefficient (0.236) and t-value (3.903). It 
reveals that there is a stronger association between the audit committee DIL and audit 
fees for PCON firms for post-BMLR 2008 implementation, thus H2b is supported. This 
is because under the demand side perspective, audit committee members who meet 
frequently are more informed and knowledgeable about relevant accounting and 
auditing issues (Raghunadan et al., 1998; Raghunadan and Hugh, 1994; Kalbers and 
Fogarthy, 1993; Goodwin and Kent, 2006). 
 
Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction term EXP_PCON is positive and significant 
(0.161, t=4.195, p<0.01). This result is consistent with our expectation in Hypothesis 2c, 
which posits that the association between audit committee EXP and audit fees is 
stronger post-BMLR 2008. As supported by DeZoort (1997) and DeZoort and Salterio 
(2001), skilled audit committee members have a better understanding of the risks faced 
by the auditor. 
 
Further, as reported by Botica, Redmayne, Bradbury and Cahan, (2011) that there is a 
positive association between audit committees and audit fees and the results are 
consistent with audit committees being an important monitoring mechanism. Hence, 
diligent and having financial expertise audit committee members who sit on PCON 
firm‟s board demand for substantive external audit work and are willing to pay higher 
audit fees. However, the results indicate that multicollinearity exists for the audit 
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committee IND (VIF = 17.830), showing that independent variables are highly 
correlated. Thus, H2a is not supported.  
 
Hypotheses 3a and 3b predict a stronger relationship between internal audit function 
attributes, OBJ and WP with AF for PCON firm‟s post-BMLR 2008 implementation. 
The coefficient on the interaction term OBJ_PCON is positive and significant (0.112, 
t=3.073, p<0.01).  The results suggest that the association between objectivity and audit 
fees is stronger post-BMLR 2008, thus fully support H3a. The positive coefficient for 
the interaction variable indicating that the PCON firms‟ heads of internal audit reporting 
directly to the audit committee is stronger after the implementation of BMLR 2008.  
 
A positive and significant result for WP_PCON and the audit fees at 1 percent 
significant level (0.173, t=3.000) is also observed, thus supporting H3b. It indicates that 
PCON firms disclose more information on internal audit activities under voluntary 
disclosure as per Para 43 of SIC. This confirms that the internal audit responsibility 
reflects the reporting relationships of IAF to audit committee and the role of audit 
committee in its oversight of IAF. The results are similar to the findings in Goodwin 
and Kent (2006) and Hay et al. (2008) that internal audit and external audit are 
complementary mechanisms within the governance framework. This is because external 
auditing standards permit external auditors to rely on the work of internal auditors in 
performing a financial statement audit to the extent that the internal auditors are 
competent, objective and also perform work that is relevant to the external audit 
(AICPA 1997; PCAOB 2007). The results also support the respondents‟ (EA3, IA3 and 
R1) opinions obtained in the present study that external auditors must be assured of the 
information and quality of the internal audit function before they can rely on the internal 
audit work. 
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Thus, it can also be said that the findings of this study correspond with the 
Transformation Program
20
 which was introduced by the Malaysian government to 
enhance corporate governance, develop social leaders and clarify social obligations to 
steer the government-linked firms (in this study collectively referred to as PCON firms), 
particularly in upgrading the effectiveness of the board (Najid and Abdul Rahman, 
2011). Further, the operational enhancement initiatives outlined in the Manual has 
already taken effect since it was introduced in 2005. This is part of the initiative taken 
by the regulatory institutions which is in line with the „normative‟ isomorphism to 
inculcate good governance practices in the corporate sector. It is believed that the 
Program may have influenced the PCON firms as they are claimed to be favoured 
organizations by the government.  
 
Besides that, the Green Book guidelines may have led the PCON firms to adopt stronger 
governance by enhancing board effectiveness (Khazanah‟s Green Book, 2006). Firms 
that are committed to strong corporate governance demand additional assurance from 
auditors and higher audit quality (Lifschutz et al., 2010), and are likely to engage in 
greater levels of internal auditing resulting in higher external audit fees (Goodwin and 
Kent, 2006). This is because audit committee members who sit on PCON firm‟s board 
demand for expanded audit scope in order to avoid being associated with financial 
misstatement and to preserve their reputational capital. Hence, the PCON firm‟s audit 
committee members are committed to strong corporate governance. They are in place to 
monitor the management, who otherwise may act in their own personal best interest and 
not in the interest of the shareholders. It is also important to note that the association 
between the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes, and audit fees from the demand side perspective is 
                                                 
20 Catalyzing GLC Transformation to Advance Malaysia‟s Development, Section II-Policy guidelines; GLCs Transformation 
Manual. 
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addressed where it was found that stronger audit committee and internal audit function 
are associated with higher audit fees. 
 
7.4 Model 2: Highly Regulated Firms (HRFs) and Less Regulated Firms 
(LRFs) 
 
7.4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The sample consists of 1045 firm-year observations for 2005 to 2009. Table 7.7 
provides the descriptive statistics for the variables in Model 2. On average, the sampled 
firms audit committee members are predominantly independent (IND) at 88.8 percent, 
diligent (DIL) in conducting meetings at an average of 5.28 and having at least 1.40 
members with accounting or finance qualification (EXP). The mean for the voluntary 
disclosure on work performed (WP) and disclosed during the year by the internal audit 
department is 10.9 out of 19 voluntary disclosures as per Para 43 of Statement of 
Internal Control (SIC). Finally, 83 percent of the internal audit functions of the sample 
firms report directly to the audit committee (OBJ). 
 
The mean audit fees (AF) is RM346,016.040 and it ranges from RM9,000 to 
RM6,172,000. The average client size (TA) is RM5,331,818, where else the mean for 
the variable indicating non-audit fees (NAF) is RM171,849. On average, the sample 
firms have 21.52 local subsidiaries (SUB), 2.16 foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN) and 
3.23 business segments. Further, the sample firms experience financial crisis (ZFC) at 
an average of -3.048, financial risk (ROA) at 0.054 and leverage (LEV) at 0.276. 
Seventy-one percent of the sample firms hire Big4 as external auditors and 18 percent of 
the firms encounter losses in any of the five (5) years. 
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7.4.2  Univariate Analysis 
Table 7.8 provides descriptive statistics for the continuous and indicator variables. The 
descriptive analysis uses the paired t-tests to determine whether there are any significant 
differences for the sample and control sample for pre-test and post-test periods. The 
analysis includes the Univariate tests, t-tests and Pearson‟s correlation tests between the 
dependent variable (audit fees) and independent variables which consisted of audit 
committee characteristics and internal audit functions attributes. 
 
Table 7.8 shows the differences in the means and medians between the variables during 
the testing periods. The results generally show significant differences for AF, IND, OBJ 
and WP. Audit fees increased from RM302,863 during the pre-test period to 
RM410,119 during the post-test period. The descriptive statistics also show that the 
average audit committee IND for the sample firms increased from 83.1 percent to 97.4 
percent. It indicates that there is an increase in the proportion of independent non-
executive directors in audit committee post-implementation of BMLR 2008. Similar 
evidence of significance was noted for internal audit function OBJ between the testing 
periods. The increase from 74 percent to 95 percent shows improvement in the number 
of heads of internal auditors who report directly to the audit committee.  
 
Additionally, it is also observed that there is a significant difference on voluntary 
disclosures on activities performed by internal auditors. The number of voluntary 
disclosures records a higher score of 11.89 during the post-test period. There are no 
significant differences for the remaining variables. 
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Table 7.7: Descriptive statistics for the number of observations (Year 2005 – 2009, n = 1045)   
         
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Median Std. Dev 
LAF 9.100 15.640 12.067 11.905 1.054 
AF 9000.000 6172000.000 346016.040 148000.000 630495.503 
 LTA 9.610 19.090 13.570 13.355 1.706 
TA 14916.000 195674251.000 5331818.870 631492.000 18815259.909 
 LNAFº 9.210 15.910 4.708 9.615 9.314 
NAF 0.000 8100000.000 171849.960 15000.000 593234.539 
SUB 0.000 360.000 21.520 12.000 31.325 
 FOREIGN 0.000 109.000 2.160 0.000 8.755 
SEG 1.000 8.000 3.230 3.000 1.642 
ZFC -4.994 -1.010 -3.048 -3.089 0.875 
ROA -.1989 0.1993 0.054 0.055 0.061 
LEV 0.000 1.001 0.276 0.245 0.183 
LOSS 0.000 1.000 0.180 0.000 * 
AQ 0.000 1.000 0.710 1.000 * 
IND 0.000 1.000 0.888 1.000 0.157 
DIL 1.000 21.000 5.280 5.000 2.039 
EXP 0.000 4.000 1.400 1.000 0.619 
OBJ 0.000 1.000 0.830 1.000 * 
WP 2.000 17.000 10.900 11.000 2.728 
ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. *not necessary 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of 
subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total 
assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-
executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if 
otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
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Table 7.8: Descriptive data and paired t-tests results for pre-test period and post-test periods (n = 1045) 
 (Year 2005 to 2007)                                                             (Year 2008 to 2009) 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev Median Mean Std. Dev Median 
t-tests/Chi-
square 
 
LAF 
 
11.970 
 
1.032 
 
11.805 
 
12.212 
 
1.072 
 
12.083 
 
-3.622* 
AF 302863.470 513717.054 134000.00 410119.49 768273.778 177000.00 -2.490* 
 LTA 13.524 1.723 13.284 13.639 1.680 13.409 -1.055 
TA 5520493.440 20166373.038 587845.000 5045793.78 16578265.208 666463.00 -0.395 
 LNAFº 4.375 9.449 9.546 5.207 9.096 9.830 -1.412 
NAF 157224.420 503866.509 14000.000 193788.28 706511.090 18605.00 -0.974 
SUB 20.720 12.000 30.443 22.720 32.603 13.000 -1.007 
 FOREIGN 2.050 8.538 0.000 2.320 9.080 0.000 -0.496 
SEG 3.230 1.643 3.000 3.230 1.642 3.000 -0.023 
ZFC -3.032 0.869 -3.094 -3.072 0.885 -3.086   0.727 
ROA 0.056 0.059 0.057 0.051 0.064 0.054   1.290 
LEV 0.277 0.181 0.248 0.274 0.187 0.243   0.193 
LOSS 0.180 * 0.000 0.180 * 0.000      ©0.453 
AQ 0.710 * 1.000 0.700 * 1.000     ©0.395 
IND 0.831 0.167 0.750 0.974 0.087 1.000 -17.941* 
DIL 5.220 1.962 5.000 5.380 2.147 5.000     -1.183 
EXP 1.380 0.610 1.000 1.420 0.631 1.000     -1.204 
OBJ 0.740 * 1.000 0.950 * 1.000     ©0.000* 
WP 10.230 2.778 11.000 11.890 2.324 12.000   -10.422* 
 **p<0.05; © Chi-square tests       * not necessary          
 ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; 
FOREIGN is the number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator 
variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the 
number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of 
SIC. 
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Table 7.9:  Pearson Correlation Matrix for sample firms (Year 2005 – 2009, n = 1045) 
 
  
LAF 
 
AF 
 
LTA 
 
TA 
 
LNAF 
 
NAF 
 
SUB 
 
FOREIGN 
 
SEG 
 
ZFC 
 
ROA 
 
LEV 
 
LOSS 
 
AQ 
 
REG 
 
IND 
 
DIL 
 
EXP 
 
OBJ 
 
WP 
LAF 1 0.765** 0.781** 0.476** 0.346** 0.472** 0.679** 0.430** 0.443** 0.118** 0.059 0.090** -0.109** 0.294** 0.278** 0.142** 0.340** 0.124** 0.161** 0.238** 
AF  1 0.650** 0.619** 0.245** 0.671** 0.659** 0.532** 0.372** -0.001 0.023 -0.024 -0.094** 0.165** 0.282** 0.146** 0.378** 0.089** 0.112** 0.152** 
LTA   1 0.630** 0.309** 0.420** 0.510** 0.335** 0.362** 0.115** 0.016 0.154** -0.135** 0.327** 0.420** 0.180** 0.329** 0.092** 0.122** 0.186** 
TA    1 0.174** 0.365** 0.277** 0.205** 0.285** -0.024 -0.077* -0.046 -0.089** 0.143** 0.481** 0.131** 0.424** 0.104** 0.091** 0.154** 
LNAF     1 0.286** 0.209** 0.159** 0.104** 0.045 0.074* 0.060 -0.057 0.238** 0.131** 0.141** 0.179** 0.083** 0.089** 0.116** 
NAF      1 0.492** 0.581** 0.184** -0.002 0.054 -0.016 -0.032 0.154** 0.132** 0.085** 0.298** 0.110** 0.084** 0.116** 
SUB       1 0.811** 0.394** 0.044 0.095** 0.013 -0.062* 0.124** 0.000 0.081** 0.099** 0.143** -0.014 0.010 
FOREIGN        1 0.204** -0.034 0.131** -0.032 -0.051 0.103** -0.015 0.067* 0.034 0.116** -0.031 -0.013 
SEG         1 0.026 -0.077* 0.014 -0.044 0.040 0.262** 0.024 0.112** 0.153** 0.008 0.061 
ZFC          1 -0.260** 0.766** 0.251** 0.034 0.031 -0.060 0.018 -0.017 0.033 0.056 
ROA           1 -0.091** -0.580** 0.047 -0.160** -0.006 -0.083** 0.037 -0.010 -0.053 
LEV            1 0.125** 0.028 0.126** -0.037 0.054 -0.071* 0.029 0.080* 
LOSS             1 -0.075* -0.050 0.005 -0.022 -0.016 0.023 0.003 
AQ              1 0.137** 0.053 0.113** 0.004 -0.039 0.048 
REG               1 0.164** 0.279** 0.029 0.107** 0.185** 
IND                1 0.146** 0.052 0.246** 0.207** 
DIL                 1 0.117** 0.071* 0.148** 
EXP                  1 -0.033 0.057 
OBJ                   1 0.486** 
WP                    1 
Significant at *10, **5 and ***1 per cent levels.                    
 ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the 
number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has 
made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; REG an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if highly regulated firms and „0‟ if otherwise;  IND is the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure 
on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
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7.4.3 Correlation 
Test of correlation is used to test the degree of relationships between the variables under 
study. The objective of the test is to see if there are any multicollinearity problems 
among the variables. Table 7.9 reports the correlations between the variables used in the 
regressions for Model 2. The table shows the correlation matrix between audit fees, 
control variables and experimental variables. From the table, audit committee IND, DIL 
and EXP have a positive and significant association with audit fees.  Further, internal 
audit function attributes OBJ and WP are positively and significantly associated with 
audit fees.  
 
 
Consistent with expectations, the correlation matrix also shows that the correlation 
coefficient between regulatory oversight (REG) and audit fees is positive and 
significant. Except for ROA, all other variables are significantly correlated with audit 
fees. The signs for the control variables are all in the right direction and significant in 
the testing periods except for the coefficient for LEV. Since none of the explanatory 
variables are highly correlated (r > 0.09), their correlations do not indicate that 
multicollinearity is a serious problem (Pallant, 2001).  
 
7.4.4 T-tests and Chi-square Analysis for Highly Regulated Firms  
 
Table 7.10 shows the results for the differences between HRFs and LRFs. The results 
generally highlight significant differences between the two groups except for SUB, 
FOREIGN, ZFC, LOSS, and EXP. The analytical procedure is applied to answer the 
third research question as to whether highly regulated firms  pay higher audit fees than 
less regulated firms and to test the following hypothesis: 
H4: Highly regulated firms pay higher audit fees than less regulated firms. 
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In comparison between the two groups, the AF is statistically different for both sub-
sample firms at p<0.05significant level (t=-7.863). From the table, it shows that HRFs 
experience higher audit fees than LRFs (µ=RM903,547, µ=RM289,307), thus fully 
supporting H4. This could be explained by HRFs having larger client size (TA), hiring 
the Big4 auditor to audit their financial statements (AQ) and bigger business segments 
(SEG). Given the t-value of -8.134 with a significant level of p<0.05, the audit 
committee independence (IND) is statistically significant for both groups. From this 
data, it shows that HRFs have higher level of audit committee IND with a majority of 
audit committee members being non-executive directors. Additionally, the audit 
committee diligence (DIL) is also experiencing significant difference at p<0.05 with 
HRFs‟ audit committees meeting at an average of 7 times in a year as compared to 
LRFs which average 5.1 times in a year.  
 
The internal audit WP during the year is significantly different at p<0.05 significant 
level for both HRFs and LRFs. However, as compared to LRFs, the HRFs internal audit 
functions voluntarily disclosed more information as per Para 43 of the SIC, on the 
activities performed. Similarly, OBJ also report significant differences between HRFs 
and LRFs in terms of internal audit function direct reporting to audit committee with 
HRFs scored 95 percent as compared to 81 percent for LRFs. Given that t=-2.860 with a 
significant level of p<0.05, the NAF is statistically significant for both groups. Client 
size measured by total assets (TA) is statistically significant for both subsamples at 
p<0.05. Additionally, comparable evidence of significance was noted for ROA, AQ and 
SEG at p<0.05 level of significance for both groups.  
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Table 7.10:  T-tests and Chi-square results for Highly Regulated Firms and Less Regulated Firms for sample firms  
(Year 2005 – 2009, n = 1045) 
 Highly Regulated Firms 
(n=100) 
Less Regulated Firms 
                             (n=945) 
 
Variable Mean  SD Mean SD t-value/ Chi-
square 
LAF 12.988 1.217 11.974 0.990 -7.863* 
AF 903547.370 1298763.043 289307.820 482894.925 -4.578* 
 LTA 15.934 1.902 13.353 1.513 -12.234* 
TA 35233228.080 50925734.307 2590325.060 7852211.850 -5.938* 
 LNAFº 8.434 7.904 4.3117 9.368 -4.865* 
NAF 411696.970 910871.080 146334.320 543279.994 -2.860* 
SUB 21.490 21.723 21.520 32.183 0.010 
 FOREIGN 1.750 3.242 2.200 9.146 0.487 
SEG 4.550 1.507 3.090 1.593 -8.752* 
ZFC -2.965 0.945 -3.056 0.868 -0.923 
ROA 0.024 0.038 0.057 0.062 7.547* 
LEV 0.347 0.300 0.268 0.164 -2.572* 
LOSS               0.120 *               0.190 * ©0.130 
AQ               0.900 *               0.690                 * ©0.000 
IND 0.967 0.093 0.880 0.160 -8.134* 
DIL 7.030 3.971 5.100 1.608 -4.820* 
EXP 1.450 0.626 1.390 0.618      -0.931 
OBJ                0.950               *               0.810                  * ©0.000* 
WP 12.450 1.940 10.730 2.749 -8.040* 
*p < 0.05   ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. © Chi-square *not necessary 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of 
subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over 
total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent 
non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, 
and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
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7.4.5 Multivariate analysis 
Multiple regression models was applied using SPSS regression between audit fees (AF) 
as the dependent variable and audit committee characteristics IND, DIL and EXP and 
internal audit functions attribute OBJ and WP as the experimental variable for HRFs 
and LRFs. Model 2 is as shown below: 
 
AF = β₀ + β₁TA + β₂NAF + β₃SUB + β₄FOREIGN + β₅SEG + ß₆ZFC + ß₇LEV + 
β₈ROA + β₉ LOSS + β₁₀PRD + β₁₁AQ + β₁₂REG + β₁₃IND + β₁₄DIL + β₁₅EXP + 
β₁₆OBJ + β₁₇WP + β₁₈IND_REG + β₁₉DIL_REG + β₂₀EXP_REG + 
β₂₁OBJ_REG + β₂₂WP_REG + ε, 
 
 
Where: 
AF 
TA 
NAF 
SUB  
FOREIGN 
SEG 
ZFC  
ROA  
LEV 
AQ 
 
LOSS  
 
PRD 
 
IND 
DIL 
EXP 
OBJ  
 
WP  
IND_REG 
DIL_REG 
EXP_REG 
OBJ_REG 
WP_REG 
ε  
= 
= 
= 
=
=
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
 
= 
= 
= 
= 
 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
Audit fees paid by the client (Natural logarithm of audit fees). 
Total assets (Natural logarithm of total assets). 
Total non-audit fees paid by client (Natural logarithm of NAF). 
Number of client‟s local subsidiaries. 
Number of client‟s foreign subsidiaries. 
Number of business segments. 
Zmijewski score for financial crisis
21
. 
Profit before tax over total assets.  
Proportion of total liability over total assets. 
An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if Big4 auditor, and „0‟ if 
otherwise. 
An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any 
of the years and „0‟ if otherwise. 
An indicator variable equals to „1‟ for post-test period and 0 if 
otherwise. 
Proportions of independent non-executive directors to AC. 
Number of AC meetings. 
Number of AC members with accounting or finance qualification. 
An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if head of internal audit 
function reports to audit committee and „0‟ if otherwise. 
Number of voluntary disclosure under IAF as per Para 43 of SIC.  
Interaction between IND and REG. 
Interaction between DIL and REG. 
Interaction between EXP and REG. 
Interaction between OBJ and REG. 
Interaction between WP and REG. 
Error term. 
                                                 
21
 Zmijewski financial distress score: The model incorporates three weighted financial ratios taken 
from Zmijewski (1984). 
4. Net income/Total assets (X₁) 
5. Total debt/Total assets (X₂) 
6. Current assets/Current liability (X₃) 
The above ratios are used to compute the Zmijewski score using the following model: 
Z = 4.3 – 4.5 X₁  + 5.7 X₂ - 0.004 X₃ 
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Table 7.11 describes the variables and the expected direction of the moderating effects 
of regulatory oversight and the association between the audit committee characteristics 
and internal audit function attributes and audit fees for HRFs and LRFs. 
 
Table 7.11: Variables Description and Expected Direction for Model 2 
 
Variable(s) Description and Measurement Exp 
Sign 
Hypo 
Dependent Variable 
AF Audit fee paid by the client (Natural 
logarithm of audit fees used in regression 
model). 
  
Experimental Variables 
AC Characteristics 
IND The proportion of independent non-
executive directors to AC. 
+ 
 
 
DIL Number of AC meetings +  
EXP Number of AC members with accounting or 
finance qualification. 
+  
IAF Attributes 
OBJ An indicator variable equals to‟1‟ if the IAF 
reports directly to audit committee and‟0‟ if 
otherwise. 
+  
WP Voluntary disclosure under IAF as per Para 
43 of Statement of Internal Control (SIC). 
+  
Control Variables 
TA Total assets for client at the end of fiscal 
year (Natural logarithm of total assets). 
+  
NAF Total non-audit fee paid by client (Natural 
logarithm of non-audit fees). 
+  
SUB Number of client‟s local subsidiaries. +  
FOREIGN Number of client‟s foreign subsidiaries. +  
SEG Number of business segments. +  
ZFC Zmijewski scores for financial crisis. +  
LEV Proportion of total liability over total assets. -  
ROA Profit before tax over total assets. -  
LOSS 
 
 
An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the 
company has made loss in any of the 
periods and „0‟ if otherwise. 
+  
AQ An indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the 
firm hires Big4 auditor and 0 if otherwise. 
+  
PRD As an indicator variable, „1‟ for post-test 
period, and „0‟ if otherwise. 
+  
IND_REG Interaction between IND and REG. + H5a 
DIL_REG Interaction between DIL and REG. + H5b 
EXP_REG Interaction between EXP and REG. + H5c 
OBJ_REG Interaction between OBJ and REG. + H6a 
WP_REG 
 
Interaction between WP and REG. + H6b 
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Table 7.12 presents the multiple regression results for testing the hypotheses. Models A, 
B and C are significant at one percent significant level (p=0.000) with an adjusted R² of 
at least 76 percent. With the exception of FOREIGN, the signs and significance (p<0.05 
or lower) of the coefficients on the control variables across the three models are in 
predicted directions. Overall, the data suggests the models are structurally stable. 
 
The results in Model A show the association between external audit fees on  eleven (11) 
control variables derived from the extant literature (Gul, 2006; Boo and Sharma, 2008; 
Yatim et al., 2006; Abdul Wahab et al., 2009). Following prior research (Simunic, 
1980; Francis and Simon, 1987; Craswell et al., 1995), it is expected that the audit fees 
are positively associated with total assets (TA), non-audit fees (NAF), number of local 
subsidiaries (SUB), number of business segments (SEG), number of foreign subsidiaries 
(FOREIGN), financial crisis index (ZFC), and audit quality (AQ). All other variables 
remain significant with the exception of LOSS. The TA being the most dominant 
determinant of audit fees, is positive and significant at one percent level of significance 
(0.460, t=18.145), indicating that the bigger the size of audit client firms‟ the higher the 
audit fees charged by the external auditors.  
 
The coefficient of NAF (0.064, t=3.896) is also significant and positive at p<0.01. 
Moreover, audit complexity measured by SUB, FOREIGN and SEG coefficient is found 
to be positive and significant at one percent significant level. Prior research expect that 
the more complex an audit client, the harder it is to audit and the process requires more 
time (Simunic, 1980; Hackenbrack and Knechel, 1997).  
 
Similarly, ZFC coefficient is positively and significantly associated with higher audit 
fees at p<0.01, suggesting that the auditors may be exposed to higher risk if the audit 
client is badly affected by the financial crisis. ROA is negatively significant at one 
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percent level (p<0.01), indicating the extent to which the auditor may be exposed to 
higher risk in the event that the audit client is not financially viable (Simunic, 1980).  
LEV is also negatively significant at one percent level (p<0.01). It is another measure 
of risk of a client failing, which potentially exposes the auditor to loss (Simunic, 1980). 
AQ is positively associated with audit fees which strongly support the observation that 
the Big4 is associated with higher audit fees. PRD which reports on post-BMLR 2008 
implementation also shows positive and significant results and higher audit fees.  
 
A positive and significant (p<0.01) coefficient on REG is also observed. This is to 
confirm that HRFs pay comparatively higher audit fees than LRFs, which is inconsistent 
with the prior study by Boo and Sharma (2008) who find a negative association between 
HRFs and audit fees. This argument is consistent with the notion that regulatory 
oversight complements the external audit monitoring, hence higher audit fees. The 
extensiveness of the external audit is higher in HRFs with stronger corporate 
governance than LRFs. This is because the audit committee members demand for 
extensive audit test even though HRFs have stronger internal controls and internal 
monitoring. 
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Table 7.12: Audit Fee Regression Models (n =1045) (dependent variable is log audit fees)                     
   Model A Model B  
Variable Sign Hypo Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value VIF 
Constant         34.781     32.319  
LTA  +  0.460 18.145*** 0.449   18.331** 2.840 
TA +  0.015 0.706*** 0.050   2.322** 2.157 
LNAF +  0.064 3.896*** 0.058 3.611*** 1.204 
NAF  +  0.118 5.819*** 0.076 3.808*** 1.894 
SUB +  0.554 17.392*** 0.554 18.124*** 4.419 
FOREIGN +  -0.278 -9.399*** -0.241 -8.376*** 3.910 
SEG +  0.078 4.382*** 0.082 4.750*** 1.400 
ZFC  +  0.101 3.966*** 0.107 4.379*** 2.840 
ROA  -  -0.064 -3.179*** -0.073 -3.757*** 1.770 
LEV  -  -0.081 -3.250*** -0.101 -4.151*** 2.783 
LOSS +  0.011            0.554 0.013       0.725 1.635 
AQ +  0.060            3.621*** 0.062       3.917*** 1.190 
PRD +  0.082 5.398*** 0.045 2.408*** 1.369 
REG +  0.054 2.802*** 0.070    4.120** 1.646 
IND  +    -0.059  -3.473*** 1.367 
DIL  +    0.107 6.280*** 1.362 
EXP  +    -0.013     -0.897 1.071 
OBJ +    0.044 2.551*** 1.400 
WP  +    0.082 4.726*** 1.437 
 
F-statistic 
 
238.663 
                        
             196.589 
 
p-value     0.000                              0.000  
Adj. R²     0.767                              0.759  
*p < 0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01                
ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; 
SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the 
proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if 
otherwise; REG an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if highly regulated firms and „0‟ if otherwise;  IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the 
number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 
43 of SIC. 
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Table 7.12 - continue 
Model C 
   I  II  III  
Variable Sign Hypo Coefficient t-value VIF Coefficient t-value VIF Coefficient t-value VIF 
Constant          32.219         32.455     32.282  
LTA  +  0.449 18.263** 2.851 0.460 18.632*** 2.900 0.452 18.436*** 2.847 
TA +  0.049 2.281** 2.172 0.077 3.307*** 2.565 0.061 2.761*** 2.313 
LNAF +  0.058 3.624*** 1.207 0.058 3.679*** 1.204 0.056 3.535*** 1.206 
NAF  +  0.076 3.803*** 1.894 0.080 4.016*** 1.903 0.081 4.024*** 1.921 
SUB +  0.554 18.119*** 4.423 0.559 18.318*** 4.431 0.558 18.247*** 4.443 
FOREIGN +  -0.241 -8.380*** 3.913 -0.246 -8.579*** 3.927 -0.244 -8.489*** 3.923 
SEG +  0.082 4.752*** 1.401 0.082 4.764*** 1.400 0.078 4.491*** 1.420 
ZFC  +  0.107 4.366*** 2.842 0.111 4.551*** 2.849 0.104 4.217*** 2.858 
ROA  -  -0.073 -3.753*** 1.770 -0.072 -3.730*** 1.770 -0.071 -3.652*** 1.775 
LEV  -  -0.100 -4.136*** 2.786 -0.100 -4.147*** 2.783 -0.098 -4.035*** 2.793 
LOSS +  0.014        0.729 1.635 0.014         0.753 1.635 0.012     0.651 1.637 
AQ +  0.062 3.925*** 1.191 0.061 3.869*** 1.190 0.062 3.929*** 1.190 
PRD +  0.070 4.121*** 1.369 0.069 4.056*** 1.370 0.069 4.057*** 1.371 
REG +  0.101        0.683 3.804 0.041        1.174 5.692 0.022     0.573 7.054 
IND  +  -0.058 -3.366*** 1.403 -0.058 -3.400*** 1.368 -0.059 -3.478*** 1.367 
DIL  +  0.107 6.287*** 1.372 0.071 3.411*** 2.063 0.109 6.393*** 1.366 
EXP  +  -0.014      -0.898 1.071 -0.009       -0.594 1.083 -0.023   -1.446 1.174 
OBJ +  0.043       2.507** 1.410 0.045 2.605*** 1.400 0.044 2.543*** 1.400 
WP  +  0.083 4.739*** 1.444 0.083 4.765*** 1.437 0.083 4.785*** 1.438 
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IND_REG + 5a 0.057       0.383 5.240       
DIL_REG + 5b    0.119 2.934*** 7.883    
EXP_REG + 5c       0.078    1.985** 7.285 
 
F-statistic 
 
188.627 
 
188.619 
 
187.509 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R² 0.787 0.787 0.786 
*p < 0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01                       
 ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-corded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of foreign 
subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm has made loss in any of the years, 0 if 
otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to 1 if the firm hires Big4 auditor and 0 if otherwise;  PRD an indicator variable, 1 for post test period and 0 otherwise; REG an indicator variable, 1 for  regulated, and 0 otherwise: PRD an indicator variable equal to 1 for post-test period and 0 
otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent  non-executive directors  audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of AC with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, 1 if the internal audit function reports to audit committee, and 0 otherwise; 
WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC; IND_REG is an interaction term; DIL_REG is an interaction term; EXP_REG is an interaction term; OBJ_REG is an interaction term; WP_REG is an interaction term; 
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Table 7.12 continue 
Model C 
   IV  V  
Variable Sign Hypo Coefficient t-value VIF Coefficient t-value VIF 
Constant         32.161          32.192  
LTA  +  0.451      18.424** 2.846 0.449 18.321** 2.840 
TA +  0.046     2.166** 2.171 0.050         2.322** 2.158 
LNAF +  0.057     3.555*** 1.205 0.058 3.605*** 1.205 
NAF  +  0.077     3.835*** 1.894 0.076 3.792*** 1.903 
SUB +  0.554   18.135*** 4.419 0.554 18.089*** 4.430 
FOREIGN +  -0.241    -8.396*** 3.911 -0.241 -8.353*** 3.924 
SEG +  0.081     4.706*** 1.401 0.082 4.747*** 1.402 
ZFC  +  0.103     4.188*** 2.865 0.107 4.371*** 2.855 
ROA  -  0.071     3.698*** 1.772 0.073 3.754*** 1.775 
LEV  -  -0.098    -4.027*** 2.795 -0.101 -4.150*** 2.786 
AQ +  0.012     0.657*** 1.637 0.014 0.726*** 1.636 
LOSS +  0.062     3.885 1.190 0.062        3.908 1.192 
PRD +  0.071     4.195*** 1.371 0.070 4.116*** 1.370 
REG +  0.160     2.513*** 7.229 0.038         0.405 6.426 
IND  +  -0.062    -3.613*** 1.375 -0.059 -3.472*** 1.367 
DIL  +  0.106    6.240*** 1.363 0.107 6.265*** 1.365 
EXP  +  -0.014    -0.913 1.071 -0.013       -0.894 1.072 
OBJ +  0.049    2.817*** 1.434 0.044        2.551** 1.402 
WP  +  0.083    4.740*** 1.437 0.082 4.622*** 1.492 
OBJ_REG + 6a        0.121    1.890** 7.445    
WP_REG + 6b    0.007         0.077 6.994 
F-statistic 187.422 186.573 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Adj. R² 0.786 0.786 
*p < 0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01          ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; 
FOREIGN is the number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator 
variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; REG an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if highly regulated firms and „0‟ if otherwise;  IND is 
the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function reports to audit 
committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
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Model B introduces the audit committee characteristics namely IND, DIL and EXP and 
internal audit function attributes OBJ and WP. The results show that the coefficients on 
audit committee DIL is positive and significant (p<0.01), and the coefficient on IND is 
significant but in the opposite direction. In addition, the coefficient on audit committee 
EXP is not significant. The coefficient on REG remains positive and significant. The 
findings on audit committee DIL are consistent with the demand-based argument that 
diligent audit committee provides more vigilant oversight of the financial reporting 
process and demand for additional assurance from external auditors to protect their 
reputational capital. Evidence consistent with this view is provided by Carcello et al. 
(2002) and Abbott et al. (2003). Similarly, the coefficient on internal audit function 
attributes, namely OBJ and WP, are also significant at (p<0.01). These findings are 
consistent with prior studies that investigate less regulated firms, generally find 
evidence supporting a positive association between internal audit and external audit fees 
(Adams et al., 1997; Deis and Giroux, 1996; Anderson and Zeghal, 1994). Thus, it can 
be concluded that the heads of internal audit of HRFs report directly to audit committee 
and disclose more information on internal audit activities as per voluntary disclosure 
under Para 43 of SIC. The results suggest that the introduction of the BMLR 2008 have 
instigated greater audit effort and have increased the audit fees for HRFs.  
 
Model C brings in the interaction variables and to test the hypotheses. It comprises of 
five individual Models I, II, III, IV and V on audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes and their interactions with regulatory oversight. The 
interaction term DIL_REG (audit committee diligence by regulatory oversight) 
examining the impact of BMLR 2008 is positive and significant (0.119, t=2.934, 
p<0.01). The positive coefficient for the interaction variable reveals a stronger positive 
relationship between DIL and higher audit fees moderated by regulatory oversight, after 
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the BMLR revision in 2008. It shows that HRFs are complying with the new 
requirements. This result is consistent with our expectation in Hypothesis 5b, which 
posits that regulatory oversight strengthens the association between audit committee 
DIL and higher audit fees. Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction term EXP_REG 
(audit committee expertise by regulatory oversight) is positive and significant (0.078, 
t=1.985, p<0.05). This result is consistent with the expectation in Hypothesis 5c, which 
posits that industry-specific regulatory oversight strengthens the association between 
audit committee EXP and higher audit fees. Further, as noted by the interviewees (IA1, 
IA2, IA3, EA2, EA3, R1 and R2) in the present study (see Chapter 6, Section 6.5), the 
role of regulators in Malaysia is very effective. All eight respondents agreed that the 
industry-specific regulator which is the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) is very much 
involved in enforcing tighter regulations, thus firms in highly regulated industry are 
more governed as compared to other. This is also in line with the Guidelines on 
Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions issued by Bank Negara Malaysia in 
2004 that the audit committees of financial firms shall comprise of non-executive 
directors with at least three members, of which the majority should be independent 
directors. At least one member should have accounting expertise or experience in the 
field of finance. Further, the guidelines also emphasised that the committee should hold 
regular meetings, at least once every quarter and should report regularly to the full 
board. 
 
Finally, the coefficient on the interaction term OBJ_REG (internal audit function 
objectivity by regulatory oversight) is positive and significant (0.121, t=1.890, p<0.05).  
The results suggest that regulatory oversight strengthens the association between 
objectivity and higher audit fees, thus fully supporting H6a. The positive coefficient for 
the interaction variable indicates that the head of internal audit reporting directly to the 
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audit committee is stronger post-implementation of BMLR 2008. Hence, this complies 
with the Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions by Bank Negara 
Malaysia (2004) which emphasised on the direct authority and supervision of the audit 
committee. Besides that, this finding is also consistent with the comprehensive 
disclosure requirements for better understanding of the financial and management 
position of the HRFs, particularly in relation to its internal governance practices. The 
remaining of the interaction variables term IND_REG, and WP_REG is insignificant 
and thus, do not support H5a and 6b. 
 
It is important to note that the results on the interaction variables on audit committee 
characteristics, internal audit functions attributes and higher audit fees post-BMLR 2008 
observed above are consistent with the demand side explanation of the audit fee 
phenomenon. It suggests that enhanced governance practices by the audit committee 
members and internal auditors, seek higher audit quality. Such greater assurance 
provided by the external auditor requires additional audit work which is reflected in 
higher audit fees. Since one of the primary responsibilities of the audit committee is to 
review and monitor the audit process, active and independent audit committees can 
influence the extent of the audit (DeZoort, 1997). Hence, we find that industry-specific 
regulatory oversight influences audit fees and the association between internal 
governance mechanisms and audit fees. We attribute the higher audit fees paid by HRFs 
to the role of the regulatory oversight function as complement, not a substitute, for 
external audit monitoring.  
 
7.4.6 Sensitivity Analyses 
In Model 1, a linear regression model was tested by including audit committee 
characteristics namely independence, diligence and expertise, and internal audit 
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function attributes, namely objectivity and work performance, and their interactions 
variables in Model 1 (PCON) and Model 2 (REG). The results show that the VIFs are 
greater than 10 for AC independence (VIF = 17.830) and multicollinearity exists for 
Model 1. Thus, the experimental variables are being interacted independently with the 
moderating variables in the respective models. Further, the Zmijewski score (ZFC) to 
control for financial crisis is removed from the regression analysis for Model 1. This is 
because the inclusion of this variable has contributed to the positive effect of ROA in 
the Model, since ROA is part of ZFC variable.  
 
In Model 2, Mann Whitney U-test was also conducted to further extend the basic 
findings. Since the sample size for highly regulated firms is small of only 20 firms 
(equivalent to 100 firm-year observations), a non-parametric statistical tool is also used. 
Previous studies that use similar matched pairs method are Beasley (1996), Carcello and 
Nagy (2004b), Farber (2005), Gul (2006), Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton, 
(2009), Zhao and Chen (2009), and Mustafa and Youssef (2010).  Gul (2006) compares 
38 firms with political connections to 206 firms without political connections and 
Nelson (2010) uses 28 fraud firms to be matched with 84 non-fraud firms. This is 
because the number of firms of interest is usually not large. This is consistent with prior 
studies such as Johnson and Mitton (2002) at 72, Gul (2006) at 43, and Abdul Wahab et 
al. (2009) at 90. The idea is to test whether the results differ from the t-tests analysis as 
shown in Table 7.10. However, insignificant difference to the results was observed. 
(Mann Whitney U test results are attached in Appendix E). 
 
7.5 Interpretation of Results 
The summary of the results is tabulated in Table 7.13. The first hypothesis predicts that 
PCON firms pay higher audit fees than non-PCON firms. The second and third 
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hypotheses for Model 1 examine the moderating effect of political connections on the 
association between audit committee characteristics and internal audit function 
attributes, and audit fees post-BMLR implementation for PCON firms. The results show 
that the PCON firms have higher audit fees due to the enhanced internal governance 
mechanisms and greater increase in audit effort. Similarly, stronger and positive 
association between audit committee DIL_PCON and EXP_PCON, and audit fees post-
BMLR 2008 implementation was reported. Further, stronger and positive association 
between internal audit function attributes namely OBJ_PCON and WP_PCON, and 
audit fees post-BMLR 2008 implementation was also evidenced. It suggests that audit 
committee members induce firms to purchase high quality audit service in order to 
reduce the likelihood of fraudulent financial reporting (Abbott et al., 2003; Carcello et 
al., 2002). However, this study does not find support for the audit committee 
IND_PCON. 
 
Table 7.13:  Summary of Findings 
 PCON Firms HRFs 
 
 
Dependent 
 Variable: 
    
Audit Fees (H1) Higher  
        Audit fees 
- Supported (H4) Higher  
        Audit fees 
- Supported 
Independent 
 Variables: 
 
(H2a) Independence 
 
- Not  
Supported 
  
 
(H5a) Independence                 
 
- Not  
Supported 
Audit 
Committee 
 
 
(H2b) Diligence 
 
- Supported 
 
(H5b) Diligence 
 
- Supported 
  
(H2c) Expertise 
 
- Supported 
 
(H5c) Expertise 
 
- Supported 
 
 
Internal Audit  
 
(H3a) Objectivity 
 
- Supported 
 
(H6a) Objectivity 
 
- Supported 
Function  
Attributes 
 
 
(H3b) Work    
Performance 
 
- Supported 
 
(H6b)  Work  
Performance 
 
- Not   
Supported 
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Further, the inclusion of political embeddedness perspective explains the political 
relationships between the PCON firms and the government. The government took 
proactive steps to dispel the negative perceptions of its favoured firms to enhance board 
effectiveness and revamp board practices and processes (Khazanah‟s Green Book, 
2006). Thus, corporate governance does matter for politically connected firms as 
suggested by Chan et al. (2012). 
 
Further, for Model 2, hypothesis 4 predicts that HRFs have higher audit fees than LRFs. 
The fifth and sixth hypotheses predict that audit committee characteristics and internal 
audit function attributes, moderated by regulatory oversight have a positive association 
with higher audit fees for HRFs. The results show that HRFs pay higher audit fees due 
to an additional industry-specific regulator i.e. Bank Negara Malaysia, which requires 
more audit effort, thus an increase in audit fees. Similarly, regulatory oversight 
strengthens the association between audit committee DIL and EXP, with higher audit 
fees for HRFs. Additionally, regulatory oversight strengthens the association between 
internal audit function attributes OBJ and higher audit fees. This is consistent with the 
notion that regulatory oversight complements the external auditing as monitoring 
mechanisms. This also supports Adams and Mehran (2003) that the boards of directors 
of HRFs are placed in a crucial role in the governance structure. Although the boards of 
HRFs are assigned the same legal responsibilities as the boards of LRFs, regulators 
have placed additional expectations on HRFs, resulting in the boards delineating their 
responsibilities even further. Consequently, the internal governance mechanisms quality 
will impact the quality of corporate governance (Gramling et al., 2004).  Therefore, it 
can be concluded that firms that are committed to strong corporate governance are 
likely to engage in greater levels of internal auditing and are willing to pay for a higher 
quality external audit (Goodwin and Kent 2006). However, this study does not find any 
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support for internal audit function namely WP. It suggests that HRFs have disclosed 
most of the voluntary disclosures under Para 43, as they are required to provide the 
audit committee members with information needed for decision making and target 
setting.  
 
The application of institutional theory in this research supports the argument that an 
institution plays an important role in monitoring the operation of the firms. In addition, 
the establishment of regulatory agencies helps to promote corporate governance best 
practices, formulating and enforcing the accounting standards applicable to listed firms. 
Further, it can be said that the additional-specific regulator i.e. BNM has put high 
expectations on HRFs, resulting in the audit committee and internal audit department 
taking a more pro-active and independent role in the monitoring process. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents the results of the data analysis to test the six hypotheses developed 
in Chapter 4. Both Model 1 and Model 2 in this study used multiple regression 
statistical techniques. The results for Model 1 indicate that hypotheses 1, 2b, 2c, 3a and 
3b are significant in the predicted direction. However, for hypothesis 2a, the results 
reveal high correlation among the independent variables thus multicollinearity exists.  
Further, for Model 2, the linear regression was executed to examine the moderating 
effect of regulatory oversight on the association between AC characteristics and IAF 
attributes, and audit fees.  The results indicate that hypotheses 4, 5b, 5c, and 6a are 
significant in the predicted direction. The results of most control variables are consistent 
with prior studies. The next chapter will provide the conclusion for the study. 
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Chapter 8  CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter synthesises the discussion in the earlier chapters and focuses 
specifically on the contributions arising from this study. Further, the chapter identifies 
some of the limitations of research and provides suggestions for future research. 
 
8.2  Summary of Research 
The main objective of this study is to further the understanding of the association 
between the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee and internal audit 
function, and audit fees in the context of an emerging economy that has an institutional 
setting that differs from most developed western economies. The revision of the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements in 2008 (BMLR 2008) to enhance the internal 
governance mechanisms of firms provides a fitting opportunity to examine audit fees 
from the demand side perspective. Thus, this study investigates the impact of the 
revised BMLR 2008 pertaining to audit committee characteristics and internal audit 
function attributes on audit fees. The uniqueness of the Malaysian corporate setting with 
the presence of favoured firms or politically connected (PCON) firms and the stringent 
regulatory oversight by the Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) over financial institutions 
and insurance firms further motivated this study to examine the moderating effects of 
political connection and regulatory oversight on the association between the audit 
committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and audit fees.  
 
Based on the afore-mentioned objectives, this thesis focused on four (4) research 
questions: First, do PCON firms pay higher audit fees than non-PCON firms; secondly, 
is the association between the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee 
characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and audit fees stronger post-BMLR 
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2008 implementation for PCON than non-PCON firms; thirdly, do highly regulated 
firms (HRFs) pay higher audit fees than low regulated firms (LRFs); and fourthly, is the 
association between the internal governance mechanisms of audit committee 
characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and audit fees stronger post-BMLR 
2008 implementation for HRFs than LRFs. 
 
Three (3) theories namely the agency theory, political embeddedness perspective and 
institutional theory are applied to examine and explain the relationship between the 
above said internal governance mechanisms and audit fees. To answer the four research 
questions mentioned above, two research models were developed. Model 1 focuses on 
the moderating effect of political connections on the association between audit 
committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes, and audit fees. Model 2 
examines the moderating effects of regulatory oversight on the association between the 
said internal governance mechanisms and audit fees. 
 
Twelve (12) hypotheses were developed and empirically tested to give a better 
impression of the breadth of this study. The audit committee characteristics were 
measured by the constructs of independence, diligence and expertise. While the internal 
audit functions attributes were measured using the constructs of objectivity and work 
performance.  
 
The majority of the hypotheses were supported by this study. Particularly, for Model 1 
hypotheses 1, 2b, 2c, 3a and 3b, while for Model 2 hypotheses 4, 5b, 5c and 6a were 
supported. Three (3) out of 12 hypotheses (i.e. hypotheses 2a, 5a and 6b) were not 
supported. The results clearly indicate that PCON firms have higher audit fees than non-
PCON firms due to enhanced governance and greater increase in audit effort. The 
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association between audit committee diligence and expertise, and audit fees is stronger 
post-BMLR 2008 implementation for PCON firms. Similar results are also evidenced 
for internal audit function attributes, of objectivity and work performance, and audit 
fees, suggesting that firms with higher audit fees are more likely to use greater level of 
internal auditing.  
 
The results also show that highly regulated firms have higher audit fees due to 
additional industry-specific regulator which requires more audit effort, thus increase in 
audit fees. Similarly, regulatory oversight strengthens the association between audit 
committee diligence and expertise, and higher audit fees. Regulatory oversight also 
strengthens the association between internal audit function attributes of objectivity and 
higher audit fees. This is consistent with the notion that regulatory oversight plays a 
vital role in corporate governance and complements the external audit as monitoring 
mechanisms.  
 
This current study draws on the agency theory, political embeddedness perspective and 
institutional theory. According to the agency theory, the separation of ownership and 
control between the owner and manager of a firm would subsequently lead to agency 
costs, such as audit fees. As managers may not act in the best interests of shareholders, 
monitoring by independent directors is crucial. The importance of the agency theory in 
corporate governance is further supported by the findings of this research, which applies 
an agency theory framework, that the improved internal governance mechanisms 
through enhanced audit committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes 
increase the demand for audit procedure resulting in higher audit fees. 
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In addition, the higher audit fees for the government favoured PCON firms may be 
explained from the political embeddedness perspective. To dispel the negative 
perceptions of PCON firms, the Malaysian government implemented steps to enhance 
their corporate governance. The results of this study shows the PCON firms have better 
governance mechanisms, indicating the success of the Transformation Program to boost 
the firms‟ corporate governance. 
 
Further, the institutional theory that theorised an important role for regulators to ensure 
firms comply with rules and regulation supports Model 2 of this study. Financial 
institutions and insurance firms in Malaysia have unique operating and financial 
structure, different reporting requirements and are subject to an additional industry-
specific regulator which is the Bank Negara Malaysia. Specifically, these firms have to 
comply with the regulations from both the Bank Negara Malaysia and the Bursa 
Malaysia. The role and responsibility of the BNM as an industry-specific regulator 
institutionalizes good practices have proven to be important in enhancing the functions 
and effectiveness of corporate governance in these highly regulated firms.  
 
8.3 Contributions of the Study 
The contributions of the study are discussed below. 
 
8.3.1 Theoretical Contributions to Theory Development 
The findings of the present study make several contributions to theory development. 
Past researches on audit fees are generally drawn upon the traditional agency literature 
which explains the role of board of directors in monitoring and controlling a firm. 
Although this present study finds the agency theory is relevant to explain the role of 
audit committee as a monitoring mechanism, this study shows that additional theory is 
needed to explain the relationships between the government and its favoured firms. 
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Thus, this research introduces the politically embeddedness perspective which 
elucidates the political relationship between the government and the politically 
connected firms.  
 
The application of political embeddedness perspective in this research is a key 
contribution to extant literature. The inclusion of political embeddedness perspective 
explains the political relationships between the PCON firms and the government. Since 
PCON firms are generally perceived to exhibit poor corporate governance and greater 
agency problems, this study evidenced that corporate governance does matter in the 
case of PCON firms where they are committed to strong corporate governance practices 
and engaged in greater levels of internal auditing and are prepared to pay for a higher 
quality external audit work.  
 
Further, prior studies on PCON firms have generally drawn on the supply based 
perspective suggesting a supply–side explanation for audit fees in the absence of a 
strong corporate governance regime. However, this study reveals that good corporate 
governance practices had been effectively implemented in PCON firms and the demand 
side explanation should prevail.  
 
In addition, given the absence of corporate governance research in regulated 
environment, the investigation as to how highly regulated firms are impacted by the 
BMLR 2008 practices are timely. The findings suggest that audit committees of HRFs 
demand extensive external audit due to stringent regulatory oversight by an additional 
industry-specific regulator, Bank Negara Malaysia. This supports the assumption of the 
institutional theory on the role of regulators in promoting governance practices. Further, 
the findings also suggest that the BNM has achieved a high level of efficiency and 
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effectiveness in performing its supervisory role to formulate regulatory framework and 
conduct oversight function over accounting matters by enforcing good corporate 
governance practices on HRFs. Hence, an industry-specific regulatory oversight also 
plays an important role in the development of good corporate governance.  
 
In conclusion, this study which combines the agency theory, politically embeddedness 
perspective and institutional theory has contributed to the extant audit fees literature.  
 
8.3.2 Theoretical Contributions to Research Design 
This research introduces new measurement for the work performance of internal audit 
functions. Instead of using internal audit size to measure the contribution of the internal 
audit function as was done in previous studies, this study adopts the measures in SAS 
No. 65 adopted in the US. Voluntary disclosures on internal audit function activities is 
introduced as the measurement for the quality of work performance. 
 
The present study also contributes to the extant literature by providing evidence using 
both archival and primary data from Malaysia to study the impact of the enhanced Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements in 2008 on audit committee characteristics and internal 
audit function attributes on audit fees. The findings add to research evidence from a 
country with a developing capital market which has less transparent and weaker 
corporate governance structures as compared to developed economies such as the US, 
UK and Australia. In addition, this research also answers to the call for research on 
highly regulated industries and from countries with developing capital market such as 
Malaysia. 
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8.3.3 Contributions to Practice and Policy Making 
From the practical perspective, the findings of this research provide feedback to the 
regulators (i.e. Bursa Malaysia, Bank Negara Malaysia and Securities Commission) on 
ensuring policies that support and enhance the link between the internal governance 
mechanisms and external auditing. This study provides further understanding on the 
impact of audit committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes on audit 
fees. Past research was conducted before the revision of the BMLR 2008 and thus it is 
important to the regulators to appreciate the impact of the revision on audit fees. The 
findings of this study support the claim in the World Bank 2012 that enhanced reforms 
since 2008 have been effectively implemented by listed firms. Further, it may also assist 
regulators as well as policy makers in implementing further enhancements as 
recommended in the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 2012 and BMLR 2012.  
 
In addition, past researches on PCON firms are drawn from the supply-side perspective 
and this present study thus extends the current knowledge and explores the demand side 
explanation by investigating the internal governance mechanisms‟ impact post-BMLR 
2008 implementation for different types of ownership structured firms and highly 
regulated firms.  The findings of this study also suggest that internal audit and external 
audit are complementary mechanisms within the governance framework. These findings 
will assist the regulators in understanding the effects of regulation on corporate 
governance, and by providing evidence to the external auditors and auditing standard 
setters that internal audit complements external auditing.  
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8.4 Limitations of Research 
Notwithstanding the contributions mentioned above, the present study has a number of 
limitations that should be noted, hence providing opportunities for further research. The 
main limitations are elaborated below. 
 
8.4.1 Highly Regulated Firms 
With regards to the study on highly regulated firms, it is acknowledged that  the number 
of HRFs in the sample is small, only 20 HRFs from approximately 831 Malaysian listed 
firms at the time of data collection (as at 6 January, 2011). However, this is the whole 
population of HRFs and the sample size is adequate for many statistical analyses since 
the sampled firms are taken for five years which is equivalent to 100 firm-year 
observations.  
 
8.4.2 Qualitative Evidence 
Eight (8) interviews were conducted with selected regulators, external auditors and 
heads of internal audit to elicit their perceptions and to obtain a better understanding on 
the enhanced corporate governance as well as auditing process and their implications on 
audit fees. The evidence served to highlight the problems and indicate possible 
explanation to the results of the analyses of the secondary data. However, richer insights 
could have been obtained by interviewing audit committee members and other senior 
management of selected firms. It would provide a thorough understanding of the 
corporate governance issues and the enhanced corporate governance of audit committee 
characteristics and internal audit function attributes on audit fees. 
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8.4.3 Measurement for IA Function Attribute - Competency 
 
Another limitation of this study pertains to internal audit function attributes. Though 
this study adopts the measures in SAS No. 65 which comprised of objectivity, 
competency and work performance, competency was not measured.  This is because 
there is no available data for internal audit function attribute, competency at the time of 
the research.  
 
8.5          Future Research 
Given the evidence presented in this thesis, there are several avenues for future 
research.  
 
8.5.1 Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 2012 
This study is based on the BMLR 2008. With the revision of the MCCG in 2012, the 
BMLR was further revised in November 2012. Although the requirement on audit 
committee characteristics and internal audit function attributes were not raised, there are 
now additional requirements on CG such as the establishment of a nomination 
committee. They will take effect only in 2013. Future research should examine the new 
changes extensively and their relation to audit fees. Besides that, a longitudinal study, 
expanding more than five years as pre-test and post-test periods would be beneficial in 
measuring the long-term impact of internal governance mechanisms on audit fees.  
 
8.5.2 Audit Fees Comparison in the Same Region 
In order to compare the level of audit fees with other countries in the same region, 
future research should also explore the feasibility of conducting research in countries 
such as Thailand, Singapore or Indonesia. The comparison across jurisdictions would 
also improve the robustness of the findings.  
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8.5.3 Relationships between Audit Committee and Heads of Internal Auditor 
 
Past research on audit fees highlights that independent audit committee‟s demand for 
high level of assurance and at the same time support the external auditor‟s demand for 
substantive audit testing, consequently higher audit fees. Further, audit committee 
members with financial expertise will have a better understanding on auditing issues 
and the risks associated with a lower audit quality. Higher level of interactions between 
the audit committee members and the head of internal audit and also the external 
auditors in terms of frequent meetings, ensure that the audit committee will be well 
informed and more diligent in carrying out its duties. However, the present study has 
not looked at these relationships. Future research should look at these relationships and 
how these relationships would affect audit fees in Malaysia. 
  
8.5.4  External Auditors Reliance on Internal Audit Contributions 
 
The present research examined the complementary effect between external auditing and 
internal auditing. Firms with strong corporate governance practices are likely to engage 
in greater levels of internal auditing and are willing to pay for a higher quality of 
external audit work.  However, this study has not looked at the external auditor‟s 
reliance on internal audit contributions. Future research should also look at the external 
auditor‟s reliance on internal audit contributions and to what extent this reliance has an 
impact on audit fees. 
 
8.5.5 Political Embeddedness Perspective 
The political embeddedness perspective has two dimensions. First, it looks at the firms‟ 
ownership and directorship of government officials in the PCON firms. Secondly, the 
appointment of former Big4 auditors to various positions in the audit client‟s firms. As 
this study only examines the first dimension on ownership and directorship of 
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government official under political influence, future research should look at both 
dimensions as it will draw on the concept of political embeddedness as a whole. 
 
8.5.6 Ownership Structured Firms 
Another issue of interest is to further categorise the non-PCON firms into 
INSTITUTIONAL, MANAGERIAL and FAMILY ownership structured firms by 
conducting an ANOVA with post-hoc comparisons. This is to determine whether there 
are any significant differences between the means of independent (unrelated) groups. 
 
8.5.7 Audit Committee Characteristics and Internal Audit Attributes 
As this study separates the audit committee characteristics into independence, diligence 
and expertise and internal audit function attributes into objectivity and work 
performance, future research should combine the audit committee characteristics and 
internal audit function attributes. It can be done by allocating points for firms that meet 
„best practice‟ criteria.  
 
8.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has summarized the research findings, overviewed its main limitations and 
noted some avenues for future research. It is evidenced that internal corporate 
governance mechanisms such as audit committee characteristics namely independence, 
diligence and expertise and internal audit function attributes namely objectivity and 
work performance also influence audit fees. The application of the political 
embeddedness perspective and institutional theory provides significant explanations to 
the audit fees phenomenon in the Malaysian context.  
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Clearly, this study shows that audit committee members have a duty not just to oversee 
the conduct of business in compliance with laws they should also be effective stewards 
and guardians of the firm in respect of ethical values, and to ensure an effective 
governance structure for the appropriate management of risks and level of internal 
controls. The enhanced corporate governance regime post-2008 has been effective in 
that politically connected firms and highly regulated firms still pay higher audit fees 
even though their internal governance mechanisms are stronger, indicating the 
dominance of the demand-side explanation compared to pre-2008 studies that 
highlighted a supply-side perspective. This observation strengthens claims that the 
corporate governance regulatory has indeed been effective. This study also facilitates to 
dispel the concerns regarding politically connected firms in the corporate governance 
reform efforts as highlighted in the World Bank Report in 2012. 
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APPENDIX A  
 
Prudential Financial Policy Development 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions 
BNM/RH/GL 001-1 
 
 
COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS 
1.12 All Licensed Institutions are expected to: 
(i) Comply and observe the Guidelines; and 
(ii)Disclose in the annual report, any non-observance of the Guidelines and provide 
explanation and alternative measures taken to comply with the principles of the 
Guidelines. 
 
 
AUDIT COMMITTEE 
Objective 
13. To provide independent oversight of the licensed institution‟s financial reporting 
and internal control system and ensuring checks and balances within the licensed 
institution. 
 
Composition 
14. The Audit Committee shall comprise only non-executive directors with at least 
three members, of which the majority should be independent directors. The 
committee should be chaired by an independent director. At least one member 
should have accounting expertise or experience in the field of finance.  
 
Roles and Responsibilities 
15. The Audit Committee should have explicit authority to investigate any matter within 
its terms of reference, full access to and co-operation by management and full 
discretion to invite any director or executive officer to attend its meetings, and 
reasonable resources to enable it to discharge its functions properly. The Audit 
Committee should have full and unrestricted access to information and be able to 
obtain independent professional advice. Duties of Audit Committee, among others, 
are as follows: 
Fair and transparent reporting 
 Ensure fair and transparent reporting and prompt publication of the financial 
accounts. 
Effectiveness of Internal Audit 
 Oversee the functions of the Internal Audit department and ensuring compliance with 
BNM/GP10 requirement; 
 Review the scope of the internal audit programme, internal audit findings and 
recommend actions to be taken by management; and Appoint, set compensation, 
evaluate performance and decide on the transfer and dismissal of the Chief Internal 
Auditor. 
 
Internal Controls 
 Review the effectiveness of internal controls and risk management processes. 
 
External Auditors 
 Select external auditors for appointment by board; 
 Recommend not only the appointment but also the removal of auditors; 
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 Assess objectivity, performance and independence of external auditor (for example 
by reviewing and assessing the various relationships between the external auditor and 
the licensed institution or any other entity); 
 Review the external auditor‟s management letter and response; 
 Approve the provision of non-audit service by the external auditor; 
 Ensure that there are proper checks and balances in place so that the provision of 
non-audit services does not interfere with the exercise of independent judgement of 
the auditors; 
 Regularly review the audit findings and ensuring that issues are being managed and 
rectified appropriately and in a timely manner; and Have direct communication 
channels with the external auditors and able to meet with the external auditor without 
the presence of management, at least annually. 
 
Related Party Transactions 
 Review all related party transactions and keep the board informed of such 
transactions. 
 
16. The committee should hold regular meetings, at least once every quarter and should 
report regularly to the full board. 
 
 
INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION 
 
Major Responsibilities of the Board 
2.10 The major responsibilities of the boards of Licensed Institutions include: 
 
Set up an effective internal audit department, staffed with qualified internal audit 
personnel to perform internal audit functions, covering the financial and management 
audit.  
Adequate internal controls and strong risk management system within the Licensed 
Institution must be supplemented by an effective internal audit function that provides an 
independent evaluation on the adequacy of, and compliance with the established 
policies and procedures. To enhance the independence of the internal auditors in 
achieving their audit objectives, the board should ensure that the internal auditors have 
full access to all records, and are given an appropriate standing in the organisation‟s 
hierarchy. 
 
Internal Audit 
2.98 The internal audit function is an important part of any effective internal control and 
risk management system because it provides an independent assessment of the 
adequacy of, and compliance with, established policies and procedures. In addition, 
internal auditors should review and evaluate the reliability, adequacy and 
effectiveness of the Licensed Institution‟s internal control. The scope of internal 
audit should cover both financial and management audit. The nature of the internal 
audit role makes it critical that internal audit personnel is independent from the day-
to-day activities of the Licensed Institution, and have unrestricted access to all 
activities conducted by the Licensed Institution. Direct accountability to the board 
facilitates the proper functioning of corporate governance by enabling the internal 
auditor to provide the board with information that is not biased as a result of 
interference by line or senior management. The importance of the internal audit 
function to the corporate governance process also requires it to be adequately 
resourced and staffed with competent and well-trained officers. 
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2.99 The internal audit function should be well placed to undertake investigation on 
behalf of the Audit Committee, thus internal auditors should have an appropriate 
standing within the institution and be placed under the direct authority and 
supervision of the Audit Committee. The internal auditors should have access to 
the Audit Committee at all times. Since the internal auditors are held accountable 
to the Audit Committee, their performance and remuneration package should be 
evaluated and decided by the Audit Committee. 
 
Principle 13: Conducting corporate governance in a transparent manner can 
reinforce sound corporate governance 
 
Comprehensive Disclosure Requirement 
2.108 To facilitate market discipline and sound corporate governance, appropriate 
disclosure is required so that shareholders, other stakeholders and market 
participants can effectively have an understanding of the financial and 
management position of the Licensed Institution, particularly in relation to its 
safety and soundness.  
 
Licensed Institutions are required to observe the “Revised Guidelines on Financial 
Reporting for Licensed Institutions” (BNM/GP8), on a comprehensive disclosure 
requirement by Bank Negara Malaysia. Components of the corporate governance 
disclosure shall, at a minimum, comprise the following: 
 
7) Internal Audit and Control Activities 
 A review of the effectiveness of the key internal control policies and procedures 
established for managing daily activities and the changes made to the policies and 
procedures during the year to ensure that they remain relevant; 
 The review should include the internal audit structure put in place to provide an 
independent assessment of the adequacy of, and compliance with established policies 
and procedures, the lines of reporting of the internal audit division, the functions, 
role and responsibilities of the internal audit division as well as the scope and nature 
of audit work; and  
 Discussion should also include the procedures used to report internal control 
deficiencies or breaches, any potential trends identified on the control issues and any 
preventive actions that were taken. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
244 
 
APPENDIX B
245 
 
 
 
 
 
    
                                                                                                                                           APPENDIX  C  
  
  
I nf o rm ed  C o n s ent  F o r m  
  
Ti t l e:   Internal Governance Mechanisms and Audit Fees   in Malaysia   
  
T h is   r e s e ar c h is   b e i n g  und e r t a ke n  f o r   a   d iss e r t a t i o n   as   p art   o f   a   do c t o ral  p r o gr a m in  t h e   Fa c u l t y  o f B u si n e ss   a n d  
A c c o un t a n c y at   U n i v e rsi t y of  Malaya .   
  
Pu r p o s e  o f   t he  st ud y :   
  
T o   d e t e r m i n e   t h e   effec ts of regulatory oversight on audit committee  (AC)  roles and internal audit function   (IAF)  
before and  after the revised Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 2008 (BMLR). This study would also  
investigate the impact of the amended BMLR on audit fees   for high   regulated industries and less regulated  
industries .   
  
    
P a rt i ci p a ti o n:   
  
D u ri n g  t h e   i n te r v i e w ,  the interviewee  w ill  b e   as ke d  qu e s t i o n s  w i t h r e gar d s   t o  his/her knowledge and experience  
on auditing specifically focusing on  regulation,  AC and IAF.  H o w e v e r   the interviewee is   fr e e   t o   e x p a n d   o n   t h e   
t o p ic   o r   t alk a b o u t   r e l a te d   i d e as.  T h e   i n te r v i e w   s h o u ld   t a k e   l e ss   t h an   an   h o u r   and t he conversation will be  
recorded as to avoid any missing out important comments or  i n a d ve r te n t l y   c h a n ge   of   w o r d s   s o m e h ow .   The  
interviewee  m a y   r e frain   fr o m   a n s we ri n g   a n y   qu e s t i o n s   or  m a y   e n d   t h e   i n t e r v i e w   at   a n y   t i m e .   
  
P o t en ti a l   R is k s :   
  
T h e re   s h o u ld   n o t   b e   a n y   r i s k s   borne by the interviewee   du ri n g   t h e   i nte r v i ew .   H o w e ve r,   if   t h e r e   is   a n y   
qu e s t i o n   o r  d is c u ssi o n  t h a t   is   considered personal or sensitive ,  the interviewee   m ay   d ec li n e   t o   a n s we r   t he m .   
  
  
P o t en ti a l   B enef its :   
  
By   und e rs t a nd i n g   the effects of regulatory oversight to corporate governance key players, it   h e l p s   
to  i m p r o v e   t h e   e ff e c t i v e n e ss   o f   t h e i n te r n al   c o n t r o l   of an organization. T h is   s t ud y   w ill   b e   u s e f u l   t o   
regulators, academicians  a n d   p ra ct i t i o n e r s .  T h is   s t ud y   m ay   p r o v i d e   some insights  o n   t h e   n ee d   f o r   policies  
and regulation   in order  to e nh a n c e  t h e   li n k   b et w ee n   t h e   a ud it   co m m i tt e e   a n d   t h e   i n te r n al   a ud it   f un ct i o n .   In   
a dd i t i o n ,   t h e   k n ow l e d g e   is also   i m p o r t a n t   to practitioners   in charging an appropriate  amount of  
audit fees to companies.   
  
  
C o nf i den ti a l i ty :   
  
All   data   w ill   b e   treated as private and   co n fi d e n t ial.   O n ly   the interviewer and   the   m e n t i o n e d   b e l o w   
advisors  w ill   h a v e   a c ce ss   t o   t h is   i n f o r m a t i o n .   U p o n   c o m p l e t i o n   o f   t h is   r e s e ar c h , all   d a t a   w ill   b e   s t o r e d   in   a   
s ec u r e   place .   A n y   i n f o r m a t i o n   t h a t   is i n c l ud e d   in   t h e  study   d o e s   n o t   i d e n t i f y   specific interviewee   as   t h e   
r e s p o nd e n t   and the  p ar t i c i p a t i o n   in   t h is   s t u d y   is  c o m p l e t e ly  v o l un t ar y .   
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Participant Certification: 
 
I have read this Consent and Authorization form. I agree to take part in this study as a research participant.  
I  am  aware  that  my  participation  in  this  interview  is  voluntary.  I have had the  opportunity to ask, and I 
have received answers to, any questions I had regarding the study. I understand the intent and purpose of 
this study. If, for any reason, at any time, I wish to stop the interview, I may do so without having to give an 
explanation. 
 
 
 
 
Participant Signature:    Date:    
 
Researcher Contact Information: 
 
Norziaton Ismail Khan AP Dr. Susela Devi 
Principal Investigator Faculty Advisor 
Faculty of Business and Accountancy Faculty of Business and Accountancy 
University of  Malaya University of Malaya 
Kuala Lumpur Kuala Lumpur 
016-6607802 03-7967 3803 
zie_khan@yahoo.com susela@um.edu.my 
 
Dr Chan Wai Meng 
Faculty Advisor 
Faculty of Business and Accountancy 
University of Malaya 
Kuala Lumpur 
03-79673890 
chanwm@um.edu.my 
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Semi-Structured Interview  
Guide 
 
 
 
Interview Guide Format: 
 
Section A: Background Information 
Section B: Internal Governance Mechanisms  
Section C:  Regulatory Oversight and Audit Fees 
Section D:        High Regulated and Less Regulated Industries 
 
 
  
Organization:    
Interview Date:    
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Section A: Background Information 
 
Gender 
 
Male 
Female 
 
Age Group 
 
Below 26 46-50 
 
26- 30 51-55 
 
31-35 56-60 
 
36-40 Above 60 
41-45 
 
Education 
 
Doctorate Diploma 
Master’s Degree Professional Cert (e.g. CPA, CIA) 
Bachelor’s Degree Others (specify  ) 
 
Professional Membership 
 
None IIAM 
MIA Others (specify  ) 
MICPA 
 
 
 
Type of industry employed in: 
 
Agriculture/Forestry/ Fisheries Wholesale and retail trade 
Mining Services 
Contract construction Others (specify  ) 
Manufacturing 
Transport, communication and 
utility services 
 
Tenure in current organization 
 
 
Less than 2 years 6 to 10 years 
2 to 5 years 11 years of more 
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Section B: Internal Governance Mechanisms (AC & IAF) 
 
1. How would you describe the auditing regulation in Malaysia? 
2. Can you explain how does the revised Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR) 2008 
affect the role of audit committee and internal audit function? 
3. Can you explain how does the revised Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 2008 affect the 
job function of an external auditor? 
 4.  In your opinion, does an external auditor rely upon IAF activities? 
5.  To what extend an external auditor can rely on the IAF activities? 
 
 
Section C: Politically Connected (PCON) Firms and Non-Politically Connected (NPCON) Firms 
1. PCON firms are perceived to have poor corporate governance and riskier than non-PCON firms? 
2. In your opinion, do the enhanced CG on AC and IAF attribute affecting PCON the most? 
3. In your opinion do PCON firms complying with the BMLR 2008 even before it became mandatory by Bursa 
Malaysia? 
 
 
Section D:  High Regulated Firms (HRFs) and Less Regulated Firms (LRFs) 
 
1. In your opinion, do you think that high regulated firms in Malaysia are more govern compared to less 
regulated firms? 
2. H igh regulated firms are being charged with higher or lower audit fees compared to less 
regulated firms? 
3.  How do you perceived the role of an additional specific-industry regulator? 
 
Section E: Audit Fees 
 
1. In your opinion, do the enhanced in CG (AC and IAF) have any impact on audit fees? 
2. In your opinion is the audit fee charged by external auditors is appropriate? 
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APPENDIX D 
 Descriptive statistics for the years 2005 to 2009   
                
 Year 2005 Year 2006 Year 2007 Year 2008 Year 2009 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
LAF 11.787 11.676 11.888 11.744 11.982 11.846 12.028 11.925 12.160 12.025 
AF 288128.400 754862.261 306756.80 126000.000 339398.840 142000.000 340284.140 153000.000 443792.420 167000.000 
 LTA 13.2389 13.076 13.271 13.065 13.348 13.118 13.385 13.110 13.427 13.126 
TA 2225159.430 484252.000 2806703.61 473147.000 2704357.850 511063.000 2814154.810 498855.000 2916607.400 505049.000 
 LNAFº 2.483 9.105 3.087 9.210 4.155 9.392 4.227 9.488 4.427 9.680 
NAF 143590.810 9000.000 176032.87 10000.000 140873.260 12000.000 221612.560 13200.000 166356.840 16000.000 
SUB 20.140 12.000 20.420 12.000 21.580 12.000 22.350 13.000 23.120 13.000 
 FOREIGN 1.940 0.000 2.040 0.000 2.260 0.000 2.370 0.000 2.390 0.000 
SEG 3.090 3.000 3.090 3.000 3.090 3.000 3.090 3.000 3.100 3.000 
ZFC -3.002 -3.076 -3.041 -3.094 -3.106 -3.098 -3.032 -3.049 -3.101 -3.069 
ROA 0.053 0.054 0.056 0.061 0.068 0.071 0.058 0.063 0.051 0.056 
LEV 0.277 0.242 0.267 0.249 0.261 0.248 0.274 0.253 0.262 0.2403 
LOSS 0.220 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.220 0.000 0.160 0.000 
AQ 0.690 1.00 0.700 1.000 0.690 1.000 0.690 1.000 0.670 1.000 
PCON 0.350 0.000 0.305 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.350 0.000 
INST&MGRL 0.280 0.000 0.280 0.000 0.280 0.000 0.290 0.000 0.290 0.000 
FAMILY 0.360 0.000 0.360 0.000 0.360 0.000 0.360 0.000 0.360 0.000 
IND 0.786 0.750 0.793 0.750 0.877 0.750 0.954 1.000 0.988 1.000 
DIL 5.020 5.000 5.040 5.000 5.070 5.000 5.240 5.000 5.130 5.000 
EXP 1.360 1.000 1.370 1.000 1.390 1.000 1.420 1.000 1.410 1.000 
OBJ 0.650 1.000 0.680 1.000 0.840 1.000 0.930 1.000 0.960 1.000 
WP 9.610 10.000 9.890 10.000 10.630 11.000 11.450 12.000 12.070 12.000 
*p < 0.05; © Chi-square tests for dichotomous variables; t-tests for other variables   ºObservations having a zero for LNAF are re-coded to a small positive value (0.00001) to enable a logarithmic transformation. *not necessary 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non-audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural logarithm of non-audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for 
financial crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm has made loss in any of the years, „0‟ if otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to „1‟ if the firm hires Big4 auditor and „0‟ if otherwise; INST&MGRL is an indicator variable „1‟, with reference to PCON and „0‟ 
otherwise; FAMILY is an indicator variable „1‟, with reference to PCON and „0‟ otherwise; IND is the proportion of independent non-executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of audit committee with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, „1‟ if the internal audit function 
reports to audit committee, and „0‟ if otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
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APPENDIX E 
Mann Whitney U Test results for High Regulated Firms and Less Regulated Firms for sample firms  
(2005 – 2009, n = 1045) 
 High Regulated Firms 
(n=20) 
Less Regulated Firms 
(n=189) 
 
Variable Mean  SD Mean SD z-statistic 
LAF 12.988 1.217 11.974 0.990 -8.010* 
AF 903547.370 1298763.043 289307.820 482894.925 -8.010* 
 LTA 15.934 1.902 13.353 1.513 -10.986* 
TA 35233228.080 50925734.307 2590325.060 7852211.850 -10.986* 
 LNAFº 8.434 7.904 4.311 9.368 -6.243* 
NAF 411696.970 910871.080 146334.320 543279.994 -6.243* 
SUB 21.490 21.723 21.520 32.183 -0.170 
 FOREIGN 1.750 3.242 2.200 9.146 -1.483 
SEG 4.550 1.507 3.090 1.593 -8.113* 
ZFC -2.965 0.945 -3.056 0.868 -0.347 
ROA 0.024 0.038 0.057 0.062 -7.426* 
LEV 0.347 0.300 0.268 0.164 -0.570 
LOSS 0.120 0.327 0.190 0.389 0.130 
AQ 0.900 0.302 0.690 0.463 0.000* 
IND 0.967 0.093 0.880 0.160 -5.179* 
DIL 7.030 3.971 5.100 1.608 -4.832* 
EXP 1.450 0.626 1.390 0.618 -0.883 
OBJ 0.950 0.219 0.810 0.390 0.000* 
WP 12.450 1.940 10.730 2.749 -6.141* 
* P < 0.05 
Notes:  AF is audit fees while LAF is natural logarithm of audit fees; TA is total assets (in RM) while LTA is natural logarithm of total assets; NAF is non audit fees (in RM) while LNAF is natural 
logarithm of non audit fees; SUB is number of subsidiaries; FOREIGN is the number of foreign subsidiaries; SEG is the number of business segments; ZFC is the Zmijewski score for financial 
crisis; ROA is net profit before tax over total assets; LEV is the proportion of total liability over total assets; LOSS is an indicator variable equals to 1 if the company has made loss in any of the 
years, 0 otherwise; AQ an indicator variable equals to 1 if the company hire Big4 auditor and 0 otherwise; REG an indicator variable, 1 for  regulated, and 0 otherwise; IND is the proportion of non 
executive directors to audit committee; DIL is the number of meetings; EXP is the number of AC with accounting or finance qualification; OBJ is an indicator variable, 1 if the internal audit 
function reports to audit committee, and 0 otherwise; WP is the voluntary disclosure on IAF under Para 43 of SIC. 
